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1. Introduction 
 
Walter Faber is a successful scientist. Logic and statistical reasoning determine his 
thinking. “I’m a technologist and accustomed to seeing things as they are”, is his credo. He 
seems to be afraid of nothing in the world. When a viper bites his daughter Sabeth, he accepts 
this fact with irritating calmness. “Did you know,” he asks Sabeth’s mother Hanna, “that the 
mortality from snake bites is only three to ten percent?” Hanna, on the other hand, reacts with 
anger and incomprehension: “You and your statistics! If I had a hundred daughters, and all of 
them had been bitten by a viper, there would be some sense in it. […] I’ve only got one 
child.”  
What is so irritating about Walter Faber? What makes his reaction so inappropriate? It 
is probably the fact that Faber, fictitious person and protagonist of Max Frisch’s novel Homo 
Faber (1957), seems to lack a central humane quality: feeling. His exaggerated character of a 
technologist stands in sharp contrast to Hanna, who seems to react more naturally—and more 
humanlike. For her, there is no reassurance in the fact that the mortality rate from a snake bite 
is quite small. It is the possibility rather than the probability that her daughter might die that 
brings her to the verge of despair. This example highlights that human perception—and risk 
perception in particular—is determined not only by probability and statistics but also by our 
fears, worries, and pleasures. There is probably no event or object that we encounter in 
everyday life toward which we do not experience some immediate feeling—be it a viper, an 
airplane, or a mobile phone.  
 Feelings usually occur rapidly, and they can help us to differentiate important from 
less important information (Damasio, 1994). Feelings can serve as a necessary and fast 
shortcut to decisions when things are unexpected or unknown (Finucane, Peters, & Slovic, 
2003). They can help us to anticipate how we will like the consequences of our actions. And 
feelings can be a powerful behavior motivator. However, they can also conflict with the 
knowledge we have gained about certain facts. And feelings can be misleading when the 
consequences of our actions turn out to be different from what we anticipated (Slovic, 
Finucane, Peters, & MacGregor, 2002).  
The general aim of this work is to examine how feelings influence risk and benefit 
perceptions, building on various psychological theories that emphasize the importance of 
feelings in human perception and behavior. Before commencing with this objective, it is 
essential to define some terms that will emerge consistently throughout the work. The term 
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feeling is very prominent in everyday speech and denotes a conscious subjective experience 
of moods and emotions (Russell, 2003). In psychological research, the term feeling includes 
affective feelings, such as anger and fear, and non-affective feelings, such as being tired or 
bored (Clore et al., 2001; Werth & Mayer, 2008). Affect simply refers to valence, that is, the 
positive or negative aspect of things (Clore, Schwarz, & Conway, 1994; Clore et al., 2001). 
Furthermore, affect is often used as a broad and inclusive label to refer to emotions and 
moods (Forgas, 1992; Werth & Mayer, 2008). Emotions, on the one hand, are high in 
intensity and short-lived, and they are usually associated with a stimulus object. Moods, on 
the other hand, are understood as relatively low in intensity, diffuse, and relatively enduring 
and are not usually associated with a stimulus object (Forgas, 1992). 
In this work, the role of affect in risk perception will be primarily examined in the 
context of risks associated with non-ionizing radiation, in particular with mobile 
communication. Studying the public perception of mobile communication might be 
challenging for various reasons. First, mobile communication is a relatively new technology. 
Many people (including experts) are uncertain about its impact on individuals. Little is known 
about the long-term health effects of the radiation produced by mobile communication. 
Furthermore, it has been shown that people often fear mobile phone base stations more than 
their mobile phones, although the actual exposure to radiation can be much higher from 
mobile phones (e.g., Hutter, Moshammer, Wallner, & Kundi, 2004). It has also been observed 
that precautionary policies intended to reassure the public (e.g., tightening the exposure limits 
of base stations by a factor of 10) can lead to an increase rather than a decrease in laypeople’s 
concerns about mobile communication (Wiedemann & Schütz, 2005). Moreover, because 
people can neither see nor smell non-ionizing radiation, mobile communication risks are also 
characterized by a feeling of loss of control. This situation is probably exacerbated by the fact 
that citizens rarely have the possibility to take part in the decision process about the location 
of a mobile phone base station, which, in turn, may lead to anger or frustration. Existing 
literature on risk perception has indicated that affect may serve as a cue for many important 
judgments, especially when things are complex or ambiguous (cf. Slovic, Finucane, Peters, & 
MacGregor, 2004). Hence, because of the uncertain, unknown, and uncontrollable 
characteristics of non-ionizing radiation risks, mobile communication seems to be an 
appropriate and interesting field in which to study affective influences on risk perception.  
In the beginning of the introductory section, important technological information 
about mobile communication will be given that will be the basis for understanding subsequent 
sections. Information will be provided about electromagnetic fields in general, and about how 
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mobile phones and mobile phone base stations work and interact. Special focus will be placed 
on scientific studies that have evaluated the possibility of adverse health effects of mobile 
communication. In a second step, central theories of risk perception will be presented. How 
these theories evolved and why and how they apply to the given context will be explained. 
Because theories that attach prime importance to affect in risk perception are of particular 
interest for this work, a subsequent section will deal with these theories in more detail. In a 
subsequent part of the introduction, studies that have examined perception of non-ionizing 
radiation and mobile communication will be discussed. Based on this discussion, research 
gaps will be identified. The last part of the introduction provides an overview of the following 
chapters and the central research questions of this work. 
 
2. Electromagnetic Fields – A Hazard for Human Health? 
2.1. Electromagnetic Fields in the Environment 
 
Electromagnetic fields (EMFs) are omnipresent in the environment. The magnetic 
field of the Earth, for example, is a natural source of EMF. In addition to natural sources, 
there are various human-made EMFs in our environment. They are generated either 
intentionally or as by-products of the use of electrical devices and systems (International 
Commission on Non-Ionizing Radiation Protection [ICNIRP], 2009). X-rays, electric and 
magnetic fields from high-voltage power lines, and micro- and radiowaves are examples of 
artificially generated EMFs. EMFs are characterized by their frequency or their corresponding 
wavelength. The frequency denotes the number of oscillations or cycles per second. The 
wavelength describes the distance between one wave and the next (World Health 
Organization [WHO], 2009). Some electromagnetic waves of higher frequency carry so much 
energy that they are able to detach electrons from atoms or molecules; thus, the waves create 
ions. This ionizing radiation includes, for instance, x-rays or nuclear power plant fuel. Most 
of the human-made sources of EMFs, however, are non-ionizing fields or non-ionizing 
radiation; they are characterized by a relatively long wavelength and low frequency. Figure 
1.1. illustrates the electromagnetic spectrum, which is typically divided into non-ionizing and 
ionizing radiation.  
The part of the electromagnetic spectrum that refers to non-ionizing radiation is 
divided into low- and highfrequency fields, infrared radiation, visible light, and ultraviolet 
radiation (Bundesamt für Umwelt, Wald und Landschaft [BUWAL], 2005). 
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Lowfrequency fields are produced by electric and magnetic fields from railway 
contact lines, high voltage power lines, and home appliances. Power lines, for example, have 
a frequency of 50 Hz, or 50 oscillations per second (BUWAL, 2005). High-frequency fields 
are defined as fields with a frequency above 100 kHz (Bundesamt für Gesundheit [BAG], 
2000). Because this part of the spectrum is used for radio and television broadcasting, it is 
also called radio frequency (RF; ICNIRP, 2009). Radar or medical devices such as magnetic 
resonance imaging are additional examples of RF fields. Frequencies beyond 300 GHz belong 
to infrared radiation.  
 
2.2. Mobile Communication  
 
Mobile communication is also part of the RF spectrum. The mobile phone and the 
base station act as an antenna and as a sender. When a phone call is made, the mobile phone 
converts the voice into electronic signals, which are sent to the base station. When the phone 
is in ready or standby mode, the phone receives control signals from the nearest base station 
and updates the network every 20 to 60 minutes about the phone’s location (BUWAL, 2005).  
The transmission power of mobile phones is considerably lower than the power of 
mobile phone base stations. However, the exposure from mobile phones can be much higher, 
Figure 1.1. The electromagnetic spectrum. Data source: BAG (2000). 
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because mobile phones operate close to the phoning person, while people rarely find 
themselves within close range of a mobile phone base station (BUWAL, 2005; Röösli & 
Rapp, 2003). Furthermore, in contrast to base stations, the exposure from mobile phones is 
concentrated on the head. Especially when a phone call is established, the radiation emitted 
by the mobile phone increases. This is also true when a person is traveling while phoning: the 
mobile phone always connects to the nearest base station, and radiates with full power for a 
short duration again when a new base station is found (Röösli & Rapp, 2003). Exposure from 
a mobile phone also increases when the phoning person is inside a building, because walls 
and roofs attenuate radiation. In addition, radiation decreases with the inverse square of the 
distance from the source (cf. Cousin & Siegrist, 2010b). When a phoning person is far away 
from the next mobile phone base station, the mobile phone therefore has to increase its output 
power to ensure network coverage.  
 
2.3. Studies on Adverse Health Effects 
 
The ongoing growth of mobile communication and other technologies (Hilty, Som, & 
Kohler, 2004) also gives rise to public concerns about potential health effects regarding non-
ionizing radiation. At the same time, the number of studies investigating causal relations 
between RF exposure and adverse health effects on humans is constantly growing. As noted 
by Ahlbom and colleagues (Ahlbom et al., 2009), the literature on this topic has more than 
doubled within the last 5 years. Therefore, reviews that evaluate, summarize, and interpret 
these studies have become more and more important.  
The European Commission's independent Scientific Committee on Newly Identified 
and Emerging Health Risks (SCENIHR) collected and assessed epidemiological, animal, and 
in vitro studies for their latest report on Health Effects of Exposure to EMF (SCENIHR, 
2009). They note that most reviewed studies are concerned with the question whether RF field 
exposure leads to an increase in cancer. SCENIHR concluded that exposure to RF fields is 
unlikely to lead to carcinogenesis. However, they stated that further studies are necessary to 
identify whether persons who have used mobile phones for more than 10 years have an 
increased cancer risk. According to the SCENIHR, there is some evidence that RF fields can 
influence EEG patterns and sleep in humans, although the mechanisms that may explain 
possible effects on sleep and EEG are largely unknown.    
The latest review of the International Commission for Non-Ionizing Radiation 
Protection summarized epidemiologic evidence on mobile phone use and risk of brain and 
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other tumors (ICNIRP, 2009). They conclude: “In our opinion, overall the studies published 
to date do not demonstrate a raised risk within approximately 10 years of use for any tumor of 
the brain or any other head tumor” (p. 357). In this review, the authors pay attention to 
methodological problems, such as selective nonresponse, inaccuracy and bias in recall of 
phone use, and exposure misclassification. For example, a self-report of the preferred side of 
mobile phone use might be prone to reporting bias: If people believe that mobile phone use 
may have caused their tumor and are retrospectively asked about their preferred side, they 
might over-report mobile phone use on the tumor side. As in the report of SCENIHR, it is 
noted that there are only limited data on long long-term use of mobile phones.  
According to the WHO, none of the recent scientific reviews has concluded that 
exposure to mobile phones’ or mobile phone base stations’ radiofrequency fields causes 
adverse health consequences (WHO, 2000). Regarding cancer, the WHO concludes that the 
epidemiologic evidence indicates that exposure to RF fields is unlikely to induce or promote 
cancers. Concerning other effects such as changes in brain activity, reaction times, and sleep, 
the WHO notes that these effects are small and have no apparent health significance. 
However, the WHO notes that various studies have demonstrated that the use of a mobile 
phone when driving increases the risk of traffic accidents. In sum, the reports acknowledge 
the lack of long-term research, which is needed to assess health consequences of mobile 
phone use that exceeds 10 years. But according to WHO, SCENIHR, and ICNIRP, it is 
unlikely that RF constitutes a severe risk to human health within 10 years of use.  
However, the public perception of risks can sometimes diverge from the experts’ 
opinion on the same risk. The next section deals with the question why experts and laypeople 
often disagree when it comes to perceived levels of risk.  
 
3. Determinants of Risk Perception 
3.1. The Psychometric Paradigm 
 
From a technological point of view, risk is a multiplication of two factors: magnitude 
of harm times probability (Sandman, 1993). Most people, however, do not rely on this formal 
definition of risk; they rather use intuitive risk judgments called risk perceptions (Slovic, 
1987). Early studies on risk perception were aimed at developing a taxonomy for hazards that 
may help to understand why people perceive different risks differently and that might help to 
predict responses to risks. More precisely, these studies were aimed at explaining why some 
hazards were rejected or dreaded while others risks are perceived with indifference, and why 
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public reactions and opinions of risks sometimes diverge from the experts’ point of view. The 
psychometric paradigm is presumably the most common and influential approach in order to 
develop this taxonomy. Launched by Fischhoff and colleagues in 1978 (Fischhoff, Slovic, 
Lichtenstein, Read, & Combs, 1978), this methodology is based on various explanatory rating 
scales such as the voluntariness of the risk, the immediacy of effect, or the severity of 
consequences (see Table 1.1. for a complete list of the scales used by Fischhoff et al., 1978).  
 
Table 1.1. Rating Scales Used in the Psychometric Paradigm 
Scale Wording and Label 
1. Voluntariness of risk Do people get into these risky situations voluntarily?  
(1 = voluntary; 7 = involuntary) 
2. Immediacy of effect To what extent is the risk of death immediate—or is death 
likely to occur at some later time?  
(1 = immediate; 7 = delayed ) 
3. Risk known to exposed To what extent are the risks known precisely by the persons 
who are exposed to those risks?   
(1 = known precisely; 7 = not known) 
4. Risk known to science To what extent are the risks known to science?  
(1 = known precisely; 7 = not known) 
5. Control over risk If you are exposed to the risk of each activity or technology, 
to what extent can you, by personal skill or diligence, avoid 
death while engaging in the activity?  
(1 = uncontrollable; 7 = controllable) 
6. Newness Are these risks new, novel ones or old, familiar ones?   
(1 = new; 7 = old)  
7. Chronic-catastrophic Is this a risk that kills people one at a time (chronic risk) or a 
risk that kills large numbers of people at once (catastrophic 
risk)? 
(1 = chronic; 7 = catastrophic)  
8. Common-dread Is this a risk that people have learned to live with and can 
think about reasonably calmly, or is it one that people have 
great dread for—on the level of a gut reaction?  
(1 = common; 7 = dread) 
9. Severity of 
consequences 
When the risk from the activity is realized in the form of a 
mishap or illness, how likely is it that the consequence will be 
fatal?  
(1 = certain not to be fatal; 7 = certain to be fatal) 
Source: Fischhoff et al., 1978.  
 
In the psychometric paradigm, participants are asked to rate a number of activities 
(e.g., swimming, hunting, skiing) and technologies (e.g., nuclear power, home appliances, 
power mowers) on each of the rating scales. Many of these scales are correlated with each 
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other: Risks that are uncontrollable are often also perceived as involuntary, and risks that are 
unknown to science are often new risks. These intercorrelations were analyzed using principal 
component analysis, which indicated that basically two higher-order factors explain the 
perception of the risks. The first principal component was labeled dread risk. The dread, 
catastrophic potential, and fatal consequences rating scales were highly correlated with this 
principal component. The second component was labeled unknown risk. It correlates with 
unknown, newness, and delayed consequences. This two-dimensional solution (the cognitive 
map) was replicated in most studies (Siegrist, Keller, & Kiers, 2005).  
Undoubtedly, the psychometric paradigm represents a landmark for research on public 
risk perception (Bronfman & Cifuentes, 2003). However, the paradigm was also criticized for 
neglecting individual differences in risk perception (Siegrist, Keller et al., 2005; Siegrist, 
Keller, & Kiers, 2006). It cannot explain why different people perceive the same risk 
differently, because in studies using the psychometric paradigm, averages are taken across all 
participants. Recent studies have shown that there are substantial individual differences in risk 
perception. A study designed to explain differences in the perception of food hazards, for 
example, indicated that individual differences in the cognitive representation of food hazards 
were correlated with attitudes toward natural foods (Siegrist, Keller, & Kiers, 2006). Little is 
known about other factors that might account for individual differences in risk perception, 
and more research is needed to identify these factors. 
 
3.2. Public Outrage  
 
The psychometric paradigm was a starting point for other models that tried to explain 
why public perception of risks often diverges from a formal risk assessment. Peter Sandman 
(1987, 1993) based his theory of public outrage on the scales suggested by the psychometric 
paradigm. Sandman proposed 12 so-called outrage factors, which were derived from the 
psychometric model (see Table 1.2. for an overview of the 12 outrage factors). A main 
difference from the psychometric paradigm is that these outrage factors also take emotional 
factors into account, such as trust and fairness, in contrast to the psychometric paradigm, 
which focuses on cognitive factors (Slovic et al., 2004). 
According to Sandman’s theory, risk is a function of hazard and outrage (Sandman, 
1993). Hazard refers to the technical aspect of risk; it is the product of risk magnitude and 
probability. Outrage, on the other hand, refers to the nontechnical aspects of risks; it refers to 
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everything that people are worried about. Outrage “suggests strong emotion but also suggests 
that the emotion is justified” (Sandman, 1993, p. 7).  
 
Table 1.2. Outrage Factors Proposed by Sandman (1993) 
Low Outrage High Outrage  
 Voluntary  Coerced  
 Natural  Industrial  
 Familiar  Exotic 
 Not memorable  Memorable  
 Not dreaded  Dreaded  
 Chronic  Catastrophic  
 Knowable  Unknowable  
 Individually controlled  Controlled by others  
 Fair  Unfair  
 Morally irrelevant  Morally relevant  
Trustworthy sources  Untrustworthy sources  
 Responsive process  Unresponsive process  
Source: Sandman, 1993.  
 
These outrage factors give important information about why people sometimes act 
apathetic in face of a serious hazard, or, in contrast, why they seem to be excessively alarmed 
about a certain risk. Voluntariness, for instance, is an important factor that determines 
outrage: if a behavior is voluntary, such as smoking, it is more acceptable than if it is coerced, 
such as second-hand smoking. Another outrage factor is the distinction between natural and 
industrial. People usually underestimate natural risks, such as the probability of being 
poisoned by spoilt food, and overestimate risks from industrial products such as food 
additives. Fairness is another important variable for public outrage: when people believe they 
have to bear more costs or fewer benefits than others, it will lead to high outrage. Likewise, 
outrage is high when a source is untrustworthy, for example, when citizens find out that a 
company or an agency has understated a risk. Thus, the outrage model has strong implications 
for risk communication, because policymakers need to address these outrage factors when 
informing the public. 
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3.3. The Social Amplification of Risk Framework  
 
Other prominent approaches to risk perception and communication have adopted an 
anthropological framework (Cultural theory; cf. Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982) or a social 
constructionism approach that considers risk as social construct (cf. Glendon, Clarke, & 
McKenna, 2006). A theory that combines various approaches is the social amplification of 
risk framework (cf. Kasperson et al., 1988; Renn, Burns, Kasperson, Kasperson, & Slovic, 
1992). It is an integrative framework based on the idea that hazards interact with 
psychological, social, institutional, and cultural processes in ways that may amplify public 
perceptions and responses to risks (Kasperson et al., 1988; Renn et al., 1992). Amplifying in 
this sense means intensifying and attenuating risk signals.  
Risks and risk events, which include routine or unexpected releases, accidents, 
discoveries of pollution incidents, reports of exposure, or adverse consequences, are 
considered signals in this framework. These signals are processed and interpreted by social 
groups and individuals, which act as amplification stations. News media, risk-management 
institutions, public agencies as well as the scientists who conduct and communicate the 
technical assessment can serve as amplification stations. They pass these interpretations on to 
other groups and individuals, who also engage in amplification and attenuating processes. 
This social amplification of risk will then lead to risk-related behavioral responses, which will 
result in secondary and subsequent impacts (i.e., ripple effects). Such second- and higher-
order impacts include enduring mental perception, repercussions on other technologies, or 
political and social pressure, and they might trigger or hinder forces for risk reduction. 
The social amplification of risk framework is a comprehensive theory that describes 
the dynamic social processes underlying risk perceptions (Pidgeon, Kasperson, & Slovic, 
2003). In this approach, risk events are always real, because they are not only an objective 
threat but also a product of culture and social experience. An example of a social 
amplification effect is the H5N1 virus, also known as bird flu. Experts assessed the risks of a 
pandemic human influenza strain as relatively small (Ferguson, Fraser, Donnelly, Ghani, & 
Anderson, 2004). While regular seasonal influenza usually kills hundreds of thousands of 
people per year, the total number of deaths due to H5N1 was 141 in 2006 (WHO, 2006). Yet 
several amplification stations such as the news media exerted a strong influence on public 
perception. These ripple effects manifested themselves not only in the public fear of a new 
pandemic that could kill millions of citizens but also in economic consequences, e.g., a 
significant loss of poultry sales in Greece and Italy (Bio Economic Research Associates, 
2006).  
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Despite the integrative and comprehensive approach, the social amplification of risk 
framework has also come under criticism because little attention has been paid to the specific 
mechanisms that might explain the social forces described in the theory. Sunstein (2002) 
complemented the framework by suggesting that reputational and informational influences, as 
well as group polarization, might explain why people come to fear or underestimate certain 
hazards. Furthermore, the social amplification of risk framework was also criticized for the 
lack of predictive power necessary to increase the understanding of the dynamics of risk 
impacts and how they can be altered by risk communication (Pidgeon et al., 2003). 
 
4. The Role of Affect in Risk Perception 
4.1. Risks as Feelings 
 
Although affective evaluations of risks were acknowledged by some early researchers 
on risk perception (e.g., Sandman, 1987, 1993), cognitive evaluations are often more central 
to risk perception theories. Affective evaluations, however, often occur more rapidly 
(LeDoux, 1996; Zajonc, 1980) and may influence cognitive assessments of risk and benefit 
more directly than cognitive evaluations. A model that acknowledges the role of affect 
experienced at the moment of decision making is the risk as feelings hypothesis proposed by 
Loewenstein and colleagues (Loewenstein & Lerner, 2003; Loewenstein, Weber, Hsee, & 
Welch, 2001). The authors criticized that virtually all theories of choice under risk and 
uncertainty are cognitive and consequentialist. The consequentialist perspective assumes that 
an individual makes decisions based on an assessment of the consequences of possible choice 
alternatives and chooses those alternatives that maximize the utility of their consequences. 
Furthermore, according to the consequentialist perspective, feelings are only of minor 
importance. They are not seen as integral to the decision process; rather, feelings are 
considered an epiphenomenon. Advocates of the risk as feelings hypothesis, in contrast, argue 
that emotional reactions often drive behavior, and that emotional reactions to risky situations 
often diverge from cognitive assessments of those risks. Central to the risk as feelings model 
is the distinction between anticipated and anticipatory affect (Albarracín, Johnson, & Zanna, 
2005). Anticipated affect consists of predictions about the emotional consequences of 
decision outcomes. Anticipatory affect, in contrast, refers to the feelings experienced during 
decision making. The risk as feelings model deals with anticipatory affect and postulates that 
responses to risky situations result in part from direct affective influences, including emotions 
such as worry, fear, dread, or anxiety. It is assumed that feelings are sensitive to certain 
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determinants that are not important for cognitive evaluations of risk, such as the vividness 
with which consequences can be imagined, personal exposure to or experience with 
outcomes, and past history of conditioning. For example, people who looked at photographs 
depicting houses in a flooded region perceived greater risk from flooding than participants 
who looked at neutral photographs (Keller, Siegrist, & Gutscher, 2006) because the vividness 
of the flood consequences likely evoked specific negative emotions such as fear and worry. 
According to the risk as feelings model, behavior is determined by the interplay between 
emotional and cognitive processes. These processes often diverge and have a reciprocal 
influence on each other. 
The risk as feelings hypothesis builds in part on the affect as information approach 
(Schwarz & Clore, 1988), the somatic marker hypothesis (Damasio, 1994), and the affect 
heuristic (Alhakami & Slovic, 1994; Finucane, Alhakami, Slovic, & Johnson, 2000; Slovic et 
al., 2002, 2004). But while these theories focus mainly on the complementary role of 
cognitive and affective evaluations, the risk as feelings hypothesis assumes that emotions also 
often produce behavioral responses that depart from what individuals view as the best course 
of action (Loewenstein et al., 2001).  
 
4.2. The Affect Heuristic 
 
According to the affect heuristic (Alhakami & Slovic, 1994; Finucane et al., 2000; 
Slovic et al., 2002, 2004), the perception and integration of affective feelings enable us to be 
rational actors in many important situations. In this sense, affect can serve as a source of 
information in its own right. It is assumed that individuals use affect as a shortcut within 
decision making because this is more efficient and easier than weighing all available pros and 
cons of different options—especially when decisions are complex or mental resources are 
limited (Slovic et al., 2002). 
 Influenced by dual process models proposed by Epstein (1994), Sloman (1996), and 
others, the affect heuristic framework distinguishes two modes of thinking: the analytical 
system and the experiential system. The analytical system uses algorithms and normative 
rules, formal logic, and evidence. This system is relatively slow and effortful, and requires 
conscious control. The experiential system is intuitive, fast, mostly automatic, and not very 
accessible to conscious awareness. This system relies on images, metaphors, and narratives, 
and it is linked by experience to affect. According to this, all of the images in people’s minds 
are tagged or marked to varying degrees with affect. It is assumed that an affect pool contains 
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these positive and negative markers associated with the images, and the markers differ in 
regard to their intensity. Rational decision making requires integration of the experiential 
system and the analytical system, because both have advantages, disadvantages, and 
limitations. Table 1.3. contrasts the analytical system with the experiential system.  
 
Table 1.3. The Experiential System and the Analytic System 
Experiential System Analytic System 
1. Holistic  1. Analytic 
2. Affective: pleasure-pain oriented  2. Logical: reason oriented (what is sensible) 
3. Associationistic connections  3. Logical connections  
4. Behavior mediated by “vibes” from past 
experiences 
4. Behavior mediated by conscious appraisal of 
events 
5. Encodes reality in concrete images,  
metaphors, and narratives 
5. Encodes reality in abstract symbols, words, 
and numbers  
6. More rapid processing: oriented toward 
immediate action  
6. Slower processing: oriented toward delayed 
Action 
7. Self-evidently valid: “experiencing is 
believing” 
7. Requires justification via logic and evidence 
Source: Slovic et al. (2004). 
 
Research on the affect heuristic has focused on the role of affect in explaining why 
risks and benefits are inversely related for many people: the greater the perceived benefit, the 
lower the perceived risk, and vice versa. From an objective point of view, however, risks and 
benefits tend to be (if at all) positively correlated (Slovic, et al., 2002). Alhakami and Slovic 
(1994) demonstrated that the perceived inverse correlation between risk and benefit is 
connected to the strength of affect. If people generally like an activity or a technology, they 
tend to judge the risks as low and the benefits as high. If they dislike it, risks are judged as 
high and benefits as low (Finucane et al., 2000). The inverse relationship between risk and 
benefit increases when people make judgments under time pressure (Finucane et al., 2000). 
Time pressure might reduce the opportunity for analytic deliberation, allowing affective 
reactions to exert a dominating influence on judgments (Slovic, et al., 2002).  
In the affect heuristic framework, affect serves as important information for judgments 
and decision options that are unfamiliar to the decision maker. In addition to acting as a 
conveyor for information, three other functions of affect were suggested by Peters, Lipkus, 
and Diefenbach (2006). Affect further may serve as an attentional spotlight, as a motivator of 
behavior, and as a common currency for evaluating different options. Affect as spotlight 
directs attention toward new information, and subsequently, the new information is used to 
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guide the judgment decision. Affect as a motivator promotes information processing and 
behavioral tendencies. Affect as a common currency allows comparing the values of different 
decision options or information rather than attempting to make sense out of a multitude of 
conflicting logical reasons (Peters et al., 2006).  
Noteworthy, the affect heuristic framework uses a specific definition of affect. Affect 
is considered as goodness or badness experiences as a feeling state, demarcating a positive or 
negative quality of a specific stimulus. The definition of affect is differentiated from 
traditional conceptualizations of affect, which define affect as an umbrella term for moods 
and emotions. According to Finucane and colleagues (Finucane et al., 2003), affect is more 
subtle than emotion, and has—unlike moods—a direct motivational effect. This 
conceptualization of affect, however, involves some ambiguity. First, this definition of affect 
seems to encompass the definition of an attitude (Spence & Townsend, 2008). Second, it is 
rather unclear how to assess affect in this context. In a systematic study, Peters and Slovic 
(2007) examined this issue. They arrived at the conclusion that in addition to using a holistic 
bipolar valenced evaluation measure, further research with affect should include a holistic, 
unipolar, discrete emotion (HUE) evaluative measure. In other words, affect should be 
measured using terms that describe discrete emotions such as anger, fear, and happiness. This 
result calls into question whether affect can be seen as a construct that is independent from 
other concepts such as emotion or moods. Furthermore, the affect heuristic framework is 
relatively sparse on how affect evolves and how it can be changed (Spence & Townsend, 
2008). 
 
4.3. Concepts Related to Affect: Trust and Implicit Attitudes 
  
Existing literature in risk perception has identified two other concepts that are 
connected to affect: trust and implicit attitudes. The role of trust in risk perception will be 
addressed first; subsequently, the concept of implicit attitudes will be illustrated.  
Trust is the willingness to make oneself vulnerable to another because of expected 
beneficial outcomes (Earle, Siegrist, & Gutscher, 2007). The trust, confidence, and 
cooperation model (TCC Model) differentiates between trust and confidence. Both trust and 
confidence are crucial antecedents of people’s willingness to cooperate and to accept new 
technologies. Confidence is based on experience and evidence, and denotes the belief that 
certain future events will occur as expected. In contrast, trust is based on social relations, i.e., 
on shared values. Shared values are inferred from available morality-relevant information. It 
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has been suggested that social trust in responsible intuitions is an important factor influencing 
affect. Affect may in turn influence judgments of risks and benefits, which may lead to 
cooperation and acceptance (Siegrist, Earle, & Gutscher, 2007). Evidence for the assumed 
relation of trust and affect comes from a study on nanotechnology foods and food packaging 
conducted by Siegrist and colleagues (2007). They demonstrated that social trust in 
institutions producing nanotechnology foods was an important factor directly influencing the 
affect evoked by these new products, and the willingness to buy genetically modified foods. 
However, there is only little research about the direction of the relationship between trust and 
affect. Affective reactions toward an activity or technology could also shape trust; hence, trust 
could also be regarded as a specific form of affect (Visschers & Siegrist, 2008). More 
research is needed to clarify the direction of this relationship. 
Recently, affect has also been compared and contrasted with implicit attitudes (Spence 
& Townsend, 2008). Greenwald and Banaji (1995) defined implicit attitudes as 
“introspectively unidentified (or inaccurately identified) traces of past experience that mediate 
favorable or unfavorable feeling, thought, or action toward social objects” (Greenwald & 
Banaji, 1995, p. 8). Implicit attitudes manifest as actions or judgments that are under the 
control of automatically activated evaluation, and the Implicit Association Test (IAT; 
Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998) was designed to assess implicit attitudes.  
Spence and Townsend (2008) have pointed to the fact that affect as defined by the 
affect heuristic refers to an attitude, i.e., the goodness or badness of something. In addition, 
both the affect heuristic and implicit attitudes are measured in a spontaneous manner. The 
IAT uses reaction times to measure implicit attitudes; within the affect heuristic, affective 
influences on risk and benefit perception are stronger under time pressure (Finucane et al., 
2000). Furthermore, both constructs are linked to the experiential system described within 
dual process models. Consequently, it has been suggested that implicit attitudes are virtually 
equal to the affect pool described within the affect heuristic framework (Spence & Townsend, 
2008). The affect heuristic, in this sense, refers then to the active use of this content.  
 
5. Public Perception of Non-Ionizing Radiation 
5.1. Psychometric Studies and Public Surveys 
 
Since mobile communication is a rather new technology, mobile phones and mobile 
phone base stations were not included in early psychometric research. More recent studies, 
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however, have accounted for mobile communication. Siegrist et al. (2005) conducted a mail 
survey to examine individual differences in risk perception. In this study, participants rated 9 
attributes for 26 hazards. In addition to the finding that there were considerable differences 
among individuals in the cognitive representation of the hazards, it was shown that laypeople 
assess mobile phones as a new hazard with unobservable consequences. Bronfman and 
Cifuentes (2003) found that, compared to other risks, technological risks emerged as little 
known, especially genetic engineering and mobile phone base stations. Taken together, these 
studies suggest that the risks attached to mobile communication are perceived as little known 
and moderately dreadful. 
In addition to psychometric studies, several public surveys about mobile 
communication have been conducted. The European Commission regularly conducts a series 
of surveys across member states (Eurobarometer). In 2006, the European Commission carried 
out a special Eurobarometer on EMF, which involved face-to-face interviews with 
approximately 30,000 citizens in their homes. The survey found that, in Europe, 48% of the 
citizens are concerned about the potential health risks of EMF, and most people erroneously 
believe that the main source of EMF is mobile communication (European Commission, 
2007). Furthermore, many citizens feel that they are insufficiently informed on the existing 
protection framework relating to the potential health risks of EMFs. 
Data from a telephone survey conducted in the German- and French-speaking parts of 
Switzerland have shown that people who use their mobile phones frequently perceived lower 
risks and higher benefits than infrequent mobile phone users (Siegrist, Earle, Gutscher, & 
Keller, 2005). Furthermore, no correlation was found between the estimated distance from 
one’s home to the closest base station and the risks associated with a base station. Another 
study conducted in Switzerland compared health concerns about mobile phones and mobile 
phone base stations with health concerns about other environmental risks (Cousin & Siegrist, 
2008). The study revealed that mobile communication evokes fewer health concerns than air 
pollution and ultraviolet rays but evokes concerns similar to those about EMF generated by 
power transmission lines. In addition, Hutter and colleagues (2004) found that risks from 
mobile phone base stations were rated slightly higher compared to mobile phones, which was 
also confirmed by the Eurobarometer.  
 
 
 
General Introduction       
 
19
5.2. Mental Models Approach and Laypeople’s Knowledge Gaps  
 
Other researchers have applied the mental models approach to explore laypeople’s 
beliefs about mobile communication. The mental models approach builds on the idea that 
people develop an internal representation of some domain or situation and process new 
information in the context of their existing beliefs (Morgan, Fischhoff, Bostrom, & Atman, 
2002). The approach aims at identifying critical gaps and misconceptions in the cognitive 
understanding of risks in order to create risk communication messages for laypeople. Morgan 
and colleagues suggested the following systematic steps to achieve this goal: (1) create an 
expert model, (2) conduct mental models interviews, (3) conduct structured initial interviews, 
(4) draft risk communication, and (5) evaluate this communication (Morgan et al., 2002).  
Concentrating on the first two steps of the mental models approach, a study by Cousin 
and Siegrist (2010b) revealed that people from the general population and base station 
opponents often have knowledge gaps concerning the interaction patterns of mobile phones 
and base stations. For instance, participants were not aware that the distance from the base 
station has an influence on the level of EMF emitted by a mobile phone. They further 
misconceive regulation issues and scientific processes. The prevalence of the revealed 
misconceptions and knowledge gaps was quantified in a follow-up study (Cousin & Siegrist, 
2010a). The mail survey, conducted in the German-speaking part of Switzerland, revealed 
that questions about the interaction patterns of mobile phones and base stations were correctly 
answered by only 21% of the respondents. A related task in the questionnaire that used 
pictogram scenarios confirmed the result that only a few people were aware of the 
interdependency of mobile phones and base stations and the resulting radiation exposure. 
Furthermore, the survey showed that participants with knowledge gaps regarding interaction 
patterns also expressed unfavorable base station siting preferences, i.e., those that would 
cause more exposure for the phoning population. Laypeople’s knowledge also depended on 
demographic characteristics. Females, respondents older than 50 years, respondents with a 
low education level, and respondents without an EMF background had significantly less 
knowledge than males, respondents between 18 and 50 years old, respondents with a high 
education level, and respondents with a professional EMF background.  
A related experimental study investigated how voluntary precautionary 
recommendations for mobile phone usage influence people’s health concerns and behavior 
(Cousin & Siegrist, 2009). Precautionary recommendations enable users to avoid unneeded 
exposure. Different versions of a booklet about mobile communication were tested: Some 
included only technical information; others also contained precautionary recommendations. 
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Results of the experiment indicated that information per se and not precautionary 
recommendations influenced the public’s perception of mobile communication. After 
participants read the information, their health concerns regarding mobile phones increased 
and remained high even after two weeks. In contrast, health concerns in regard to mobile 
phone base stations decreased significantly after two weeks. The study also examined whether 
providing information resulted in behavioral changes. Results indicated that the specific 
precautionary recommendations were effective here: Less behavioral change was found in the 
group who received a booklet without recommendations. Among those respondents who 
indicated that they had adopted behavioral changes, most people stated that they had started to 
avoid holding the mobile phone close to their head when a connection is established.  
In sum, the studies that adopted the mental models approach have identified several 
knowledge gaps and misconceptions of laypeople. In addition, the studies revealed that 
information about mobile communication might lead to an increase in risk perception and 
health concerns, especially with regard to mobile phones. For informed decision making by 
laypeople, this result can be regarded as a positive shift in risk perception, because correct 
handling of the mobile phone is the most efficient way to reduce exposure from mobile 
communication radiation. 
 
6. Research Questions and Chapter Overview 
 
So far, research on public perception of mobile communication has primarily focused 
on cognitive factors. Results of the mental models approach, for example, have shown that 
people have little knowledge with regard to mobile communication. However, the literature 
on risk perception strongly suggests that affective variables play a critical role in the 
perception of risk, too. Trust, fairness, and other affective variables are central in the theory of 
public outrage (Sandman, 1987, 1993). Likewise, both the affect heuristic and the risk as 
feelings hypothesis attach prime importance to affect in risk perception (Loewenstein et al., 
2001; Slovic et al., 2002). Recently, it has been suggested that implicit attitudes closely 
resemble the affect pool that is central to the affect heuristic framework (Spence & 
Townsend, 2008). Little research, however, has measured affect using an implicit measure 
such as the IAT (Siegrist, Keller, & Cousin, 2006). In addition, the social amplification of risk 
framework suggests that risks and risk events are signals that are intensified or attenuated by 
amplification stations. Some seemingly minor risks or risk events often produce extraordinary 
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public concerns or vice versa. This effect might be accompanied or caused by group 
polarization (Sunstein, 2002). In this light, it seems reasonable to assume that different groups 
of people (such as experts, base station opponents, or laypeople) hold different affective 
reactions to mobile communication. By drawing on the these theories, the present work is 
dedicated to exploring the role of affect in the perception of mobile phones and their base 
stations in more detail.  
The first part of this work concentrates on different operationalizations of affect in the 
context of risk perception. More precisely, Chapter II presents the results of a single category 
variant of the IAT designed to measure global positive or negative reactions to mobile 
communication. These results are directly linked to findings from the psychometric paradigm. 
The specific affect-laden words and images that people have in mind when they think of 
mobile phone base stations will be investigated in Chapter III. The next chapter (Chapter IV) 
addresses specific emotions: fear and anger. How these specific emotions emerge will be 
analyzed and discussed, and how they influence risk/benefit judgments and acceptance of 
mobile phone base stations.  
Second, this work also explores how knowledge influence base station decisions. In 
Chapter V, participants are asked to find an appropriate site for a base station in a 
hypothetical village. Different attributes of the base station (for instance, the location) are 
considered during this task. The study addresses the question what kind of base station 
attributes are deemed most important by laypeople, and whether these preferences depend on 
variables such as trust, health beliefs, and knowledge. Little is known about such public 
preferences, although public authorities and risk communication facilitators would profit from 
these insights. Finally, in Chapter VI, the influence of knowledge on siting decisions (as well 
as on health concerns and explicitly stated affect) will be investigated experimentally. Table 
1.4. gives an overview of the respective chapters and the central research questions.  
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Table 1.4. Overview of the Research Questions and Methods 
 Chapters and Research Questions Method 
(I.) (Introduction)  
II. Implicit associations to mobile phones, mobile phone base 
stations, and other hazards 
• Are implicit associations connected to explicit affect? 
• Do experts, opponents, and laypeople differ in their 
implicit associations? 
• Is the dread dimension of the psychometric paradigm 
related to implicit associations? 
Single Category 
Implicit 
Association Test 
III.  Free associations to mobile phone base stations 
• Do experts, opponents, and laypeople differ in their free 
associations? 
• Regarding the general population, what are the first words 
or images that come to people’s minds?  
• Do people with a high risk perception differ from those 
with a low risk perception? 
Free Associations 
Technique 
IV. The influence of fear and anger on risk judgments and 
acceptance 
• How do specific emotions influence risk and benefit 
perceptions, and the acceptance of base stations? 
• What are the antecedents of fear and anger in a risk 
context? 
Structural 
Equation 
Modeling  
V. Public preferences for mobile phone base station sites 
• Which aspects of base station sites does the public regard 
as most important? 
• Are there specific segments of respondents who differ in 
their preferences?  
• Can these segments be characterized by other important 
variables such as trust and knowledge? 
Conjoint 
Measurement  
VI. Experimental manipulation of knowledge about mobile 
communication  
• Does the provision of knowledge lead to a change in siting 
decisions, public concerns, and explicitly stated affect? 
 Experiment  
(VII.) (General Discussion)  
 
Chapter II: Examining the Relationship between Affect and Implicit Associations: 
Implications for Risk Perception 
 
This chapter highlights the importance of affect in shaping attitudes and opinions 
toward risks. Two studies are presented that used a Single Category Implicit Association Test 
(SC-IAT) to measure associations evoked by different hazards.  Primarily, it was tested 
whether the SC-IAT corresponds to the theoretical construct of affect in a risk framework. 
Specifically, it was found that the SC-IATs correlated with other explicit measures that claim 
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to measure affect, as well as with a measure of trust, but not with a measure that captures a 
different construct. Furthermore, it was revealed that effects of a Mobile Phone SC-IAT and a 
Base Station SC-IATs were significantly different between matched samples of experts, base 
station opponents, and laypeople.  
The second study examined whether hazards that vary along the dread dimension of 
the psychometric paradigm also differ in the affect they evoke. The results of the SC-IAT 
indicated that a high-dread hazard (nuclear power) elicits negative associations. Moreover, the 
high-dread hazard evoked more negative associations than a medium-dread hazard 
(hydroelectric power). In contrast, a non-dread hazard (home appliances) led to positive 
associations. The results of the SC-IAT support the assumption that affect is strongly linked 
to the degree to which a hazard evokes feelings of dread. The findings further suggest that 
implicit measures may provide valuable insight into people’s risk perception above and 
beyond explicit measures. 
Chapter III: Mobile Communication in the Public Mind: Insights from Free Associations 
to Mobile Phone Base Stations 
 
The prior chapter demonstrated that experts, opponents, and laypeople differ in their 
automatic affective reactions to mobile communication. The SC-IAT, however, is designed to 
investigate global spontaneous evaluations and provides no insights into the specific words or 
images that experts or laypeople have in mind when they evaluate mobile communication. 
Such images might be best explored using a free association method, which captures the first 
words or images that come to a person’s mind in response to a certain cue. In a first study, 
considerable differences in free associations to mobile phone base stations between experts 
and base station opponents were found. The prevalence of free associations in a large random 
sample from the general population was explored via correspondence analysis in a second 
study. The results of these studies were in line with the affect heuristic that guides risk and 
benefit assessments. 
Chapter IV: Fear and Anger: An Emotion-Specific Approach to Risk Judgments 
 
Chapter IV examines how specific integral emotions influence decisions and 
judgments. More precisely, the study investigated how fear and anger determine risk and 
benefit perceptions and the acceptance of a technology. Using structural equation modeling, 
the study found that risk perception of mobile phone base stations was more strongly 
influenced by fear than by anger. On the other hand, benefit perceptions and the acceptance of 
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mobile phone base stations were primarily determined by anger. In addition, controllability 
and fairness emerged as important cognitive appraisals for these two emotions. In sum, our 
findings highlight how specific emotions, rather than global affect, shape decisions in a risk 
context. Furthermore, the study gives insights into how emotions toward a hazard develop 
and, thus, how they could be modified. 
Chapter V: Conjoint Measurement of Base Station Siting Preferences 
 
This chapter explores how affective (i.e., trust) and other variables such as health 
beliefs and knowledge influence base station siting decisions. A random sample of 503 
persons from the German-speaking part of Switzerland was interviewed face-to-face in their 
homes. Conjoint analysis was used to evaluate participants’ preferences for various attributes 
of base stations (appearance, location, building, decision process). The results show that 
location plays the most important role in participants’ acceptance of base stations. The 
findings also indicate that most people would prefer a covered or camouflaged base station to 
a freely visible one. A cluster analysis distinguished several segments, showing that base 
station siting preferences were not homogeneous. These segments differed in risk and benefit 
perceptions, and in knowledge, health beliefs, and trust.  
Chapter VI: The Impact of Specific Information Provision on Base Station Siting 
Preferences 
 
When it comes to the new siting of a mobile communication base station in one’s 
neighborhood, some people react with rejection because they fear health consequences from 
the emitted high-frequency radiation. Most people would prefer to site base stations outside 
residential areas, but from a public health perspective, this may result in even more radiation 
for the phoning population. Therefore, authorities are interested in improving the current base 
station siting processes. The question arises whether specific knowledge enhancement would 
influence base station siting preferences or whether affective or emotional components (due 
to the scientific uncertainties involved) would overrule the influence of such attempts. To 
answer this question, an experimental study with a convenience sample of Swiss citizens (N = 
228) was conducted. Participants were confronted with one of three texts: a neutral text 
(control group), an information booklet about mobile communication and an emotionally 
charged newspaper article that reported a conflict about the siting of a new base station. After 
reading the text, participants filled out a questionnaire about their perception of mobile 
communication and their base station siting preferences. Reading the information booklet 
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increased participants’ knowledge and led to perceptual changes of base stations and mobile 
phones. Importantly, participants reading the booklet were able to transfer their knowledge to 
a base station siting task and found locations that would emit less radiation for the phoning 
population. Implications and limitations of these results are discussed. 
Chapter VII: General Discussion  
 
Finally, the general discussion summarizes and integrates the main findings of this 
work. Furthermore, methodological issues and limitations will be discussed, and implications 
for research and practice will be derived. 
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Abstract 
 
It has been suggested that affect may play an important role in risk perception. Slovic et al. 
argued that people make use of the “affect heuristic” when assessing risks because it is easier 
and more efficient to rely on spontaneous affective reactions than to analyze all available 
information. In the present studies, a Single Category Implicit Association Test (SC-IAT) to 
measure associations evoked by different hazards was employed. In the first study, we tested 
the extent to which the SC-IAT corresponds to the theoretical construct of affect in a risk 
framework. Specifically, we found that the SC-IAT correlates with other explicit measures 
that claim to measure affect, as well as with a measure of trust, but not with a measure that 
captures a different construct (subjective knowledge). In the second study, we addressed the 
question of whether hazards that vary along the dread dimension of the psychometric 
paradigm also differ in the affect they evoke. The results of the SC-IAT indicated that a high-
dread hazard (nuclear power) elicits negative associations. Moreover, the high-dread hazard 
evoked more negative associations than a medium-dread hazard (hydroelectric power). In 
contrast, a non-dread hazard (home appliances) led to positive associations. The results of our 
study highlight the importance of affect in shaping attitudes and opinions toward risks. The 
results further suggest that implicit measures may provide valuable insight into people's risk 
perception above and beyond explicit measures.  
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1. Introduction  
 
The psychometric paradigm has been the most influential approach to the examination 
of risk perception and has been used in numerous studies (Fischhoff, Slovic, Lichtenstein, 
Read, & Combs, 1978; Slovic, 1987). In these studies, participants usually respond to 
different rating scales for a set of hazards. Principal component analysis is then used to 
identify the factors that determine the perception of these hazards, typically revealing two 
components. One component, labeled “unknown risk,” loads highly on scales of perceived 
newness, perceived scientific knowledge, and delay of effect. The other component loads on 
such scales as perceived lack of control, dread potential, and fatal consequences. This 
component is labeled “dread risk.”  
It is important to bear in mind, however, that these labels are interpretations from the 
factor loadings. More than one interpretation can be made of the same data, and 
interpretations of factors should be validated against external criteria. The rating scales that 
constitute the dread risk component are heterogeneous; not only dread potential but also 
cognitive rating scales correlated highly with the dread risk dimension. More recently, it has 
been suggested that the dread risk component is closely linked to affect (Slovic, Finucane, 
Peters, & MacGregor, 2002; Visschers & Siegrist, 2008). It is still unclear, however, whether 
this interpretation bears up under empirical investigation. One reason that this assumption has 
not yet been tested might be that affect is a construct that is not easy to capture. In the present 
research, we applied a Single Category Implicit Association Test (SC-IAT, Karpinski & 
Steinman, 2006), which might be an appropriate proxy for affect in risk perception. The SC-
IAT assesses people’s associations via response latencies. Because little is known about how 
the SC-IAT relates to other affect measures in risk research, the first aim of our research was 
to explore whether the SC-IAT offers a sufficient degree of validity and reliability in a risk 
context. In the second step, we wanted to examine the relationship between affect and the 
“dread risk” dimension in more detail. 
 
1.1. Affect in Risk Perception 
 
Affect is an important determinant of perception and behavior. Slovic et al. (2002) 
describe affect as “the specific quality of ‘goodness’ or ‘badness’ (1) experienced as a feeling 
state (with or without consciousness) (2) demarcating a positive or negative quality of a 
stimulus. Affective responses occur rapidly and automatically.” In the field of risk research, 
reliance on affective feelings was termed “the affect heuristic” (Finucane, Alhakami, Slovic, 
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& Johnson, 2000; Slovic et al., 2002; Slovic, Finucane, Peters, & MacGregor, 2004). It has 
been argued that people use the affect heuristic because relying on spontaneous affective 
reactions is easier and more efficient than analyzing all available information. In a similar 
vein, Loewenstein et al. (Loewenstein, Weber, Hsee, & Welch, 2001) introduced the “risk as 
feeling” model, which highlights the role of affect experienced immediately during decision 
making. The idea that affect plays an important role in decision making and risk perception is 
also central in several dual-process models (Epstein, 1994; Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 
2007a; Slovic et al., 2004). Slovic et al. (2004) assumed that there are two modes of thinking, 
the experiential system and the analytic system. The analytic system, on the one hand, is 
considered to be slow and effortful, and requires conscious control. This system relies on 
probabilities, logical reasoning, and evidence. The experiential system, on the other hand, is 
intuitive, fast, mostly automatic, and not very accessible to conscious awareness. This system 
relies on images, metaphors, and narratives, and is assumed to be associated with the 
experience of affect (Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2007a).
 
Especially for laypeople, decisions 
about risks are often too complex to allow consideration of all pros and cons; it seems 
reasonable to assume that laypeople may use the experiential system to evaluate risks. Time 
pressure and limited cognitive resources may also lead to a pronounced reliance on the 
experiential system and, thus, on affect (e.g., Vorhold et al., 2007).
 
 
1.2. Implicit Measures 
 
In the field of risk research, affect is typically measured via self-reports. In most 
studies, participants are asked to indicate on a scale whether they evaluate a certain hazard as 
positive or negative, good or bad (see, for example Alhakami & Slovic, 1994). This 
conceptualization of affect strongly resembles what social psychologists consider to be an 
attitude: the evaluation of the “goodness” or “badness” of something (Spence & Townsend, 
2008). 
In a social psychology framework, a distinction is further made between explicit and 
implicit attitudes. Explicit attitudes (such as affect in risk research) are usually equated with 
deliberative, self-reported evaluations. They rely on the assumption that people generally 
have access to the strength of their evaluative associations. Accordingly, people know if they 
have positive or negative associations with an object. However, it has been repeatedly shown 
that people often have difficulty in identifying their own mental processes, because these can 
lie beyond one’s introspective capability (Nisbett & Wilson, 1977; Wilson & Brekke, 1994). 
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In addition, some questions may evoke social desirability concerns, e.g., when questions enter 
displeasing or embarrassing domains. These concerns may lead participants to alter their 
responses when explicitly asked. 
Implicit measures of attitudes try to overcome these shortcomings by assessing 
associations indirectly. The idea behind implicit measures is that they capture associations 
(e.g., nuclear power + bad) that are stored in memory without requiring introspection on the 
part of the subject (Perkins, Forehad, Greenwald, & Maison, 2008).
 
One of the most 
prominent implicit measures is the Implicit Association Test (IAT), which was introduced by 
Greenwald and colleagues (Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998). The IAT measures the 
relative association strength between concepts by observing response latencies in a 
computerized categorization task (Greenwald, Poehlman, Uhlmann, & Banaji, 2009).
 
Participants conducting an IAT are instructed to sort stimuli that appear on a computer screen. 
For example, in one of the IATs used by Greenwald et al. (1998), participants first 
categorized names of insects and names of flowers using two keys. The keys were named 
after the target categories (flowers vs. insect). In a subsequent block, another pair of concepts 
(pleasant vs. unpleasant) was contrasted using the same two keys. In the following two 
critical parts of the IAT, the first and second blocks were combined. One time, one response 
key stood for flower + pleasant and the other for insect + unpleasant. Another time, the keys 
represented the combination flower + unpleasant and insect + pleasant. The IAT effect 
indicates which of the two combined tasks can be conducted faster by participants. In the 
example outlined above, participants responded faster to the combination flower + pleasant 
and insect + unpleasant than when flower was paired with unpleasant and insect with 
pleasant. The rationale underlying the IAT is that the categorization task is much easier when 
the two combined concepts are strongly associated in memory.  
Since the test’s introduction, the IAT has been used in a diverse array of disciplines 
and studies (for an overview see Lane, Banaji, Nosek, & Greenwald, 2007). The IAT is a 
flexible as well as a reliable instrument (Friese, Wänke, & Plessner, 2006),
 
which may explain 
the IAT’s broad popularity among researchers. Nonetheless, the IAT has also been criticized 
for methodological and theoretical limitations (for an overview, see Gawronski, 2009).
 
Interestingly, the IAT has been shown to correlate more strongly with explicit (self-
report) measures when these explicit measures have an affective focus, such as feeling 
thermometers, as compared to measures with a cognitive focus, like trait ratings (Hofmann, 
Gschwendner, & Schmitt, 2005).
 
In fact, some researchers have argued that the IAT provides 
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a proxy for immediate affective reactions to a given object (Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 
2007a).
 
However, empirical evidence about the link between implicit measures and affect 
remains sparse or ambiguous (Spence & Townsend, 2008). Phelps and colleagues (2000), for 
example, found that the relative strength of amygdala activation was correlated with the race 
IAT effect but not with explicit race attitudes. The amygdala, a brain region in the medial 
temporal lobes, has been associated with the processing and recollection of emotional stimuli 
(e.g., Zald, 2003). However, amygdala activation has also been linked with evaluations more 
generally. Other studies using fMRI (Chee, Sriram, Soon, & Lee, 2000; Richeson et al., 2003) 
showed that IAT performance was also related to activation in the dorsolateral prefrontal 
cortex, a region that reflects deliberative inhibition. These results suggest that the IAT effect 
is not process pure but triggered by multiple processes (Conrey, Sherman, Gawronski, 
Hugenberg, & Groom, 2005; Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2007b). In sum, one might argue 
that the connection of implicit measures and affect is best described such that affect appears 
to be a central component of implicit evaluative associations, which may be more or less 
salient within different topics (Giner-Sorolla, 2004). 
Only a few studies have used implicit measures to assess evaluative associations of 
different hazards (Siegrist, Keller, & Cousin, 2006; Spence & Townsend, 2007; Visschers, 
Meertens, Passchier, & de Vries, 2007).
 
For example, Siegrist et al. (2006) employed a 
traditional IAT (i.e., using the IAT procedure described above) and contrasted nuclear power 
with hydroelectric power. They showed that the IAT was capable of revealing negative 
associations regarding nuclear power that were not detected by explicit measures. These 
results suggest that implicit measures may give important insight into the perception of risks, 
and into the role of affect in risk perception.  
These studies often assume that implicit measures are a good proxy for measuring 
affect, but only little is known about the validity of implicit measures in risk perception. The 
few existing studies that have explored this issue come from clinical psychology, exploring 
pathological risk perception such as spider phobia or alcohol abuse (Teachman & Woody, 
2003; Wiers, van Woerden, Smulders, & de Jong, 2002). Thus, the first aim of our studies 
was to examine the validity of the IAT in an environmental risk context. We were interested 
in whether and how the IAT is related to other measures that measure affect explicitly, and to 
measures that capture other, unrelated constructs. 
 In addition, the study was designed to test a newly developed variant of the IAT that 
might be more appropriate in measuring implicit association regarding risks. One major 
shortcoming of studies using the traditional IAT is that it is a relative measure, i.e., it is not 
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possible to make conclusions about evaluative associations with a single hazard. For instance, 
in an IAT that contrasts evaluative associations of hydroelectric power with nuclear power, a 
high negative score could indicate that participants have either many hydroelectric power + 
pleasant associations or many nuclear power + unpleasant associations. Furthermore, if 
researchers want to investigate the evaluative associations of more than two attitude objects, 
the number of required IATs would increase rapidly to a great number of pairwise 
comparisons. To solve the above-mentioned limitations, several non-relative tasks have been 
suggested. Among those, the Single Category IAT (SC-IAT) stands out among other 
measures because of its satisfactory psychometric properties (Bluemke & Friese, 2008; 
Karpinski & Steinman, 2006). It is a modification of the traditional IAT procedure and omits 
the complementary category. Thus, when naturally opposing categories are unavailable and 
absolute evaluations are of most interest, the SC-IAT is considered to be the most 
advantageous implicit measure (Bluemke & Friese, 2008). For this reason, we decided to 
utilize the SC-IAT in the present studies.  
 
2. Study 1: Assessing the Validity of the SC-IAT in the Field of Risk 
Perception 
 
 
 The objective of Study 1 was to evaluate the construct validity of the SC-IAT. 
Construct validity is the extent to which an operationalization measures the construct that the 
operationalization is supposed to measure (Nunnally & Bernstein, 1994). Empirical indicators 
for construct validity are convergent and discriminant validity (Campbell & Fiske, 1959). 
Convergent validity is achieved when different measurements claiming to measure the same 
construct correlate positively. Discriminant validity is achieved when different measurements 
of different construct diverge (i.e., do not correlate or correlate weakly). Thus, we expected 
that the SC-IAT correlates with other explicit measures that claim to measure affect. In a 
study by Peters and Slovic (2007),
 
where various affective self-reports were tested, the 
authors recommended that “further research with self-reports of the affective component 
include the holistic, unipolar, discrete emotion (HUE) evaluative measures […] in 
combination with a holistic bipolar valenced evaluation measure” (p. 300). On these grounds, 
we tested the convergent validity of the SC-IAT with the two explicit measures mentioned 
above. Furthermore, the SC-IAT should also be related to trust, because trust is assumed to 
have affective components as well (Visschers & Siegrist, 2008).
 
On the other hand, because 
36     Chapter II 
 
affect is considered to be part of the experiential system, the SC-IAT should not correlate 
with a construct that is based in the analytic system (i.e., subjective knowledge about the 
hazard).  
 To test our predictions, we investigated two technologies, mobile phones and mobile 
phone base stations. We recruited participants who were experts about electromagnetic fields 
(EMF) and matched the experts with people who were opposed to mobile phone base stations 
and with people from the general population. This sample was chosen because we expected 
that affect toward the technology would vary strongly in this sample, providing an ideal 
precondition for comparing correlations. Furthermore, a difference in implicit evaluations 
between the three groups would further corroborate the criterion-related validity of the SC-
IAT. 
 
2.1. Method 
2.1.1. Participants 
 
A total of 63 persons from the German-speaking part of Switzerland were included. 
One third were experts on mobile phone communication (n = 21), one third were opponents 
of mobile phone communication (n = 21), and the remaining third were selected from the 
general population (n = 21). The matching criteria were gender, age (within a five-year band), 
and self-reported education (five levels: primary school, lower secondary school, upper 
secondary vocational school, upper secondary university-preparation school, and college or 
university). 
We selected experts with different backgrounds and viewpoints on the topic. Six of the 
experts indicated that they were working in the field of basic EMF research, seven in the field 
of applied EMF research, four in general risk research, five for federal authorities, seven for a 
cantonal or municipal authority, and one for a consumer protection board (multiple answers 
possible). On average, the experts stated that they had been engaged in the topic of non-
ionizing radiation for 9.86 years (SD= 4.43), and all but one stated that they regularly read 
scientific publications on the topic.  
Each expert was matched with a base station opponent and a person from the general 
public. Opponents were recruited via Internet platforms of citizens’ action committees, and 
within the committees, by word of mouth. Participants from the general public were randomly 
drawn from the electronic telephone directory. Similar to the opponents, the general public 
participants were first called and asked about their age and educational background to find 
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adequate matches. If the criteria were fulfilled, appointments were made at the participant’s 
home or office. 
2.1.2. Measures and Procedure 
 
In the first part of the study, participants were asked to associate freely about the terms 
“mobile phone” and “mobile phone base station.” The results of this task are not central for 
the present purpose and are not reported here. After the association task, two SC-IATs were 
administered on a portable computer (Lenovo 1.8 GHz dual core ThinkPad) using Inquisit 
software (www.millisecond.com). Each of the SC-IATs took approximately 5–10 minutes. 
Afterwards, participants completed a questionnaire designed to assess their explicit affect, as 
well as trust and subjective knowledge. These questions appeared on the computer screen, and 
participants responded via the computer keyboard. Because several studies revealed that the 
order of measures does not influence the relationship of implicit and explicit measures 
(Hofmann, Gawronski, Gschwendner, Le, & Schmitt, 2005; Nosek, 2005; Nosek, Greenwald, 
& Banaji, 2005), the order of implicit and explicit measures remained constant. During the 
whole study, care was taken to ensure that no distraction from outside (e.g., phone calls) 
could occur to disrupt the procedure. 
 
SC-IAT. The two SC-IATs differed with respect to their target category, i.e., “mobile 
phone” and “mobile phone base station.” Each SC-IAT consisted of two blocks, while each 
block included 24 practice trials and 72 test trials. In the first block, participants categorized 
target stimuli and positive stimuli on the right key (“I”) and negative stimuli on the left key 
(“E”). In the second block, the assignment of the target category was changed so that target 
stimuli and negative stimuli shared the same response key (“E”). Furthermore, half of the 
participants conducted the study in the sequence described above, while for the other half of 
participants the sequence of blocks was reversed to prevent position effects.  
The words related to the positive and negative categories were taken from Siegrist et 
al.,
(30)
 although two words of the negative category were replaced with novel stimuli. The 
four words relating to the positive category were enjoyable, likable, pleasant, and good. The 
four words related to the negative category were atrocious, bad, displeasing, and repulsive.  
Because of difficulties in finding an appropriate set of words that were adequate 
characterizations of the target category, we also included pictures that represented the target 
category. For each target category, three words and three pictures served as stimuli. The target 
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black-and-white pictures were all standardized to 240 x 320 pixels (72ppi), resulting in a size 
of 6 x 8 cm on the computer screen. Target stimuli as well as coupled and uncoupled 
evaluative stimuli were presented in a 7:7:10 ratio to ensure that the proportion of left-hand 
and right-hand responses was approximately equal. An intertrial stimulus interval of 500 ms 
was used. 
 All participants received the same fixed random order of stimuli. To urge participants 
to respond rapidly to the stimuli, a reminder (“Please respond more quickly!”) appeared on 
the screen if participants did not respond within 3000 ms. In addition, a green O and a red X 
for 150 ms followed correct and incorrect responses, respectively. The sequence of the two 
SC-IATs was alternated. 
 
Self-reports. Participants then answered different items that were designed to measure 
the participants’ explicit affect toward mobile phones and mobile phone base stations. Two 
other scales assessed trust in mobile communication authorities and subjective knowledge 
about mobile communication. 
For both technologies, participants first filled in the HUE scale, which included 
holistic unipolar discrete emotion items. The scale consisted of five positive terms (happy, 
friendly, enthusiastic, love, and excited) as well as five negative terms (upset, angry, annoyed, 
disgust, and afraid). Participants responded on a 4-point scale ranging from 1 (“does not 
apply/describe”) to 4 (“completely describes”). For each HUE scale, a mean score of all items 
was calculated. The reliability of these scales was checked by calculating Cronbach’s alpha. 
The scales for both technologies were reliable (base stations  = .66; mobile phones  = .75).  
Next, respondents were asked to describe their feelings toward the two technologies 
(holistic bipolar valenced evaluation measure). Respondents used a 6-point rating scale 
ranging from -3 (“negative” ) to +3 (“positive”) to answer these questions.  
To examine trust in mobile communication authorities, participants were asked to rate 
how much they trust several authorities and their specific sphere of authority. Judgments were 
made about (a) providers (technical aspects), (b) providers (health aspects), (c) federal 
authorities (legal framework), (d) federal authorities (health care), (e) cantonal authorities 
(approval procedure), (f) research groups at universities (research), and (g) consumer 
protection boards (consumer safety). In answering these questions, respondents used a 6-point 
rating scale ranging from 1 (“no trust”) to 6 (“complete trust”). The final trust measure 
consisted of an average of its individual items. Reliability analysis revealed a high 
Cronbach’s alpha ( = .82). 
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Finally, participants were asked to judge their subjective knowledge about mobile 
communication. More specifically, they were asked to judge their subjective knowledge about 
(a) the risks, (b) the technical aspects, and (c) the legal aspects of mobile communication. 
Participants answered these questions on a 6-point-scale ranging from 1 (“not informed at 
all”) and 6 (“very well informed”). The three items were averaged; reliability (Cronbach’s 
alpha) of the subjective knowledge scale was  = .84. 
 
2.2. Results    
2.2.1. Data Processing  
 
For the two SC-IATs, the response latencies (in milliseconds) and error rates for each 
trial were recorded by the computer. The scoring algorithm developed by Karpinski and 
Steinman (Karpinski & Steinman, 2006), modeled on the D-Score algorithm for IAT data 
(Greenwald, Nosek, & Banaji, 2003), was used for the data processing. According to this, 
participants with an error rate greater than 20% in one of the two SC-IATs should be excluded 
from further analyses. One participant from the general population and one participant from 
the base station opponents were above this criterion and were excluded from the SC-IAT 
analysis. 
The first 24 trials of each block were not included in computations because those trials 
served as practice trials. Trials with latencies of less than 350 ms or longer than 3000 ms were 
eliminated. Response errors were replaced with the block mean plus 400 ms. The mean 
response times for the block combining stimuli from the target and the positive category 
(Block 1) were subtracted from the block combining the target and the negative category 
(Block 2). Each difference score was divided by the standard deviation of the correct 
responses within both blocks of the SC-IAT, which was used as the SC-IAT effect. Thus, a 
positive score indicates that the target is more related to positive concepts, and a negative 
value that the target is associated with negative concepts. Finally, the EXAMINE procedure 
of SPSS was used to detect outliers or extreme values (values more than 1.5 or 3 interquartile 
ranges, respectively). One subject who was an outlier for the Mobile Phone SC-IAT effect 
was identified and discarded from further analyses concerning implicit associations. 
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2.2.2. SC-IAT 
 
First, we calculated the reliability of the two SC-IATs. Each SC-IAT (only test trials) 
was divided into thirds, and for each third, a separate SC-IAT score was computed. Because 
separating the task into thirds underestimates the reliability of the entire measure, the 
Spearman-Brown correction was applied. The reliability score for the Base Station SC-IAT 
was somewhat higher (r = .81) than the score for the Mobile Phone SC-IAT (r = .72).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A closer look at the Base Station SC-IAT (see Figure 2.1.) results reveals that the 
opponent group held negative implicit associations toward base stations (M = -0.21, SD = 
0.44). The Base Station SC-IAT effect for those participants was significantly more negative 
than zero, t(19) = 2.19, p = .041. In contrast, base stations evoked positive implicit 
associations in the expert group (M = 0.30, SD = 0.33); the Base Station SC-IAT effect in this 
Figure 2.1. IAT-Effects (mobile phone base stations and mobile phones) for the matched 
groups (Study 1). Error bars indicate the standard errors of the means. 
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group was significantly more positive than zero, t(20) = 4.15, p < .001. For participants from 
the general population, the Base Station SC-IAT effect was neither positive nor negative (M = 
0.03, SD = .43), p > .7. A one-way ANOVA showed that there were differences in the Base 
Station SC-IAT effect between the three groups, F(2, 58) = 8.44, p = .001. Post hoc tests 
(Tukey HSD) were used to analyze this difference in more detail. They revealed that base 
station opponents showed more negative implicit associations than the expert group, p < .001. 
In addition, there was a trend that participants from the general population differed from 
participants from the expert sample. This trend was not significant, however; p = .085. 
For base station opponents, mobile phones also evoked negative implicit associations, 
(M = -0.15, SD = 0.34); the Mobile Phone SC-IAT effect for opponents reached marginal 
significance, t(19) = 1.92, p = .070. The Mobile Phone SC-IAT effect was neutral for the 
expert group (M = 0.10, SD = 0.42); and did not differ significantly from zero, p > .29. In 
contrast, participants from the general population showed positive implicit associations 
towards mobile phones (M = 0.14, SD = .30), the Mobile Phone SC-IAT effect was 
marginally positive, t(18) = 1.98, p = .063. A one-way ANOVA revealed that there were 
differences in the Mobile Phone SC-IAT effect between the three groups, F(2, 57) = 3.64, p = 
.033. Base station opponents held more negative implicit associations with mobile phones 
than did the group from the general population, p = .044. There was also a non-significant 
trend that opponents showed more negative implicit associations than the expert sample, p = 
.082 (Tukey HSD). 
2.2.3. Correlations 
 
Table 2.1. shows the correlation matrix for the two SC-IATs and the explicit affect. 
For both technologies, the convergent validity of the SC-IATs was indicated by a high 
correlation of the SC-IAT with the HUE scale and with the holistic bipolar valenced 
evaluation measure. Moreover, the convergent validity was confirmed by the high correlation 
of the SC-IATs with the measure of trust in mobile communication authorities. In contrast, 
the SC-IATs did not correlate with subjective knowledge, indicating the discriminant validity 
of the SC-IAT. Furthermore, we found that the HUE scale and the holistic bipolar valenced 
evaluation measure (both designed to measure affect explicitly) correlated positively for both 
technologies. 
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Table 2.1. Correlations (Study 1) 
Measures (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
1. SC-IAT (BS) 1        
2. Holistic bipolar 
valenced evaluation 
measure (BS) 
.477** 1       
3.HUE scale (BS) .391** .403** 1      
4. SC-IAT (MP) .242 .333** .409** 1     
5. Holistic bipolar 
valenced evaluation 
measure (MP) 
.244 .465** .253* .267* 1    
6.HUE scale (MP) .379** .405** .290* .307* .596** 1   
7. Trust  .516** .691** .359** .285* .432** .621** 1  
8. Subjective 
knowledge 
.148 .321* .157 -.032 .105 -.111 .026 1 
Note. SC-IAT = Single Category Implicit Association Test; BS = Base Station; MP = Mobile 
Phones; *p<0.05, **p<0.01 
 
2.3. Discussion 
 
Study 1 demonstrates that both SC-IATs had sufficient reliability. Both reliability 
scores were in the same range as found in other studies (Karpinski & Steinman, 2006). 
Moreover, the study results suggest that the SC-IAT is related to explicit affective measures 
of the same technology, and to trust. Again, this was true for both the Mobile Phone SC-IAT 
and the Base Station SC-IAT. It is noteworthy that the correlations of the SC-IATs with 
explicit measures in our study were quite high compared with other studies. Two recent meta-
analyses exploring the relationship between the traditional IAT and self-reports find an 
average correlation of .24 (Hofmann, Gawronski et al., 2005) and .36 (Nosek, 2005), 
respectively. In the present study, all correlations of the SC-IAT with the two explicit affect 
measures or trust exceed the average correlations of Hofmann et al.’s (2005) meta-analysis, 
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and most strikingly, the correlation of the Base Station SC-IAT with trust is the highest of all. 
None of the SC-IATs correlated with subjective knowledge, supporting the discriminant 
validity of the SC-IAT. In addition, the finding that the two SC-IATs were significantly 
different between the three groups corroborated the criterion-related validity. Taking the 
results together, it is tenable that the SC-IAT measures affective responses in a risk context.  
 
3. Study 2: Affect and Feelings of Dread  
 
 
To explore the relationship between the dread risk factor and affect more precisely, a 
second study was conducted. The main purpose of this second study was to test the 
assumption that hazards that vary along the dread dimension of the psychometric paradigm 
would also differ in the affect they evoke. In Study 2, implicit associations regarding three 
hazards were examined, i.e., nuclear power, hydroelectric power, and home appliances. These 
three hazards can be located along the “dread risk” dimension of the psychometric paradigm.
1
 
Nuclear power is perceived as an extremely high-dread hazard, hydroelectric power as 
medium dread, and home appliances as non-dread (Siegrist, Keller, & Kiers, 2005).
2
 It was 
assumed that the three hazards would differ in their implicit associations (measured via three 
SC-IATs). We hypothesized that nuclear power would evoke more negative associations than 
hydroelectric power and that home appliances would evoke more positive associations than 
hydroelectric power. In addition, we also assessed explicit affect using the holistic bipolar 
valenced evaluation measure, which was also used in Study 1. This time, we used only one 
measure for the explicit affect, since the results of Study 1 indicated that the HUE scale and 
the holistic bipolar valenced evaluation measure are correlated. According to Alhakami and 
Slovic’s
 
(1994) results, affect should also be connected to the perceived risks and benefits of 
the hazards (see also Finucane et al., 2000; Slovic et al., 2004; White, Eiser, Harris, & Pahl, 
2007).  
                                                
1
 In our study, we selected only these three hazards, since conducting an SC-IAT demands 
time and attention. By contrast, studies using the psychometric paradigm typically examine a 
large set of hazards. For the present study, we chose three hazards from the psychometric 
paradigm that varied on the dread dimension, and that could be easily and unmistakably 
pictured in the SC-IAT as well. 
2
 Siegrist et al. (2005) conducted a mail survey to examine individual differences in risk 
perception. The researchers reported the results of a three-way principal component analysis. 
Details of a two-way principal component analysis, including a “cognitive map” that depicts a 
range of hazards in a two-dimensional space, are available on request from the authors. 
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3.1. Method 
3.1.1. Participants 
 
Eighty-three undergraduates from the University of Zurich participated in the study 
(44 males, 39 females). Psychology students received credit for participation. The majority 
were studying psychology (66%) or other social sciences (18%). The remaining participants 
were studying law (5%) or natural sciences (4%) or did not specify their major (7%). The 
participants’ mean age was 25.44 years (SD = 6.43). 
3.1.2. Measures and Procedure  
 
The study described here was preceded by an unrelated study that examined decisions 
about nutrition, which took approximately 30 minutes. In our study, participants were tested 
in groups of three or fewer. Each person was seated in front of one of three portable 
computers (Lenovo 1.8 GHz dual core ThinkPad using Inquisit software), which were placed 
outside the range of vision of the other participants. During the first part of our study, 
participants completed three SC-IATs at the computer. In the second part of our study, 
participants answered some explicit questions that appeared on the computer screen. These 
questions assessed the explicit affect toward the three hazards, as well as their perceived risk 
and benefits. Participants were asked to remain silent during the study and were requested to 
indicate questions about the procedure by raising their hands.  
 
Implicit Measure. The design of the SC-IAT as described in Study 1 was used. Three 
hazards served as target category, i.e., nuclear power, hydroelectric power, and home 
appliances. The sequence of the three SC-IATs was controlled via a Latin square so that each 
SC-IAT was conducted equally often in each position.  
 
Self-reports. After taking the SC-IATs, participants answered three questions 
assessing the participants’ explicit affect toward nuclear power, hydroelectric power, and 
home appliances; judgments were to be made about the participants’ feelings toward the three 
hazards (holistic bipolar valenced evaluation measure), using a 6-point rating scale ranging 
from -3 (“negative”) to +3 (“positive”). To assess the perceived risk and benefit of each 
hazard, participants were asked to judge how risky (beneficial) they considered the hazard to 
be for Swiss society as a whole. They used a 6-point rating scale ranging from 1 (“small”) to 
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6 (“large”) to answer these questions. Finally, participants were asked for some personal data 
including age, gender, and course of study. 
 
3.2. Results 
3.2.1. SC-IATs 
 
Data processing of the SC-IATs was the same for Study 2 as for Study 1. No 
participant had an error rate greater than 20% in any of the three SC-IATs. Furthermore, the 
EXAMINE procedure of SPSS was again used to detect outliers or extreme values. It revealed 
that two subjects showed an outlying SC-IAT effect; they were discarded from further 
analyses regarding implicit associations.  
As in Study 1, we calculated the reliability for each of the three SC-IATs (all scores 
were Spearman-Brown corrected). The reliability score of the Home Appliances SC-IAT was 
the highest (r = .76). The other reliability scores were lower (Nuclear Power SC-IAT: r = .55; 
Hydroelectric Power SC-IAT: r = .54). A repeated-measures ANOVA was used to evaluate 
the effects of the three SC-IATs. Results show that the examined hazards were perceived 
differently, F(2, 160) = 13.65, p < .001. The pattern of means (see Table 2.2.) shows that 
nuclear power evoked more negative associations than hydroelectric power, and hydroelectric 
power evoked fewer positive associations than home appliances. There was a clear linear 
trend for the three SC-IATs, F(1, 80) = 19.51, p < .001. To test the differences between the 
SC-IATS, planned comparisons were conducted. We found that the effect of the Nuclear 
Power SC-IAT was significantly more negative than that of the Hydroelectric Power SC-IAT, 
t(81) = 4.68, p < .001. However, the difference between the SC-IAT with the target category 
“hydroelectric power” and the SC-IAT with the target category “home appliances” was not 
statistically significant, t(81) = 0.92, p = .36. Furthermore, it was revealed that the effect of 
the Nuclear Power SC-IAT was significantly more negative than zero, t(81) = 2.02, p = .046; 
and the effect of the Home Appliances SC-IAT was significantly more positive than zero, 
t(81) = 4.40, p < .001. The effect of the Hydroelectric Power SC-IAT was also significantly 
more positive than zero, t(82) = 4.30, p < .001. There were no significant correlations 
between the SC-IATs, where all p > .31. 
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Table 2.2. Means of the SC-IAT Effect for Nuclear Power, Hydroelectric Power, and Home 
Appliances with Standard Deviations in Parentheses (Study 2) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note. SC-IAT = Single Category Implicit Association Test 
 
3.2.2. Self-reports  
 
A repeated-measures ANOVA was also used to analyze the explicit affect toward 
nuclear power, hydroelectric power, and home appliances. Participants were asked to indicate 
their feelings about the three hazards (holistic bipolar valenced evaluation measure, see Table 
2.3.). The repeated-measures ANOVA indicated that the explicit affect toward the three 
hazards differed significantly from each other, F(2, 164) = 118.85, p < .001. Planned 
comparisons showed that participants reported more negative explicit affect toward nuclear 
power than toward hydroelectric power, t(82) = 12.80, p < .001. Participants also expressed 
more negative explicit affect toward home appliances than toward hydroelectric power, t(82) 
= 2.86, p = .005, although hydroelectric power is considered to be a medium-dread hazard and 
home appliances non-dread according to the psychometric studies (Fischhoff et al., 1978; 
Siegrist et al., 2005; Slovic, 1987).
 
Participants also assessed the risks and benefits associated with the different hazards. 
The results of an ANOVA with repeated measures showed that participants evaluated the risk 
of the three hazards differently, F(2, 164) = 53.65, p < .001, as well as the benefits, F(2, 164) 
= 21.19, p < .001. As the planned comparisons showed, participants perceived greater risks 
associated with nuclear power than with hydroelectric power, t(82) = 8.10, p < .001, but the 
participants did not associate more risk with hydroelectric power than with home appliances, 
t(82) = 1.46, p = .149. Participants also judged nuclear power as less beneficial than 
hydroelectric power, t(82) = 3.79, p < .001, and hydroelectric power as less beneficial than 
home appliances, t(82) = 2.42, p = .018.   
 
 
Hazard SC-IAT 
Nuclear power -0.06 (0.29) 
Hydroelectric power 0.15 (0.31) 
Home appliances 0.19 (0.40) 
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Table 2.3. Means (with Standard Deviations in Parentheses) of Explicit Affect, Perceived 
Benefits and Risks, and Correlations with the Corresponding SC-IAT (Study 2) 
Measure Hazard M (SD) 
Correlation 
SC-IAT 
Explicit Affect Nuclear Power -0.93 (1.75)        .308** 
 Hydroelectric Power 2.02 (1.12)        .152 
 Home Appliances 1.57 (1.11)        .110 
Benefits Nuclear Power 4.37 (1.36)        .206 
 Hydroelectric Power 5.05 (0.94)        .003 
 Home Appliances 5.39 (0.73)       -.115 
Risks Nuclear Power 4.04 (1.45)       -.226* 
 Hydroelectric Power 2.51 (1.28)       -.100 
 Home Appliances 2.25 (1.28)       -.108 
Note. SC-IAT = Single Category Implicit Association Test 
*p<0.05, **p<0.01 
 
3.2.3. Correlations  
 
The Nuclear Power SC-IAT was related to the holistic bipolar valenced evaluation 
measure of nuclear power (see Table 2.3.); we found a significant correlation with the 
explicitly stated affect toward nuclear power (r = .31, p = .005, N = 82). There was also a 
significant negative correlation with perceived risks (r = -.23, p = .04, N = 82) and a 
marginally significant positive correlation with perceived benefits (r = .21, p = .06, N = 82). 
The two SC-IATS that measured associations toward hydroelectric power and home 
appliances were not related to the explicit affect measure, however (all p > .1).  
 
3.3. Discussion 
 
The results of the implicit measure support the assumption that affect is strongly 
linked to the degree to which a hazard evokes feelings of dread (Slovic et al., 2002). The SC-
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IAT effect regarding nuclear power, hydroelectric power, and home appliances was found to 
increase linearly, like the hazards’ levels of dread. Beyond that, our findings indicate that 
nuclear power (a high-dread hazard) evoked negative implicit associations. Furthermore, 
nuclear power evoked more negative implicit associations than hydroelectric power (a 
medium-dread hazard). In contrast, home appliances (a non-dread hazard) evoked positive 
implicit associations. Surprisingly, the mean effect of the Home Appliances SC-IAT was not 
significantly different from the Hydroelectric Power SC-IAT effect. Based on the results of 
Siegrist et al. (2005) that showed that hydroelectric power is perceived as a medium-dread 
hazard, we expected that hydroelectric power would elicit more negative implicit associations 
than home appliances.  
Participants were also asked about their explicit affect (using a holistic bipolar 
valenced evaluation measure). As in the SC-IAT, participants stated more negative feelings 
toward nuclear power than toward hydroelectric power. Contrary to the SC-IAT, participants 
had more negative feelings toward home appliances than toward hydroelectric power when 
asked explicitly. These findings indicate that the explicit affect measure was not able to 
reproduce the hazards’ locations along the dread dimension of the psychometric paradigm. 
The results also suggest that the results of implicit and explicit measures may differ 
essentially.  
We also found that associations with nuclear energy (measured via SC-IAT) are 
connected to the perceived risks and benefits of nuclear energy. This finding is in line with 
the assumption that the affect heuristic guides perceptions of risk and benefit (Alhakami & 
Slovic, 1994; Finucane et al., 2000; Slovic et al., 2004; White et al., 2007). However, the 
remaining two SC-IATs were not connected to risk and benefits, which might be due to the 
fact that stronger evaluations are known to show greater implicit-explicit correspondence than 
weaker ones (Nosek, 2005). Risks and benefits of nuclear power are presumably more 
discussed and receive more media coverage than hydroelectric power or home appliances, 
leading to a greater evaluative strength in the case of nuclear power. 
 
4. General Discussion  
 
 
The present research examined the relationship between implicit measures and affect 
in risk perception. In both studies, a SC-IAT measuring implicit associations with different 
technologies was used. The SC-IAT assesses the relative strength between concepts via 
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response times. In contrast to the traditional IAT, the SC-IAT is able to estimate an absolute 
evaluation of a certain hazard and not only a relative evaluation.  
The first study showed that the SC-IAT was a reliable measure of evaluative 
associations in a risk context. Furthermore, the study revealed that the SC-IAT and explicit 
measures of affect covaried, which provides evidence for the convergent validity of the SC-
IAT. Medium size effects were observed, and the two measures were more strongly related to 
each other than in other studies.  
The results of the implicit measures in Study 2 provide evidence for the hypothesis 
that the “dread risk” dimension of the psychometric paradigm might be closely related to 
affect (Slovic et al., 2002). Thus, these findings support the idea that affective reactions to 
technologies and activities guide decisions and judgments, which is known as the “affect 
heuristic”. The results of the SC-IAT highlight that people are quick in their affective 
reactions to technologies, which is in line with the affect heuristic and therefore with the idea 
that immediate gut feelings inform people about whether a hazard might be safe or whether it 
would be better to avoid it (Visschers & Siegrist, 2008).
 
The affect heuristic also corresponds 
with the notion of the “risk as feelings” model that affective visceral reactions (or 
“anticipatory” emotions, in contrast to “anticipated” emotions, which are expected to be 
experienced in the future) occur immediately and, thus, give instantaneous informational 
inputs to decision making (Loewenstein et al., 2001). 
In Study 2, participants’ affect toward the three hazards was also assessed explicitly. 
In contrast to the implicit measure, the hazards’ locations along the dread dimension of the 
psychometric paradigm were not reproduced using an explicit measure. Although different 
moderators for the implicit-explicit consistency have been suggested (Hofmann, 
Gschwendner et al., 2005), we can only speculate on the origin of the differences between 
explicit and implicit measures in our study. In the SC-IAT, participants are urged to react very 
quickly, while participants answering explicit questions have time to consider all the pros and 
cons of a technology. Thus, the conscious evaluation may have altered spontaneous 
evaluations of the technologies. Following this line of argumentation, one could argue that 
implicit measures are more suitable for measuring affect than explicit measures, because 
affect is generally considered to be located in the fast-working experiential system, which is 
oriented toward immediate action (Slovic et al., 2004). These rapid feelings might be masked 
when participants are asked about it directly in self-reports. Accordingly, it is tenable that the 
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SC-IAT would correlate more with explicit measures of affect, risk, and benefit perception 
when these explicit measures are assessed under time pressure.  
Moreover, our studies highlight that experts and laypeople differ in their implicit 
associations toward mobile phones and mobile phone base stations. The results of our first 
study suggest that differences in risk perception between laypeople and experts are due to 
different affective reactions to technologies. Because our groups were matched, the 
alternative explanation that this result was due to differences in age, gender, or education can 
be ruled out.  
Some limitations of the present research need to be discussed. In Study 2, it would 
have been interesting to examine more than three hazards, in particular because studies using 
the psychometric paradigm mostly investigate a whole set of hazards. Because the SC-IAT 
demands some amount of attention, however, more than three SC-IATs in succession might 
have led to a loss of concentration and motivation for the task. It is known from other studies 
that the SC-IAT effect can be less pronounced toward the end of a within-subject session 
(Bluemke & Friese, 2008). In our research, the reliability of the SC-IATs was smaller in the 
second study, where we used three SC-IATs in succession, compared to the reliability of the 
SC-IATs in the first study, where only two SC-IATs needed to be conducted. Therefore, we 
believe it is important not to overstrain participants with too many SC-IATs in one session. 
The limited number of (SC-) IATs that can be conducted in one study, as well as the extended 
time and effort that are needed to apply this measure, is clearly a disadvantage for the IAT in 
comparison to other, explicit measures. It would therefore be all the more useful to explore 
the differences between implicit and explicit measures in greater detail. Specifically, such 
future studies may provide insights into the question of which measurement techniques are 
superior in their predictive validity concerning risk perception or which are more sensitive 
concerning experimental manipulations of affect.  
In addition, the dread risk component of the psychometric paradigm is calculated 
using principal component analysis, which uses aggregated individual data (Fischhoff et al., 
1978; Slovic, 1987). Therefore, we could not measure the dread risk component directly, e.g., 
by asking participants about the terribleness of a hazard. Instead, the hazards location on the 
dread dimension was inferred from a study conducted by Siegrist et al. (2005). However, we 
cannot think of any reason why public perception in Switzerland should have completely 
changed within only a few years. 
Furthermore, it could be useful to investigate how global spontaneous evaluations, 
which are measured by the SC-IAT, relate to discrete emotions, which are also commonly 
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used to assess affective reaction toward certain stimuli (Peters & Slovic, 2007). For example, 
the global negative associations with nuclear power might be primarily related to discrete 
emotional responses such as fear or anger, while the global positive associations with home 
appliances might be connected with delight or contentment. One should also take into 
account, however, that some specific emotional reactions tend be more cognitively 
constrained than others (Damasio, 1994). Secondary emotions, such as “hope” or “relief,” that 
involve deliberative, cognitive processes, might be less related to implicit measures than some 
of the basic emotions, such as “fear” or “anger.” 
The present study highlights the importance of affect in risk perception. The results of 
the implicit measure suggest that risks are evaluated through the experiential system and not 
only by the analytical system, which holds for laypeople as well as for experts. We therefore 
argue that risk communication strategies should also focus on affective reactions that are 
evoked by certain hazards. Most risk communication approaches, however, aim to provide 
information and knowledge, which address only the analytic system. Future research should 
evaluate the effect of approaches that focus on affective reactions toward risks. The SC-IAT 
might help to assess the outcome of such approaches.  
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Abstract 
 
Research indicates that the risks associated with mobile communication are perceived 
differently by experts, laypeople, and base station opponents. Using a free association 
method, we analyzed these differences in more detail. In our first study, considerable 
differences in free associations between experts and base station opponents were found. The 
prevalence of free associations in a large random sample from the general population was 
explored via correspondence analysis in a second study. Our research is in line with the affect 
heuristic that guides risk and benefit assessments, and highlights the role of affect in risk 
communication.  
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1. Introduction  
 
According to the World Health Organization (WHO), none of the recent scientific 
reviews has concluded that exposure to mobile phones’ or mobile phone base stations’ 
radiofrequency fields causes adverse health consequences (WHO, 2000). Other public health 
authorities have come to similar conclusions, e.g., the International Commission on Non-
Ionizing Radiation Protection (ICNIRP, cf. Ahlbom, Green, Kheifets, Savitz, & Swerdlow, 
2004). Because mobile communication technology is relatively new and is continuously 
developing, however, some authorities have become concerned about the lack of long-term 
studies on the possible health effects of this technology. Thus, some authorities have 
recommended that it should be the subject of further research (Stewart, 2000), and 
accordingly, research on the topic is still ongoing.  
Public perception of risks related to mobile communication often diverges strongly 
from the experts’ view. Many laypeople are worried about serious health consequences, 
especially from the electromagnetic fields (EMF) generated by mobile phone base stations. 
Psychometric studies conducted in various countries indicate that the risks attached to mobile 
communication are perceived as little known by the public and moderately dreadful 
(Bronfman & Cifuentes, 2003; Siegrist, Earle, Gutscher, & Keller, 2005). Many people 
believe that mobile phones will turn out to have effects that are unknown today (Sjöberg, 
2002 ). In Europe, 48% of the citizens are concerned about the potential health risks of EMF, 
and most people erroneously believe that the main source of EMF is mobile communication 
(European Commission, 2007).  
Another study compared health beliefs about mobile phones and mobile phone base 
stations with health beliefs about other environmental risks (Cousin & Siegrist, 2008). The 
study revealed that mobile communication evokes fewer health concerns than air pollution 
and ultraviolet rays, but the concerns were similar to those about EMF generated by power 
transmission lines. Moreover, the study showed that mobile phone base stations evoked 
significantly more concern than mobile phones themselves, and that only 27% of all 
respondents in the sample were not worried about the technologies. Other studies have 
explored laypeople’s beliefs about mobile communication qualitatively (Cousin & Siegrist, 
2010b). Laypeople and experts were found to hold different mental models of mobile 
communication. People from the general population and base station opponents often have 
knowledge gaps concerning the interaction patterns of mobile phones and base stations. For 
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instance, many people were not aware that the distance from the base station has an influence 
on the level of EMF emitted by a mobile phone: when the caller is far away from the next 
mobile phone base station, the mobile phone has to increase its output power to ensure 
network coverage (Cousin & Siegrist, 2010a, 2010b). Due to this knowledge gap, most people 
prefer to site base stations outside living areas (Cousin & Siegrist, 2010a), which may result 
in even more radiation for the phoning population. 
 
1.1. The Affect Heuristic 
 
Knowledge deficits of laypeople are commonly assumed to be why experts and 
laypeople often disagree when it comes to perceived levels of risks. But the causes of these 
differences seem to be manifold: self-selection, perceived control, or familiarity have been 
suggested as possible reasons why expert and public perception diverges (Sjöberg, 2002).  
Recently, it has been demonstrated that expert–laypeople’s differences in the 
perception of mobile communication risks are also due to differences in automatic affective 
reactions toward the technology (Dohle, Keller, & Siegrist, 2010). In this study, a Single 
Category Implicit Association Test (SC-IAT) was used. The SC-IAT is a computer-based 
categorization task designed to measure the strengths of association among concepts in 
memory (Karpinski & Steinman, 2006). The implicit test is based on reaction times, and does 
not require introspection on the part of the subject. The study conducted by Dohle and 
colleagues (2010) showed that experts immediately attached positive concepts to mobile 
phone base stations. Opponents, on the other hand, showed a negative SC-IAT effect for base 
stations; for laypeople, the SC-IAT effect was neutral. Thus, the study indicated that experts 
and opponents have strong affective reaction to mobile phone base stations. 
These results are in line with the affect heuristic (Alhakami & Slovic, 1994; Finucane, 
Alhakami, Slovic, & Johnson, 2000; Slovic, Finucane, Peters, & MacGregor, 2002, 2004). In 
this framework, it is hypothesized that individuals use affect as a shortcut within decision 
making because this is more efficient and easier than weighing all the available pros and cons 
of different options—especially when decisions are complex or mental resources are limited 
(Slovic et al., 2002). More specifically, the affect heuristic assumes that people rely on an 
affect pool during decision making. This affect pool contains all the negative and positive 
markers associated with images (perceptual and symbolic representations) of objects and 
events. Taken together, the affect heuristic suggests that people do not rely only on cognitive 
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factors (such as knowledge) to determine whether, for instance, mobile phones and their base 
stations are safe or not but largely rely on affective factors. 
While the implicit measure used in the study by Dohle et al. (2010) gives insights 
about the positivity and negativity of the mobile communication images people have in mind, 
little is known about the images of the affect pool itself. Knowing these images would help to 
understand why experts, laypeople, and opponents differ in their spontaneous evaluations of 
mobile communication, and such images might be explored using a free association method. 
 
1.2. Free Associations to Mobile Communication 
 
Free associations are the first words or images that come to a person’s mind in 
response to a certain cue (thinking about the word “beach,” for example, may bring up 
associations such as “water,” “sand,” or “vacation”). Since Galton’s (1879) pioneering work, 
whose systematic investigations mark the beginning of the experimental study of free word 
association, researchers have developed and refined the free association technique in order to 
gain more insight into the relationship and frequency of free associations (e.g., Szalay & 
Deese, 1978).  
In the field of risk research, free associations are typically studied in a two-step 
approach. In the first step, respondents are asked to indicate the words or ideas that come to 
mind in response to the cue. As a precondition, these responses should arise spontaneously 
and not be influenced by the researcher. After indicating one or more associations, 
respondents are instructed to evaluate each association on a scale ranging from negative (e.g., 
-5) to positive (e.g., +5). The mean values of these ratings can be viewed as indicators of the 
affect evoked by a certain hazard.  
The technique has been successfully applied to explore various risk topics, such as 
adolescent health-threatening behaviors (Benthin et al., 1995), nanotechnology (Siegrist, 
Cousin, Kastenholz, & Wiek, 2007), mobile phone base stations (Siegrist et al., 2005), 
HIV/AIDS (Goodwin et al., 2003), nuclear power and nuclear waste repositories (Peters & 
Slovic, 1996; Slovic, Flynn, & Layman, 1991; Slovic, Layman, & Flynn, 1991), global 
warming and climate change (Leiserowitz, 2005, 2006; Lorenzoni, Leiserowitz, Doria, 
Poortinga, & Pidgeon, 2006), as well as blood transfusion (Finucane, Slovic, & Mertz, 2000).  
Compared to traditional methods such as surveys or opinion polls, the free association 
technique allows tapping into unfiltered, idiosyncratic, and spontaneous meanings associated 
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with a hazard, minimizing the researcher bias (Goodwin et al., 2003; Leiserowitz, 2005, 
2006). As another advantage, the free association technique as described above not only 
provides information about which word associations are connected most frequently with a 
certain hazard but also provides a numerical value indicating positive or negative affect. This 
value (i.e., the affective rating of the hazard) can then be connected to other psychometric 
variables measuring risk perception, attitudes, or behavioral intentions. For instance, in the 
study by Slovic, Layman, et al. (1991), respondents were asked to associate freely about the 
phrase “nuclear waste repository” and frequently mentioned words such as “dangerous” or 
“danger,” “death,” and “pollution”; positive words, however, accounted for only 1% of all 
word associations. Moreover, the researchers were able to show that the affective rating of 
those images was related to the perception of the likelihood of possible accidents and 
predicted rejection of a repository. 
 
1.3. The Present Studies 
 
People who want to minimize risks from radiation emitted by mobile communication 
should ensure that network coverage is adequate when phoning, which is the case when a base 
station is close to the caller (Cousin & Siegrist, 2010a, 2010b). Thus, compared to other 
hazards, mobile phone base stations should be approached rather than avoided in order to 
minimize risks. Many people, however, feel discomfort in the vicinity of a base station, which 
is reflected in their spontaneous reactions to base stations (Dohle et al., 2010).  
 Thus, knowing free associations related to mobile phone base stations would be 
useful for risk communication. This knowledge would provide an indication why many 
people fear mobile phone base stations (in contrast to phones). A study conducted by Siegrist 
et al. (2005) indicated that mobile phone base stations primarily evoke negative free 
associations (such as electric smog, irradiation, and similar concepts) but fewer negative 
associations than for gene technology or nuclear waste repositories. Free associations related 
to mobile phone base stations (which can be counted and compared based on their 
frequencies) and their relation to risk perception and demographic variables are not known in 
all particulars, however.  
In addition, it would be interesting to investigate whether experts have images in mind 
when they think of mobile phone communication that are different from those of base station 
opponents or a randomly chosen sample of laypeople. Since media reports on the topic tend to 
report only results indicating negative health effects (Elvers, Jandrig, Grummich, & Tannert, 
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2009), it can be expected that laypeople or base station opponents frequently mention related 
images. In this sense, this study would yield insights for developing a mutually 
comprehensible language between experts and laypeople, and help to achieve reciprocal 
understanding.  
 
2. Study 1: Free Associations of Experts, Lay People, and Base Station 
Opponents 
 
It seems reasonable to assume that the content and affective ratings of free 
associations related to base stations are different for experts and laypeople. First, a number of 
researchers have demonstrated that experts and laypeople differ in their risk perception 
(Fischhoff, Slovic, & Lichtenstein, 1982; Kraus, Malmfors, & Slovic, 1992; Savadori et al., 
2004; Sjöberg, 1998; Thomson, Onkal, Avcioglu, & Goodwin, 2004). Furthermore, people 
who are strongly opposed to mobile phone base stations may think of different concepts than 
experts or randomly chosen laypeople, because research indicates that opponents hold strong 
negative affective reactions toward mobile phones (Dohle et al., 2010). Base station 
opponents also differ from laypeople in regard to knowledge. Opponents are often more 
familiar with base station and mobile phone properties than unversed laypeople (Cousin & 
Siegrist, 2010b). 
Study 1 was designed to explore these hypothesized differences among experts, 
laypeople, and base station opponents in more detail. To avoid confounding, the three groups 
were matched according to age, gender, and education.  
 
2.1. Method 
2.1.1. Participants 
 
Sixty-three persons from the German-speaking part of Switzerland participated in the 
study. Twenty-one were experts on mobile phone communication. The experts had different 
backgrounds on the topic: 6 indicated that they were working in the field of basic EMF 
research, 7 in the field of applied EMF research, 4 in general risk research, 5 for federal 
authorities, 7 for a cantonal or municipal authority, and 1 for a consumer protection board 
(multiple answers possible). The experts had, on average, 10 years’ experience with the topic 
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non-ionizing radiation (M = 9.86, SD = 4.43), and all but 1 stated that they regularly read 
scientific publications about it. Each expert was matched to a base station opponent (n = 21) 
and a person from the general public (n = 21). The matching criteria were gender, age (± 5 
years), and self-reported education (five levels: primary school, lower secondary school, 
upper secondary vocational school, upper secondary university-preparation school, and 
college or university). 
Opponents were recruited via Internet platforms of citizens’ action committees and, 
within the committees, by word of mouth. Laypeople were randomly drawn from the 
electronic telephone directory. Similar to the opponents, the laypeople were first called and 
asked about their age and educational background in order to find adequate matches. If the 
criteria were fulfilled, appointments were made at the participant’s home or office. 
The average age of the participants was 51 years (SD = 8.60). Participants were well 
educated, 95% (n = 60) having completed college or university, and the remainder (5%; n = 
3) having completed upper secondary vocational school. Seventy-six percent (n = 48) of the 
participants were male, and 24% (n = 15) were female.  
2.1.2.  Measures and Procedure 
 
Participants were asked to associate freely about the concept “mobile phone base 
station”. More precisely, they were asked to indicate the first three thoughts or images that 
came to mind when they thought about mobile phone base stations. The question appeared on 
the screen of a portable computer (Lenovo 1.8 GHz dual core ThinkPad using Inquisit 
software), and participants were instructed to write down their responses in a textbox on the 
screen. Afterward, each association was presented again on the screen, and the participant 
rated his or her association on an 11-point scale ranging from extremely negative (-5) to 
extremely positive (+5). 
 
2.2. Results 
2.2.1. Affective Rating of Free Associations 
 
The affective rating of the associations related to mobile phone base stations was, 
overall, negative (M = -1.95, SD = 2.04). Taking the mean of all three expert affective ratings, 
the results indicate that associations from the expert group were negative to a small extent (M 
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= -0.92, SD = 1.21, n = 21). Participants from the lay sample mentioned words and images 
that were slightly more negative than the experts’ associations (M = -1.40, SD = 1.60, n = 21). 
The affective ratings of the base station opponents were the most negative (M = -3.52, SD = 
2.20, n = 21). A repeated measures analysis of variance (ANOVA) showed that the three 
groups differed in the affective rating of their associations, F(2,60) = 13.70, p < .01. Post hoc 
tests (Tukey’s honestly significant difference [HSD]) revealed that the affective ratings of the 
base station opponents differed from those of the laypeople and the expert sample (both: p < 
.01). Expert affective ratings did not differ from those of the laypeople, however (p > .6). 
2.2.2. Content of Free Associations 
 
Each participant expressed three word-association images. These 189 associations 
were assigned to 28 subcategories by a first rater. A second rater verified the subcategory 
assigned to each association. Interrater reliability (Cohen’s kappa) was very good ( = .80). 
Afterward, the subcategories were subsumed under 10 general categories. As 
illustrated in Table 3.1., the general category negative consequences was most dominant. 
Thirty-nine out of 63 participants (62%) mentioned at least one free association belonging to 
this category, and the affective rating of this category was, on average, negative. 
Subcategories belonging to the general category negative consequences were, for example, 
electric smog, conflicts and discussions, or environmental aspects. The subcategory with the 
most negative rating within the general category negative consequences was health aspects (M 
= -3.77, SD = 1.74). Examples of the specific associations that were mentioned by 
participants are listed in Table 3.1..  
Two other general categories that were mentioned frequently were radiation and 
esthetic aspects. Twenty-three participants (37%) stated at least one association that belonged 
to the category radiation, and 22 participants (35%) mentioned an image associated with 
esthetic aspects. Both general categories were rated clearly negative as well. Associations 
related to technical concepts were raised by 18 participants (29%) and included images such 
as “transmitter” and “magnet.” Positive concepts and technical concepts were the only two 
general categories that were judged to be slightly positive. Other frequently mentioned 
associations belonged to the category negative concepts or synonyms or repetition of the word 
“base station” (which were both rated negatively), or were assigned to the miscellaneous 
category. 
 
        Chapter III 
 
64
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
T
a
b
le
 3
.1
. 
F
re
q
u
en
cy
 a
n
d
 A
ff
ec
ti
v
e 
R
at
in
g
s 
o
f 
F
re
e 
A
ss
o
ci
at
io
n
s 
to
 t
h
e 
T
er
m
 “
M
o
b
il
e 
P
h
o
n
e 
B
as
e 
S
ta
ti
o
n
” 
(S
tu
d
y
 1
) 
N
o
te
. 
n
 =
 n
u
m
b
er
 o
f 
p
ar
ti
ci
p
an
ts
 w
h
o
 m
en
ti
o
n
ed
 a
t 
le
as
t 
o
n
e 
as
so
ci
at
io
n
 t
h
at
 b
el
o
n
g
ed
 t
o
 t
h
e 
p
ar
ti
cu
la
r 
g
en
er
al
 c
at
eg
o
ry
. 
F
o
r 
p
ar
ti
ci
p
an
ts
 
m
en
ti
o
n
in
g
 m
o
re
 t
h
an
 o
n
e 
as
so
ci
at
io
n
 o
f 
th
e 
sa
m
e 
g
en
er
al
 c
at
eg
o
ry
, 
th
e 
m
ea
n
 w
as
 t
ak
en
 a
s 
an
 i
n
d
ic
at
o
r 
fo
r 
th
e 
af
fe
ct
iv
e 
ra
ti
n
g
 o
f 
th
e 
ca
te
g
o
ry
.
 
Free Associations to Mobile Phone Base Stations      
 
65 
2.2.3. Differences in Free Associations Between Matched Groups 
There were considerable differences in the frequency and the affective ratings of the 
associations among the three groups. As illustrated in Table 3.1., base station opponents more 
often mentioned associations that belonged to the general category negative consequences 
than experts or laypeople. Logistic regression was used to test whether the group would 
predict the presence or absence of associations belonging to this category. For this purpose, a 
dummy variable was calculated that indicated the presence or absence of a response in the 
category negative consequences. The logistic regression for the overall model was marginally 
significant, 2(2, N = 63) = 5.15, p = .08, Nagelkerke R2 = .11. Indicator contrast with the lay 
group as the reference category showed that laypeople did not differ from the expert group (p 
= 1.00) but were marginally different from the opponent group, B = 1.35, Wald = 3.66, 
Exp(B) = 3.86, p = .06. The three groups also varied in the affective rating of the associations 
belonging to the category negative consequences, F(2, 36) = 5.19, p = .01. Post hoc tests 
(Tukey’s HSD) indicated that participants from the opponent group rated negative 
consequences associations more negatively than either the expert group or the lay group 
(experts: p = .05, laypeople: p = .02).  
Group was also a significant predictor for the presence or absence of associations 
belonging to the category technical concepts, 2(2, N = 63) = 6.35, p = .04, Nagelkerke R2 = 
.14. Here again, the lay group (indicator) differed from the opponent group (B = -1.77, Wald 
= 4.13, Exp(B) = 0.17, p = .04) but not from the expert group (p = 1.00). A similar pattern 
was found for the affective rating of the technical concepts associations. Results of the 
ANOVA indicated that there were differences between groups, F(2, 15) = 7.18, p = .01, and a 
post hoc test showed that the opponent group had a more negative rating of those associations 
than either experts or laypeople (both: p = .01).  
In addition, the presence or absence of the category negative concepts was marginally 
significantly predicted by group, 2(2, N = 63) = 5.15, p = .08, Nagelkerke R2 = .12. Neither 
the expert group (p > .1) nor the opponent group (p > .5) differed significantly from the lay 
group (indicator), suggesting that this difference was due to expert–opponent differences. 
Moreover, the affective rating of the associations belonging to the general category negative 
concepts varied among the groups, F(2, 13) = 6.58, p = .01; the opponent group associations 
were more negative than those of the laypeople (p = .01), according to post hoc tests. 
Furthermore, the affective rating of the category miscellaneous was different among the 
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groups as well, F(2, 8) = 7.02, p = .02. This significant effect was due to expert–opponent 
differences (p = .01). 
For all other general categories, no significant relationship was found between group 
and the presence or absence of a particular category (p > .1) or the affective ratings (p > .2) of 
the category
1
.  
 
2.3. Discussion  
 
The aim of Study 1 was to examine whether experts, laypeople, and base station 
opponents (who were matched according to gender, age, and education) would differ in their 
free associations related to the term mobile phone base station. The present findings indicate 
that the three groups differ in the frequency of associations belonging to the categories 
negative consequences, negative concepts, and technical concepts. While the base station 
opponents primarily thought more often of negative consequences and negative concepts than 
laypeople or experts (and rated those associations more negatively), the latter more often 
mentioned the technical concepts of mobile phone base stations (and rated these associations 
more positively). “Radiation” was mentioned slightly less often by experts, but no statistical 
relationship between group and frequency of associations was found. “Esthetic aspects” were 
generally mentioned often, independent of group membership, and were rated similarly by 
experts, laypeople, and opponents.  
In contrast to other studies (Fischhoff et al., 1982; Kraus et al., 1992; Savadori et al., 
2004; Sjöberg, 1998; Thomson et al., 2004), we found no significant differences between the 
experts and the unversed laypeople, either in the frequency of the categorized associations or 
in the affective rating of these associations. Group variations seem to be driven by differences 
between the opponent group, on the one hand, and the experts and laypeople, on the other. In 
our study, experts and laypeople were matched according to age, gender, and education, 
because studies of expert–laypeople differences in risk judgments have often been criticized 
for being inconclusive about whether differences in risk perception are due to expertise per se 
or to sociodemographic characteristics (Rowe & Wright, 2001). Thus, expert–laypeople 
differences, as found in other studies, might frequently be confounded. It should be noted, 
however, that, due to the complex matching procedure, the subsample sizes in our study were 
relatively small. Therefore, it is possible that differences between experts and laypeople might 
                                                
1
 The category synonyms had a cell frequency < 1, so logistic regression and analysis of 
variance couldn’t be applied. 
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be detected in studies with greater statistical power. Presumably, the present study revealed 
only the most prominent differences among the three groups. 
Furthermore, the findings show that, overall, participants primarily utter associations 
that have a negative meaning for them. Of all general categories, only two categories were 
rated as slightly positive (i.e., technical concepts and positive concepts). The results also 
emphasize the fact that participants most often think of the negative consequences of mobile 
phone base stations; almost two-thirds of the participants mentioned associations connected 
with this aspect. Taken together, the results of Study 1 underline that, despite some 
differences in the frequency and affective rating of the associations among the three groups, 
the majority of the associations was negative in all groups. 
 
3. Study 2: Free Associations of a General Population 
 
Study 2 was conducted in order to discover systematic patterns in the free associations 
produced by a large, randomly drawn sample of the general population. The study was aimed 
at providing information about the prevalence of free associations evoked by the term mobile 
phone base station and about the affective rating of those associations. Because of the large 
sample size, this study allowed us to analyze the frequencies of free associations on a 
subcategory level—in contrast to Study 1, in which only general categories were explored. 
Furthermore, in Study 1, the lay sample was matched to the expert sample. Respondents were 
therefore predominantly male and highly educated. Thus, the sample was not suited to 
drawing generalizable conclusions about which word associations are connected most 
frequently with the term mobile phone base station.  
In order to explore the frequencies of associations, a correspondence analysis was 
applied in Study 2. Correspondence analysis is a powerful tool to represent the relations 
among two or more sets of variables (Weller & Romney, 1990). This analysis has been 
associated mainly with Jean-Paul Benzécri and his research group in France (Le Roux & 
Rouanet, 2004), and became more and more popular in the 1980s with the publication of 
English textbooks on this topic (Greenacre & Blasius, 2006). Data input for correspondence 
analysis is typically a two-way contingency table. The objective of correspondence analysis is 
to reduce the dimensionality of the table and to visualize it in a space of low dimensionality 
(Nenadic & Greenacre, 2007). Thus, correspondence analysis facilitates the interpretation of 
complex contingency tables, since this analysis replaces the raw data with a more simple data 
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matrix (Clausen, 1998; Greenacre & Blasius, 2006). A comprehensive theoretical overview of 
correspondence analysis can be found in the work of Greenacre and Blasius (2006). In our 
study, correspondence analysis was used to study the connections between the free 
associations with mobile phone base station on the one hand and risk perception on the other.  
 
3.1. Method 
3.1.1. Participants 
 
The survey was carried out in the urban area of Zurich, Switzerland, between 
November 2008 and March 2009. The randomly selected households (drawn from the 
electronic telephone directory) were contacted by mail requesting cooperation with the 
survey. Approximately 1 week later, a trained interviewer telephoned them, and the person 
answering the phone was asked to participate in the study. If this person agreed to participate, 
the interviewer made an appointment at the person’s home. The face-to-face interview, which 
addressed several issues of mobile phone communication, lasted 1 hour on average. The 
response rate was about 35%.
2
 
Participants (N = 503) were between 18 and 80 years of age. The distribution of age 
(M = 51.60, SD = 15.10) and gender (45% female, 55% male) indicated that males and older 
people were slightly overrepresented, compared to the general Swiss population (BFS, 2009). 
The self-reported education level ranged from primary or lower secondary school (6%; n = 
28) through upper secondary vocational school or upper secondary university-preparation 
school (58%; n = 294) to college or university (36%; n = 178). Ninety-four percent of the 
participants (n = 470) were mobile phone owners, using their mobile phone 26.04 (SD = 
60.76) times per week for communication purposes. Due to a computer error, the free 
associations of 3 participants were missing. Furthermore, 3 other participants refrained from 
filling out the questionnaire that was presented at the end of the interview. 
3.1.2. Measures and Procedure 
 
Free Associations. In the first part of the interview, participants were asked to 
associate freely about the term mobile phone base station. The same free association 
                                                
2
 The response rate was calculated as: Response rate = (number of completed 
interviews)/(number in sample-number not eligible). 
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technique described in Study 1 was applied. The question appeared on a computer screen, and 
respondents typed in the first three associations that came to mind. Subsequently, the 
respondents rated the association on a scale ranging from extremely negative (-5) to extremely 
positive (+5). 
 
Questionnaire. Risk perception of mobile phone base stations was measured in a 
paper-and-pencil questionnaire, which was administered at the end of the interview. The item 
was worded in the following way: “How risky do you consider mobile phone base stations to 
be for Swiss society as a whole?” It was answered on a 6-point scale ranging from low risk 
(1) to high risk (6). On the final page of the questionnaire, demographic data regarding age, 
gender, and education were collected. 
 
3.2. Results 
3.2.1. Affective Rating of Free Associations 
 
First, the affective rating of the three associations as judged by participants was 
analyzed. Not only was the participants’ affective rating of the first association clearly 
negative (M = -1.80, SD = 3.00) but also the second (M = -1.47, SD = 2.94) and third 
associations (M = -0.89, SD = 3.04) were judged to be negative. The affective rating of all 
three associations differed significantly from the scale’s midpoint (p < .001). According to a 
linear contrast revealed through a repeated measures ANOVA, the affective rating of the 
associations increased significantly from the first to the last association, F(1,499) = 31.24, p < 
.001. A linear regression was used to regress risk perception on the three affective ratings. 
The first ( = -.22, p < .001), the last ( = -.16, p < .001), but not the second ( = -.07, p > 
.10) affective rating predicted risk perception significantly (R
2
 = .12). 
3.2.2. Content of Free Associations  
 
The same general categories and subcategories used in Study 1 were used to 
categorize the words and images expressed by the participants. However, due to the larger 
number of associations (N = 1,500), we added three subcategories that were not present in the 
first study: acceptance, provider, and not-in-my-backyard beliefs (NIMBY). These 
subcategories were assigned to the preexisting general categories positive concepts, technical 
concepts, and location, respectively.  
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Table 3.2. Frequencies of Free Associations to the Term “Mobile Phone Base Station” in a 
General Population Sample (Study 2): General Categories and Subcategories (Indented) 
Categories Frequencies 
Negative consequences 370 
   Health aspects 139 
   Number of base stations 60 
   Electric smog  49 
   Conflicts and discussions 44 
   Environmental aspects  42 
   Hazard  36 
Esthetic aspects 241 
   Esthetic aspects  241 
Radiation 227 
   Radiation 227 
Positive concepts 164 
   Necessity 114 
   Acceptance 32 
   Usefulness 18 
Negative concepts 143 
   Problem 57 
   Insecurity  31 
   Negative emotions  24 
   Invisibility 18 
   Senselessness 13 
Technical concepts 103 
   Technical concepts  86 
   Provider  9 
   Mobile phones  8 
Political and societal aspects 76 
   Coordination  28 
   Initiatives and rejections  25 
   Political aspects  23 
Location 74 
   Location: General  42 
   Location: Building  25 
   NIMBY  7 
Synonyms 58 
   Synonyms  58 
Miscellaneous 44 
   Miscellaneous  17 
   Future  9 
   Communication 8 
   Camouflage  7 
   Science  3 
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A subsample of the associations (n = 150) was coded and assigned to the subcategory 
by a second rater. Interrater reliability (Cohen’s kappa) was again very good ( = .83). A 
complete list of all general categories and subcategories and their frequencies is given in 
Table 3.2.  
The general category negative consequences was most dominant. Almost every fourth 
association belonged to it; within this category, participants mentioned health aspects (9%) 
most frequently. In addition, more than 16% of the associations belonged to the category 
esthetic aspects and 15% to the category radiation. Positive concepts were also mentioned 
regularly (11%), which were primarily covered by the subcategory necessity (7%). The 
NIMBY phenomenon, which was added in Study 2, occurred only rarely (0.005%). 
3.2.3. Correspondence Analysis 
 
Subcategories were further analyzed with a correspondence analysis. The data input 
for the correspondence analysis was a contingency table that included the 31 free associations 
categories (columns) and three different levels of risk perception (rows). The risk perception 
scale was used to divide participants into three groups: low-, medium-, and high-risk 
perception (scale points 1 and 2, 3 and 4, and 5 and 6, respectively).  
In addition, the demographic variables age, gender, and education were used as 
supplementary elements (i.e., as additional rows in the contingency table to describe the free 
association categories). Supplementary elements do not determine the solution space but 
rather support the interpretation of the geometric orientation and serve as a validity check 
(Clausen, 1998; Greenacre, 2006). The continuous variable age was divided into four groups 
(participants younger than 30 years, between 31 and 45 years, between 46 and 65 years, older 
than 65 years). Likewise, the variable education was divided into two groups: low education 
(primary, lower secondary, or upper secondary vocational school) and high education (upper 
secondary university-preparation school and college or university). 
Applying correspondence analysis to this table yielded the graphic display shown in 
Figure 3.1. The display indicates a two-dimensional joint space that represents the columns 
and rows of the contingency table. The first dimension explains 73%, and the second 27% of 
the variance. The overall chi-square was 2(60) = 9.22, p = .005, and total inertia was G = 
0.066. 
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Figure 3.1. Bidimensional graphic representation of the correspondence analysis. Risk 
perception: 1 = low risk, 2 = medium risk, 3 = high risk. Gender: A = females, B = males. 
Age: C = < 30 years, D= 31-45 years, E = 46-65 years, F = 65+ years. Education: G = low 
education, H = high education. 
 
 
The interpretation of the graphic display is based on the proximity of the points: two 
points that are close together are closely related or similar, and two points apart are less 
closely related or dissimilar (Weller & Romney, 1990). Thus, the interpretation of the display 
consists in inspecting how the free association categories lie relative to one another and how 
the different levels of risk perception are spread out relative to the free association categories. 
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It is also common practice to study the distribution of the points along the dimensions in order 
to interpret the dimensions (Clausen, 1998). 
The first dimension illustrates the difference in risk perception. Participants with low-
risk perception often mentioned associations that belonged to the categories science, 
camouflage, conflicts and discussions, acceptance, or location on building, or they thought of 
synonyms. Participants with high-risk perception, on the other hand, mainly mentioned 
associations such as senselessness or hazard. They also thought about health effects and the 
number of base stations, and mentioned NIMBY concepts.  
On the second dimension, young and old people are slightly directed toward each end 
of the dimension. Young adults tended to think about the providers, communication, and the 
coordination of mobile phone base stations. This group is also directed toward the low-risk 
end of the first dimension. Older people mentioned invisibility and senselessness, but the 
category future also lies in the direction of older age groups. Moreover, older participants 
were located slightly toward the high-risk end of the first dimension. Concerning the other 
supplementary elements, Figure 3.1. shows that female and less-well-educated participants 
were located slightly toward the negative end of the first dimension, which represents a higher 
risk perception, while male and better-educated participants are located slightly toward the 
positive (low-risk) end of the first dimension. It is important to note, however, that all 
supplementary elements (and gender and education in particular) are situated near the 
centroid, i.e., the origin of the coordinate system. Thus, they contribute only a little to the 
difference between high- and low-risk perception.  
 
3.3. Discussion 
 
In Study 2, data from a large Swiss survey were analyzed in which free associations 
related to mobile phone base station were collected. The results showed that, on average, 
participants rated their own associations slightly negatively, which is line with results 
obtained by Siegrist et al. (2005). 
Especially the first association that came to the participants’ minds was negative, and 
became less negative in the second and third responses. It is possible that the participants 
wanted to balance their first negative association with a more positive one, and that neutral or 
positive associations occurred to the participants only after some time of reflection. In this 
regard, our study differs from a free association study conducted by Lorenzoni et al. (2006). 
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In their study on climate change, the mean affect in one of their samples became 
progressively more negative in the second and third responses. Differences in the two studies 
might be due to methodological factors, however. In Lorenzoni et al.’s (2006) study, 
participants were free to express fewer than three associations, and it is possible that only 
concerned people expressed second and third associations, which may have inflated the 
negativity of the last associations.  
The results further indicated that the affective ratings were related to risk perception. 
Risk perception was predicted by the affective rating of the first and the last associations, 
indicating that not only the first spontaneous and immediate association but also more 
deliberative associations are important predictors of risk perception.  
 The free associations were categorized and assigned to 31 subcategories and 10 
general categories. As in Study 1, negative consequences was the most prevalent general 
category, while esthetic aspects and radiation were also quite dominant. NIMBY beliefs were 
added in Study 2, but occurred only rarely. Interestingly, they were slightly rarer than 
NIMBY beliefs in regard to a nuclear waste repository (Slovic, Flynn, et al., 1991), although 
people are presumably more often confronted with the construction of or the request to built a 
base station in their vicinity. 
Furthermore, a correspondence analysis indicated that people who differ in their risk 
perception also have different images and words in mind when they think of mobile phone 
base stations. Respondents who assigned high risks to base stations often noted that they are 
senseless and a hazard that may lead to health effects. The rarely occurring NIMBY beliefs 
were also primarily brought up by participants with high-risk perception. Respondents with 
low-risk perception, on the other hand, often mentioned concepts that are less affective. 
Similar to the experts in Study 1, the respondents simply noted synonyms (“mast”), for 
instance. They also mentioned associations that belonged to the category conflicts and 
discussion; however, it cannot be determined whether these respondents were referring to 
their own conflicts or whether they drew on discussions in the media and by base station 
opponents. The demographic variables age, gender, and education were only slightly 
connected with differences in free associations and risk perception. 
 
4. General Discussion 
 
In the free association technique, a person reports anything that may cross his or her 
mind in response to a certain cue. The method allows categorizing of unfiltered, idiosyncratic 
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responses, which may differ substantially among groups of people. A subsequent rating of the 
associations allows the investigation of differences in the affective quality of those 
associations, and can be related to other psychometric variables. Thus, the technique 
combines a qualitative approach (the content of the associations) with a quantitative approach 
(the affective rating of the associations).  
The affective rating of the free associations differed significantly between experts in 
mobile communication and people who were clearly opposed to mobile communication. This 
is in line with a reaction time study conducted by Dohle et al. (2010), which found that 
experts, base station opponents, and laypeople differ in their spontaneous affective 
evaluations of mobile phone base stations. The content of the free associations, as provided in 
the present research, provides insights into the causes of such differences. We found, for 
instance, that experts often think of technical concepts, while opponents think of the negative 
consequences and negative concepts of base stations. Remarkably, differences were primarily 
found between experts and base station opponents, but not between experts and randomly 
selected laypeople. However, all groups agreed upon the negative visual impact of base 
stations.  
Esthetic aspects were also mentioned frequently in the second study, in which a large 
sample from the general population was surveyed. The focus of the second study was to 
explore differences between participants who attribute high or low risks to mobile phone base 
stations. Compared to the low-risk group, participants from the high-risk group more often 
mentioned highly affective images or words such as “hazard” or “senseless.” Health aspects 
were frequently expressed in this group as well, which might be a reflection of media reports 
on the adverse health effects of mobile communication.  
The results of our study support the idea of the affect heuristic, according to which 
people consult an affect pool during decision making, which permits an easier and more 
efficient decision-making process (Finucane, Alhakami, et al., 2000). We believe that the free 
association technique is a way of exploring the contents of this affect pool. This is in line with 
the notion that implicit associations are simply a different description of the affect pool 
(Spence & Townsend, 2008). Implicit measures, however, give insights only into whether a 
certain cue is more strongly associated with positivity or negativity. The free association 
method, in contrast, goes beyond assessing spontaneous evaluation and elicits the specific 
images that are most frequently connected with, e.g., a certain hazard.  
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This study also has some limitations that have to be addressed. First, due to the small 
subsample sizes in Study 1, only the most prominent group differences in free associations 
could be detected. Moreover, with the results of our studies, we can only speculate about the 
development of differences between experts and base station opponents in free associations 
about mobile phone base stations. It might be the affinity for technology, and less the 
scientific knowledge about a technology, that resulted in more positive affective ratings from 
the experts. It has been noted that the affect heuristic literature says relatively little about how 
the positive and negative tags of the affect pool are developed (Spence & Townsend, 2008). 
For mobile communication, it seems reasonable to assume that laypeople’s and opponents’ 
associations are influenced by media reports, because people are often uncertain how to 
integrate and evaluate scientific results on this technology. Future research might want to 
address this assumption in an experiment or a quasi-experiment, in which participants receive 
pro and con messages (as carried out by Rodriguez, 2007, for instance) on a certain topic. 
Such an experimental setting might reveal whether spontaneous affective reactions (assessed 
with implicit measures) or free associations change after receiving one-sided messages, or 
whether the reactions remain stable and unaltered.  
In a similar vein, it might be interesting to see if free associations related to mobile 
phone base stations change over time. As noted by Elvers and colleagues (2009), there is a 
trend in media publication style that can be described as “from amplification to information”: 
journalists have switched over to acknowledging the existence of scientific uncertainty and 
provide more detailed information on the topic. This switch might also become noticeable in 
the public’s free associations with the topic after some time.  
For the dialog among experts, laypeople, and base station opponents, the findings of 
our research suggest that communication should not be constructed as a one-way transfer of 
information (Davies, 2008). Experts and nonexperts seem to have their own idiosyncratic 
apprehension about the risks associated with mobile communication. A context-dependent, 
multisided debate that seeks to acknowledge all opinions and apprehensions, as described by 
Davies (2008), would be desirable in this regard. Furthermore, affective variables in general 
seem to play an important role in risk perception and communication. Lee et al. (2005) 
pointed to the fact that affective variables might influence the impact of cognition and vice 
versa, because in that study emotional responses moderated the effect that knowledge has on 
people’s overall attitudes toward a technology. Following this line of argument, affective 
responses are central in shaping attitudes and perception. The present study provided evidence 
that affective factors are important for the perception of mobile communication risks as well.  
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But experts and opponents, as well as individuals with high- and low-risk perception, 
do not merely differ in the magnitude of their affective responses to mobile communication. 
More importantly, what makes people’s reactions different from another is that they are based 
on different images. Thus, this research points to similarities and differences in the conception 
of mobile communication risks, and provides an indication about why experts and laypeople 
sometimes seem to talk at cross-purposes. Therefore, we believe that this study provides the 
first step for an improved mutual understanding among laypeople, opponents, and experts.  
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Abstract 
 
Previous research has shown that broad and unspecified affective reactions can serve as a 
heuristic in decision making. The present study, in contrast, examines how specific integral 
emotions influence decisions and judgments. More precisely, the study investigated how fear 
and anger determine risk and benefit perceptions and the acceptance of a technology. Using 
structural equation modeling, we found that risk perception of mobile phone base stations was 
more strongly influenced by fear than by anger. On the other hand, benefit perceptions and 
the acceptance of mobile phone base stations were primarily determined by anger. In addition, 
controllability and fairness emerged as important cognitive appraisals for these two emotions. 
In sum, our findings highlight how specific emotions, rather than global affect, shape 
decisions in a risk context. Furthermore, the study gives insights into how emotions toward a 
hazard develop and, thus, how they could be modified.    
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1. Introduction 
 
According to the affect heuristic, the perception and integration of affective feelings 
enable individuals to be rational actors in many situations (Slovic, Finucane, Peters, & 
MacGregor, 2002). Affect can serve as an effective shortcut within decision making, 
especially when decisions and judgments are complex and cognitive resources are limited. 
The affect heuristic developed from evidence of early psychometric studies of risk perception, 
which indicated that feelings of dread play a powerful role in public perception and 
acceptance of risk. It shares a number of similarities with the How do I feel about it? heuristic 
(Schwarz & Clore, 1988), which arose from social psychology, and with the somatic marker 
hypothesis in the field of neuroscience (Damasio, 1994).  
In the theoretical framework of the affect heuristic, affect is understood as goodness or 
badness experienced as a feeling state, and demarcates a positive or negative quality of a 
stimulus. According to Slovic and colleagues (Finucane, Peters, & Slovic, 2003; Slovic et al., 
2002), affect differs from emotions, and from moods. Affect is more subtle than emotions, 
and unlike moods, it has a direct motivational effect. This definition of affect differs from 
traditional conceptualizations of affect, which use affect as a broad and inclusive label to refer 
to both moods and emotions.  
 
1.1. The Influence of Specific Emotions on Decision Making 
 
The influence of global affect on decision making and risk and benefit perceptions has 
been demonstrated in various studies (Dohle, Keller, & Siegrist, 2010b; Slovic et al., 2002). 
Considering affect as conceptually independent from specific emotions and moods involves 
some ambiguity, however. First, this definition of affect seems to encompass the definition of 
an attitude (Sjöberg, 2007; Spence & Townsend, 2008). Second, the question arises how 
affect can be measured (Dohle et al., 2010b; Peters & Slovic, 2007). Peters and Slovic (2007) 
reported three studies that systematically examined this issue and took the predictive validity 
of different measures into account. The authors concluded that research with affect should 
include a holistic, unipolar, discrete emotion (HUE) evaluative measure. The HUE measure is 
based on discrete emotions such as anger, fear, and happiness. This result calls into question 
whether affect can be seen as a construct that is detached from other concepts such as 
emotion. In a similar vein, Zeelenberg and colleagues (Zeelenberg, Nelissen, Breugelmans, & 
Pieters, 2008) have argued that specific emotions have an important influence on decisions. In 
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their feeling is for doing approach, the authors argue that different emotions may produce 
different behaviors; thus, it necessary to study the effect of emotions to fully understand 
decision making. 
Relatively little research (Peters, Burraston, & Mertz, 2004; Sjöberg, 2007), however, 
has examined how integral emotions influence subsequent judgments (Dunn & Schweitzer, 
2005; Zeelenberg et al., 2008). Integral emotions stem from thinking about the consequences 
of one’s decision, unlike incidental emotions, which are caused by dispositional or situational 
sources objectively unrelated to the decision problem at hand. Sjöberg (2007) studied the 
relationship between integral emotions and perceived risk and attitudes. The author found that 
emotional factors were the most important determinants in explaining attitude toward 
repository for spent nuclear fuel, followed by epistemic trust, perceived risk, and the general 
attitude to nuclear power. Peters et al. (2004) investigated the role of integral emotions using 
an emotion-based model of stigma responses toward radiation. Stigma responses indicate that 
something is disgraceful, unacceptable in general, and unacceptable under any imaginable 
circumstances. The authors showed that stigma responses emerged from fear and anger, 
highlighting their importance for risk judgments. In the Peters et al. (2004) study, fear and 
anger were subsumed under a negative emotion scale. However, research that examined the 
influence of incidental emotions on risk perception has shown that fear and anger can have 
quite different effects on risk estimates and choices (Lerner & Keltner, 2001). Therefore, it 
seems reasonable to assume that integral fear and anger also have a different influence on risk 
judgments. 
 
1.2. Emotions and Cognitive Appraisals 
 
Little is known about the antecedents of affect. The affect heuristic literature is 
relatively sparse on how affect evolves (Spence & Townsend, 2008). An emotion-specific 
approach may be effective for drawing conclusions about how affective reactions develop and 
how they can be changed. Appraisal theories of emotion emphasize the causes of emotions. 
These theories propose that discrete emotions arise from conscious or unconscious processes 
of evaluation of significant events and of attributions of the causes of those events 
(Niedenthal, Krauth-Gruber, & Ric, 2006). These appraisals encompass, for instance, the 
novelty of the stimulus, goal significance, and coping potential. Prior research has identified 
the appraisal of control, i.e., the perspective that one’s own actions can modify the course of 
events (Frijda, 1986), as particularly important in distinguishing different emotions (Dunn & 
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Schweitzer, 2005). For example, in his cognitive theory of emotion, Lazarus (e.g., Lazarus & 
Folkman, 1984) suggested that appraising an outcome as controllable reduces stress and can 
turn danger from threat into challenge; likewise, absence of control can result in learned 
helplessness (Seligman, 1975). Another appraisal that is strongly related to control and that 
might be an important antecedent of emotion is fairness—especially in a risk framework (e.g., 
Earle & Siegrist, 2008). Smith and Ellsworth (1985) demonstrated that fairness is relevant for 
appraisals of responsibility and control: if another person is responsible for a certain event or 
situation, it is seen as less fair than if the person herself or himself is responsible. Likewise, 
Mikula and colleagues (1998) found that perceived injustice plays a major role in the 
elicitation of many different emotions, and primarily for anger. 
 
1.3. The Present Study  
 
The present study examines risk perception and acceptance of hazards in an emotion-
specific manner. In line with the feeling-is-for-doing approach (Zeelenberg et al., 2008), we 
assumed that anger and fear may have different influences on risk perception and acceptance 
of hazards. We hypothesize that risk and benefit perceptions are primarily influenced by fear, 
because prior research has shown that dread is a major determinant for risk perceptions. 
Anger, in contrast, should mainly determine the acceptance of a hazard. Sjöberg (2007) found 
that anger, not fear, was the most important emotion factor in predicting attitude toward a 
repository. The importance of anger for the acceptance of a risk is also highlighted in 
Sandman’s outrage model (Sandman, 1987).  
A second aim of the paper is to explore the causes of emotion in a risk context, and we 
concentrated on control. We also included fairness, because it is strongly related to control 
(Smith & Ellsworth, 1985). The relationships between cognitive appraisals (fairness, control), 
specific integral emotions (fear, anger), acceptance, and risk and benefit perception were 
investigated with structural equation modeling (see Figure 4.1. for an overview of the 
proposed model).  
The model was tested in the field of mobile communication. We focused on mobile 
phone base stations, rather than on mobile phones, because research has shown that people 
often fear mobile phone base stations more than mobile phones, although the actual exposure 
to radiation can be much higher from mobile phones (Cousin & Siegrist, 2010). Moreover, 
mobile phone base station risks are also characterized by a loss of control. Human beings 
cannot perceive nonionizing radiation; citizens therefore have no control about the exposure 
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to a base station’s radiation. Furthermore, citizens usually have only a few possibilities to 
participate in base station siting decisions. Thus, we assumed that mobile communication 
provides an optimal context for testing the proposed model.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.1. Initial (hypothesized) model of determinants of acceptance of mobile phone base 
stations. 
 
2. Method 
2.1. Participants 
 
The data from the present study come from a survey conducted in the urban area of 
Zurich, Switzerland. A sample of 500 participants, randomly drawn from the electronic 
telephone directory, was interviewed face-to-face in their homes. The response rate was 35%. 
Forty-five percent (n = 225) of the respondents were female, and 55 % (n = 275) were male. 
The mean age was 51.60 (SD = 15.10).  
 
2.2. Materials and Procedure 
 
The paper-and-pencil questionnaire contained a wide range of items on the issue of 
mobile communication. Table 4.1. shows the 28 variables used for measuring control, 
fairness, anger, fear, acceptance, and risk and benefit perception. Participants expressed their 
agreement with each item using a number between 1 (no agreement at all) and 6 (absolute 
agreement). The items on perceived risk or benefits of mobile phone base stations were 
answered on a scale ranging from 1 (low risk or benefit) to 6 (high risk or benefit).  
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The items for measuring acceptance stem from the work of Siegrist, Earle, and 
Gutscher (2003). New items were formulated to measure the variables on perceived control, 
fairness, anger, fear, risk and benefit perception. For the variable control, questions assessed 
control of radiation (V1 to V4) and control of construction (V5 and V6). For anger, four items 
were formulated using the word angry (V15 to V18), and four items used the word annoyed 
(V19 to V22).  
 
2.3. Data Analysis 
 
Structural equation modeling procedures were used to test the plausibility of the 
postulated causal model. AMOS 17.0 (SPSS Inc.) was used for estimating parameters. 
Analysis was based on raw data, and the maximum likelihood (ML) method was employed. 
Assessment of model fit was based on the comparative fit index (CFI), the root mean square 
error of approximation (RMSEA), and the meaningfulness of the model (Hu & Bentler, 
1995).  
Ninety-eight percent (n = 488) of the respondents answered all questions used to test 
the causal model; 2% (n = 10) had one missing value, and 0.4% had two missing values (n = 
1) or three missing values (n = 1). The SPSS data imputation procedure was utilized. Missing 
values were replaced using a procedure based on the EM algorithm. Variables referring to a 
particular latent variable were used as predictors of the missing value estimates of these 
variables. 
Before we estimated the structural model, we employed confirmatory factor analysis 
to test whether the postulated measurement model was appropriate. All factor loadings were 
significant (p < .001) and substantial (a > .40 or a < -.40). Furthermore, the factor loadings 
indicated that the eight items assessing anger measured the same construct.  
To analyze the structural model, i.e., the relationships between the latent variables, 
modification indices were employed to identify which parameters could be added to improve 
the fit of the model. Because subsequent models are nested, the difference in 2 was used to 
assess the improvement of the fit of the new model.  
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3. Results 
 
The hypothesized model yielded a reasonable fit (Hu & Bentler, 1995) to the data (CFI 
= .90; RMSEA = .075). However, the modification indices indicated that the addition of a 
correlation between the error terms for items V5 and V6 would improve the model fit. 
Relaxing the parameter seems to be justified due to the content of the items: Items V5 and V6 
were related to the perceived control of a base station’s construction, whereas all the other 
items of the same scale measured the perceived control of the base station’s radiation. Table 
4.2. shows the chi-square distribution (2) for the revised model, in which the correlation 
between the two error terms has been incorporated. The 2 decreased significantly (2 (1) = 
166.3, p < .001). The modification indices also suggested the addition of a correlation 
between the error terms for items V7 and V9. Correlation between these two items is likely 
because both items were written from a personal point of view; thus, they were more 
subjective than the other items. As shown in Table 4.2., estimation of this revised model 
yielded a significant decrease in the 2 statistic (2 (1) = 79.2, p < .001). Inspection of the 
modification indices further showed that adding a covariance between the latent variables fear 
and anger would contribute to an improved model fit. As indicated in Table 4.2., 2 decreased 
significantly in the new model (2 (1) = 90.8, p < .001). 
 
Table 4.2. Test Statistics for the Hypothesized Model  
Model 2 df CFI RMSEA 2 df 
Initial 1299.9 340 .90 .075   
Addition of correlations among error terms e(V7), e(V8) 1133.6 339 .91 .069 166.3 1 
Addition of correlations among error terms e(V9), e(V11) 1054.4 338 .92 .065 79.2 1 
Addition of path fear  anger 963.6 337 .93 .061 90.8 1 
Note. CFI = comparative fit index; RMSEA = root mean square error of approximation. 
 
The final model showed an acceptable to good fit. Standardized factor loadings for the 
final model are presented in Table 4.1.. Most of the specified relationships were highly 
significant (p < .001 or p < .01). However, the relationships between risk perception and 
acceptance, between fear and acceptance, and between fear and benefit perception were not 
significant (p > .05). The model accounted for a substantial amount of variation in fear (60%) 
and anger (67%). The model also explained 27% and 26% of the variance in risk and benefit 
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perception, respectively. Furthermore, the model accounted for 63% of the variance in 
acceptance. Figure 4.2. presents the final model schematically.  
 
Figure 4.2. Final model of determinants of acceptance of mobile phone base stations. Values 
represent standardized estimates, N = 500. Asterisks refer to levels of significane: ** p < .01; 
*** p < .001 
 
4. Discussion  
 
The aim of our study was to examine not only how specific emotions determine risk 
judgments but also how emotions develop in a risk context. Our research question was 
detached from global affect as considered in the affect heuristic, since a focus on global affect 
may not suffice to thoroughly comprehend decision making (Zeelenberg et al., 2008). We 
concentrated on fear and anger as they have been identified as particularly important in risk 
perception (Lerner & Keltner, 2001; Peters et al., 2004; Sjöberg, 2007). 
Structural equation modeling was used to test these relationships. Data analysis 
demonstrated that the model shown in Figure 4.2. fits the data quite well. Results of the 
structural equation model indicate that anger strongly determined the acceptance of mobile 
phone base stations, and had a strong impact on benefit perception. Fear, on the other hand, 
had no influence on acceptance and benefit perception but strongly influenced risk perception 
of mobile phone base stations. Risk perception was also determined by anger, but to a lesser 
extent.  
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These results show that different emotions can have different influences on risk 
perception and acceptance of hazards, which is in line with the work of Sjöberg (2007), who 
observed that anger most strongly predicted acceptance of a risk. The findings are also in 
accordance with the feeling-is-for-doing approach (Zeelenberg et al., 2008), because they 
highlight that an emotion-specific approach allows for more specific predictions in a risk 
context.  
In the present research, we examined emotions integral to the object being judged. 
Thus, this study differs from other studies that focus on the carryover effects of incidental 
emotions (e.g., Lerner & Keltner, 2001). As noted by Zeelenberg and colleagues (2008), 
incidental emotions are rather irrelevant for a current decision and give only little insight into 
the functional influence of emotions in regular decision making. Integral emotions, in 
contrast, serve as a signal to the decision maker and work in service of goal pursuit. Similarly, 
Frijda (1986) suggested that most emotions are action tendencies, i.e., a state of readiness to 
execute a given kind of action. Accordingly, the two emotions examined in the present study, 
fear and anger, should lead to different tendencies to execute expressive behavior. Frijda 
(1986) suggested that anger is accompanied by intentionality, or the idea of an external agent. 
Thus, it makes sense that anger primarily influences the acceptance of a mobile phone base 
station, because the construction of a base station is more closely and directly related to 
external persons than the risks related to it. Fear, in contrast, is reflected in behavior such as 
escape from a threat (Frijda, 1986), which might explain why fear primarily determined 
whether a risk was perceived as high or low. Likewise, studies relating to the psychometric 
paradigm have shown that dread—which is more closely related to fear than to anger—is a 
major determinant of risk perception.  
We found no relationship between fear and benefit perceptions. Other studies have 
shown that mere affect strongly determines both risk and benefit perceptions. With the results 
of the present study, one could argue that this effect is due to different emotions. Anger 
primarily determined benefit perceptions, while fear influenced risk perceptions. This 
difference might be covert in studies that consider affect in more general terms. 
An emotion-specific approach can also be useful for identifying how affective 
reactions toward risks emerge. Our model indicates that control is an important antecedent for 
fear and anger. Fear was strongly determined by control, and anger was influenced by both 
control and fairness. These results suggest that people’s fears and anger regarding mobile 
phone base stations would be reduced if people could control the radiation or the construction 
of a base station. Since fairness and control were strongly related in our model, this aim could 
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also be achieved when fairness is increased. Involving the public in the decision-making 
processes would be one possibility for increasing fairness. A study by Dohle and colleagues 
(Dohle, Keller, & Siegrist, 2010a) has shown that people strongly favor the idea that 
representatives from the public should be allowed to participate in base station siting 
decisions. In a similar vein, Sandman (1987) pointed out that fairness reduces public outrage 
and, thus, decreases anger. Likewise, fear might be decreased if people have a feeling of 
control over exposure to radiation from a base station. Providing concerned citizens with 
exposimeters that display personal radiofrequency electromagnetic field exposure or 
integrating a scale on mobile phones that displays exposure in relation to international 
exposure limits could be a way to visualize radiation and thus to technically implement 
perceived control.     
The present results are not limited to mobile communication; they can also be applied 
to other risks. Risks from mobile communication are rather overestimated: although there is 
little evidence the exposure leads to severe health consequences, many people are quite 
alarmed about its consequences. However, other hazards such as radon, smoking, or talking to 
someone on the phone while driving are risks that are perceived with indifference. For risk 
communication purposes, our model suggests that highlighting the loss of control (for 
example, by emphasizing that phoning while driving has similar effects on reaction times as 
driving while intoxicated) might be helpful to increase fears in underestimated risks, which in 
turn might lead to a higher risk perception. 
We found a relationship between benefit perceptions and acceptance but no 
relationship between risk perception and acceptance. A number of studies have shown that 
acceptance is more strongly influenced by benefit perceptions than risk perceptions (e.g., 
Siegrist, 2000). Our finding might also be due to methodological factors: the item on 
acceptance was expressed from a personal point of view, while the items on risk and benefit 
perception asked about Swiss society as a whole. Furthermore, risk and benefit perceptions 
were measured using a single item. Single items usually explain less variance than Likert 
scales and tend to have low reliabilities. As a result, we may have underestimated the effects 
of risk and benefit perception on the acceptance of mobile phone base stations. Moreover, it 
should be noted that, in addition to control and fairness, there might be other cognitive 
appraisals in the context of fear and anger that were not taken into consideration. However, 
because we were primarily interested in consequences for risk communication, we focused on 
appraisals that are modifiable in a risk context. Similarly, it might be possible that, for other 
risks (especially for those that are rather underestimated), positive emotions and their 
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corresponding appraisals are as important as negative ones. Furthermore, it would be useful to 
extend the present research to an experimental setting. Future studies might want to 
investigate how manipulations of controllability and fairness act on emotions and judgments 
of risks, benefits, and acceptance.  
In the present study, we called into question whether studying broad and unspecific 
affective reactions suffice to understand decision making, especially in a risk context. Linking 
the affect heuristic with appraisal theories, one could argue that mere affect serves as the first 
appraisal when facing a hazard. It has been noted that virtually all appraisal theorists hold that 
in the first step people start with an evaluation of whether or not the stimulus is good or bad 
for them (Barrett, Ochsner, & Gross, 2007). However, since human beings are provided with 
a multifaceted emotional life, we believe that persons do not stop at this point but rather 
proceed with taking up other, more complex appraisals such as controllability or fairness. To 
truly understand the influence of affect on decision making, it is important to investigate these 
diverse appraisals and the specific emotions that arise from the appraisals.  
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Abstract 
 
Mobile communication has become a ubiquitous part of today's life. The ongoing growth of 
this technology, however, involves the construction of new mobile phone base stations in 
order to assure network coverage. The selection of a new base station site often results in 
conflicts between providers and public authorities, on the one hand, and residents on the 
other. The aim of the present study was to examine public preferences regarding base station 
sites. A random sample of 503 persons from the German speaking part of Switzerland was 
interviewed face-to-face in their homes. Conjoint analysis was used to evaluate participants’ 
preferences for various attributes of base stations (appearance, location, building, decision 
process). The results show that location plays the most important role in participants’ 
acceptance of base stations. The findings also indicate that most people would prefer a 
covered or camouflaged base station to a freely visible one. By means of a cluster analysis, 
several segments were distinguished, showing that base station siting preferences were not 
homogeneous. Implications for risk communication are discussed.  
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1. Introduction  
 
Over the last decade, mobile communication has become a global phenomenon. 
Launched in Finland in 1991, mobile services increased to four billion mobile connections 
worldwide (ITU, 2009). However, the ongoing growth of mobile communication and other 
technologies (Hilty, Som, & Kohler, 2004) also gives rise to public concerns about potential 
health effects regarding electromagnetic fields (EMF). In particular, some citizens fear that 
mobile phone base stations may lead to severe health disorders, and strongly support 
corrective measures such as warning labels, appliance shielding and further research 
(MacGregor, Slovic, & Morgan, 1994). 
From a technical point of view, in order to ensure network coverage, it is necessary to 
construct mobile phone base stations in the vicinity of places where people want to use their 
phones. The transmission power of base stations constructed outside of living areas is often 
not sufficient to ensure stable mobile reception; besides, the radiation from the mobile phone 
of a phoning person would be at a maximum. Thus, centrally located base stations reduce the 
mobile phone user’s daily radiation exposure, because mobile phones and mobile phone base 
stations are connected entities: they radiate less when the distance between them decreases 
(Cousin & Siegrist, 2010). Furthermore, because of the narrow vertical spread of the base 
station’s beam, the levels of exposure inside or to the sides of buildings with base stations 
mounted on their rooftops are normally very low (WHO, 2000). 
In order to reduce public fears about EMF and to promote greater acceptance of a new 
facility, various courses of action have been suggested (Wiedemann & Schütz, 2005). Among 
others, public participation in base station siting decisions is frequently mentioned by public 
authorities (e.g., WHO, 2000). Little is known, however, about public preferences regarding 
mobile base station sites. It is unclear which characteristics of base stations are deemed most 
important by the public and whether there are considerable differences among segments of the 
population regarding site preferences. By means of a conjoint analysis, the present study is 
designed to address these issues in more detail.   
 
1.1. Conjoint Analysis and Risk Perception 
 
Conjoint analysis is a decompositional method developed to investigate preferences 
for hypothetical or real products and services. Respondents evaluate or rank a set of total 
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profile descriptions and consider different attributes jointly, in contrast to compositional 
approaches, where various attributes are assessed separately (Green & Srinivasan, 1978).   
The biggest advantage of conjoint analysis is that it maintains a high degree of realism 
and resembles real choice situations (Hair, Anderson, Tatham, & Black, 1998). It is based on 
the assumption that it is easier for people to judge a product or service in its global utility than 
to assess each attribute in isolation. In addition, conjoint analysis is also useful in identifying 
different groups of respondents with similar preferences (Hair et al., 1998). These segments, 
usually derived using cluster analysis, can then be connected to various descriptor variables, 
such as socio-demographic or psychological variables. Despite its widespread use in other 
disciplines, especially in market research, only few studies used conjoint analysis to 
investigate  risk assessment or environmental issues (Bond, 2001; Gegax & Stanley, 1997; 
Machado & Mourato, 2002; McLean & Mundy, 1998; Winslott Hiselius, 2005). Winslott 
Hiselius (2005) investigated preferences for the transport of hazardous materials using a 
choice experiment, a variant of traditional conjoint analysis. In a similar vein, Machado and 
Mourato (2002) studied marine water quality improvements and health risk reductions. 
Choice experiments, however, do not allow for individual level analyses (Louviere, 1991). To 
the best of our knowledge, no study has examined EMF risks using traditional conjoint 
analysis.  
 
1.2. Identification of Relevant Attributes for Siting Decisions 
 
For the design of a conjoint analysis, researchers should ensure that the attributes and 
attribute levels are both communicable and actionable (Hair et al., 1998). Beside these general 
characteristics, theoretical considerations on the identification of attributes should also be 
taken into account.  
Several outcome variables (i.e. physical and tangible base station characteristics) may 
play a crucial role in base station siting preferences. First, the location of the base station 
might be a key issue, since research indicates that lay people often prefer great distance 
between themselves and the base station (Cousin & Siegrist, 2010). Secondly, the appearance 
of the base station seems to be an important aspect as well. A study using a free association 
technique carried out by Siegrist et al. (2005) suggests that lay people frequently mention 
aesthetic aspects when they think of mobile phone base stations. Changing the appearance of 
the base station, however, can be realized either by hiding the base station (behind sheeting 
etc.), or by camouflaging the base station (for example, as a tree or a crucifix). The latter 
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option, in particular, might be perceived very differently because some might see a 
camouflaged base station as an aesthetic improvement, while others sense it as an attempt to 
deceive the public. Finally, a third outcome variable relevant for people’s acceptance of base 
stations might be the type of building (WHO, 2000). Residents often object to base stations in 
the vicinity of sensitive zones (e.g kindergartens, schools or dwellings), although these sites 
would ensure minor exposure for the mobile phone users. Accordingly, placing a base station 
on a church might be perceived as inappropriate, or even as impious, by some people.  
Besides these outcome variables, the process of the decision should also be taken into 
account. The question arises of whether people would rather reject or accept the idea that 
representatives from the public be allowed to participate in base station siting decisions. 
Several researchers have argued that one of the key features in environmental risk perception 
is fairness (Renn, Webler, & Wiedemann, 1995). Procedural fairness means that each person 
has the opportunity to express individual interests and can contribute to the collective will 
(Linnerrooth-Bayer, 1995). However, some residents might also conclude that pubic 
representatives lack the knowledge to find appropriate sites, and thus reject this option.  
 
1.3. The Present Study 
 
Conjoint analysis is a fairly new approach in the field of environmental evaluation and 
permits a systematic understanding of preference structures. It has been suggested that it 
might be a useful tool for environmental risk analysis and communication (Alriksson & 
Oberg, 2008).  
After reviewing the relevant literature, we identified four key attributes to be crucial 
for base station siting decisions, i.e. the location, the appearance, the type of building and the 
decision process itself. The purpose of the present work is to determine the relative 
importance of these attributes from the perspective of laypeople, and thus to explore which 
aspects of base station sites are considered most important by the public.  
A second aim of the study is to detect specific segments of respondents that differ in 
their preferences. Some researchers have emphasized that individual differences in risk 
perception are often neglected (Siegrist, Keller, & Kiers, 2005). Moreover, we wanted to 
examine if these groups of respondents would also differ in respect to other characteristics 
that were found to be important in the risk perception of mobile communication, such as trust 
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(Poortinga & Pidgeon, 2003; Siegrist, Gutscher, & Earle, 2005), knowledge (Cousin & 
Siegrist, 2010), and health beliefs (Cousin & Siegrist, 2008).  
 
 
2. Method 
2.1. Participants 
 
The data were collected in a survey conducted in the urban area of Zurich, 
Switzerland. A sample of 503 participants aged from 18 to 80 was interviewed face-to-face in 
their homes between November, 2008, and March, 2009.  
Participants were randomly selected from the electronic telephone directory. They 
were first contacted by mail and informed about the study. Approximately one week later, 
they were called by an interviewer and asked to participate in the study. The complete face-to-
face interview lasted one hour on average. The response rate was about 35%
1
. Interviewers 
were trained to conduct the interview in a standardized manner.  
Forty-five percent (n = 225) of the respondents were female, and 55 % (n = 275) were 
male. The mean age was 51.60 (SD = 15.10). Self-reported education level ranged from 
primary or lower secondary school (6%; n = 28), upper secondary vocational school or upper 
secondary university preparation school (59%; n = 294), to college or university (36%; n = 
178). According to census data (BFS, 2009), males were slightly overrepresented. Moreover, 
age and education level were slightly higher than the Swiss average. Ninety-four percent of 
the participants (n = 470) owned a mobile phone. On average, participants indicated that they 
use their mobile phone 26.04 (SD = 60.76) times per week for communication purposes. 
Three participants refrained from filling out the questionnaire that was presented at the end of 
the interview; thus, no demographic data were available for them.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
1
 The response rate was calculated as: “Response rate” = (“number of completed 
interviews”)/(“number in sample-number not eligible”). 
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2.2. Conjoint Analysis 
 
In the conjoint analysis
2
, hypothetical mobile phone base station sites were presented 
to the participants. The four attributes and their corresponding levels were: location (outside 
of the village/ on the outskirts/ in the center of village), appearance (visible/ covered/ 
camouflaged), building (factory/ church/ dwelling) and the decision process about the location 
of the base station site (residents were involved/ government was involved/ only provider 
decided). 
 
 
 
Figure 5.1. Sample stimulus card. 
 
Given that four attributes with three levels would yield 81 (3 x 3 x 3 x 3) possible 
combinations, it was necessary to reduce the number of the stimulus cards (i.e., the 
hypothetical mobile phone base station sites) by means of a fractional factorial design. The 
design and the number of the stimulus cards, which were presented in full-profiles, was 
determined through the ORTHPLAN procedure of the statistical software SPSS. The 
interviewers explained the meaning of the card attributes beforehand by means of an 
illustration that showed some additional explanations about the attributes. For example, the 
illustration showed three pictures of a mobile phone base station that was freely visible, 
covered with sheeting, or camouflaged as a crucifix. The specific attributes of the different 
sites were listed in table form and printed on cards (Figure 5.1. shows an example stimulus 
card). The participants were asked to rank the cards according to their preference.  
 
2.3. Questionnaire 
 
The questionnaire was designed to measure a broad range of constructs that were 
related to mobile communication. For the present study, variables measuring the following 
                                                
2
 Previous to the conjoint analysis, participants conducted a free association task and a Single 
Category Implicit Association Task; results of these tasks are not reported here. 
Location center of village 
Appearance covered 
Bulding dwelling 
Decision Process  residents were involved in site selection 
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five constructs were used: risk perception, benefit perception, knowledge, health beliefs, and 
trust.  
Risk and benefit perception of mobile phone base stations was measured using the 
item: “How risky (beneficial) do you consider mobile phone base stations to be, for the Swiss 
society as a whole?”. Participants responded on a 6-point scale ranging from 1 (“small”) to 6 
(“large”).   
The knowledge questions about mobile communication were taken from a scale 
developed by Cousin and Siegrist (2010). The original scale is divided into several domains. 
For the present study, the subscales “base stations” and “interaction patterns” were selected. 
The eleven items (e.g., “A base station gives off the same level of radiation throughout the 
whole day”) could be answered using the options “true”, wrong”, or “don’t know”.  A 
summative index of the correct items was calculated for further analysis. In our sample, the 
mean of the scale was 3.40 (SD = 2.48), indicating that participants had little knowledge 
about mobile communication (only one person was right on all of the eleven items). 
Health beliefs were assessed by means of a scale introduced by Cousin and Siegrist 
(2008). The sixteen questions (e.g., “There are some people who can feel even low levels of 
radiation”) could be answered using the options “true”, wrong”, or “don’t know”, and were 
summarized to a scale. High values on the health belief scale indicate a strong belief in 
adverse health effects of mobile communication. On average, participant agreed on 7.25 (SD 
= 3.40) items.  
Finally, trust in mobile communication authorities was measured by asking 
participants to evaluate how much they trusted several authorities and their specific sphere of 
authority. They indicated their trust in (a) providers (technical aspects), (b) providers (health 
aspects), (c) federal authorities (legal framework), (d) federal authorities (health care), (e) 
research groups at universities (research), and (f) consumer protection boards (consumer 
safety). Participants answered these questions on a 6-point-scale ranging from 1 (“no trust”) 
and 6 (“complete trust”). For the final trust scale, a mean score of all items was calculated. 
The reliability of the scale was checked by calculating Cronbach’s alpha ( = .66). 
Participants trusted research groups at universities most (M = 4.68, SD = 1.01), and providers 
(both items) least (M = 3.01, SD = 1.09). 
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3. Results 
3.1. Part-Worths and Relative Importance of Attributes 
 
Based on the respondents’ ranking, part-worth utilities for each individual respondent 
and for the total sample were calculated (using SPSS CONJOINT). Part-worth utilities 
provide a quantitative measure of the preference for each attribute level (SPSS, 2007). They 
were estimated using Ordinary Least Square (OLS) regression analysis and used to determine 
the relative importance values of each attribute. Importance values are calculated by taking 
the part-worth utility range for each factor separately and dividing it by the sum of the utility 
ranges for all factors. Thus, they provide a measure of how important the factor is to overall 
preference (SPSS, 2007). 
The attribute of greatest importance was the location of the mobile phone base station 
(35%). Decision process and building were of almost equal importance (24% and 23%, 
respectively), and the appearance of the base station had the lowest importance (17%).  Thus, 
location was twice as important as appearance.  
Figure 5.2. shows the part-worth utility scores for each attribute.  The results clearly 
showed positive utility for a location outside of the village; a location on the outskirts had 
only a slightly positive utility.  In contrast, locations in the center of the village yielded a 
negative utility. 
Furthermore, the appearance of the mobile phone base station had a positive utility 
when it was covered or camouflaged. When the base station was visible, appearance resulted 
in a negative utility. Concerning the building, results demonstrate that participants preferred a 
mobile phone base station that was constructed on a factory, but they rejected a base station 
that was mounted on a dwelling. With regard to the decision process, Figure 5.2. indicates a 
positive utility for a decision where residents were involved. Also, a decision process in 
which the government was involved had a positive utility, while a decision process where 
only the provider decided about the location of the base station clearly yielded a negative 
utility.  
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Figure 5.2. Part-worth utilities for each attribute level (all respondents). 
 
 
3.2. Segmentation 
 
Cluster analysis was applied to classify participants into homogeneous subgroups. A 
K-Means clustering based on the individual part-worth utilities was used. A four-cluster 
solution showed high substantial interpretability, and clusters differed significantly on all 
variables used for clustering. Table 5.1. shows the results of the cluster analysis, together with 
the size of each cluster. 
To describe the clusters, one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) and Tukey-HSD 
post-hoc analyses were applied for the continuous variables (risk perception, benefit 
perception, knowledge, health beliefs, trust and age). The results are presented in Table 5.2. 
Age did not reach significance and is therefore not presented in the table (p > .28). For the 
discrete variables (gender and education), a chi-square test was performed. Gender ( =8.06, 
p = .045), but not education (p > .20), was a significant descriptor for the four segments. 
The findings indicate that participants in cluster 1 (11%) place great importance on the 
type of building on which the base station is constructed. They would not accept a mobile 
phone base station on a church, and prefer that it be built on a factory. Cluster 1 is the 
smallest segment. It is the only segment that favors base stations that are freely visible and 
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refuses camouflaged base stations. In contrast to cluster 2, it has less knowledge about mobile 
communication. Participants in cluster 2 (15%) mainly attach importance to the appearance of 
the base station. They reject freely visible base stations and rather prefer one that is 
camouflaged or covered.  Cluster 2 is the only group that prefers a base station that is located 
in the center of the village, which would be the best location from a public health perspective 
(Cousin & Siegrist, 2010; WHO, 2000). Location, however, was not of high importance. 
Compared to the other groups, participants of cluster 2 perceive lower risks and higher 
benefits from mobile communication, have more knowledge, fewer health beliefs and have 
more trust in mobile communication authorities. Participants of cluster 2 are predominantly 
male (70%).   
 
Table 5.1. Utility of Each Attribute Level, and Importance of the Attributes “Location,” 
“Appearance,” “Building,” and “Decision Process” in Groups Obtained Through Cluster 
Analysis 
 Cluster 1 
(n = 54) 
Cluster 2 
(n =  73) 
Cluster 3 
(n = 167) 
Cluster 4 
(n = 209) 
F p 
Utility of location “outside of village” .77 -.47 .54 2.42 266.27 .000 
Utility of location “on the outskirts” -.25 .17 .07 .33 10.41 .000 
Utility of location “center of village” -.52 .30 -.60 -2.75 416.74 .000 
       
Utility of appearance “visible” .20 -2.15 -.11 -.25 124.84 .000 
Utility of appearance “covered” .17 .89 .16 .18 19.69 .000 
Utility of appearance “camouflaged” -.37 1.26 -.05 .07 
 
62.27 .000 
       
Utility of building “factory” 1.57 .65 .89 .56 19.00 .000 
Utility of building “church” -1.91 -.16 .44 .14 121.37 .000 
Utility of building “dwelling” .34 -.49 -1.32 -.70 41.41 .000 
       
Utility of decision process “residents” .27 -.05 1.54 .46 71.65 .000 
Utility of decision process “government” -.05 .51 .58 -.03 25.59 .000 
Utility of decision process “provider” -.22 -.45 -2.12 -.43 156.92 .000 
       
Importance of location 20.57 21.14 17.51 57.30   
Importance of appearance 20.58 39.47 13.81 12.01   
Importance of building 41.08 18.90 27.87 16.84   
Importance of decision process 17.77 20.50 40.81 13.86   
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Participants belonging to cluster 3 (33%) are mainly interested in the decision process. 
A decision process in which only the provider is included is clearly rejected. Rather, they 
would prefer that residents are involved in the decision process. Some importance is also 
attached to the attribute “building”. Like all other segments, they prefer a base station that is 
mounted on a factory. They share with clusters 1 and 4 that they see higher risks and lesser 
benefits of mobile communication. 
Cluster 4 is the largest cluster (42%). Participants of this segment stress the 
importance of the location, and hardly take other attributes into account. They strongly favor a 
base station that is located outside the village and refuse base stations located in the center. 
Like cluster 3, they have little trust in mobile communication authorities. Compared to cluster 
2, they also have less knowledge.  
 
4. Discussion 
 
The findings of this study give insight to public preferences for mobile phone base 
station sites. Results show that a covered base station that is mounted on a factory, and whose 
remote location is determined by residents, had the highest utility.  
Location of the base station plays the most critical role in acceptance of base station 
sites. Participants clearly prefer base stations outside of the village, which is in line with 
Cousin and Siegrist (2010), who showed that people favor locations that are located as distant 
as possible.  
Less importance is placed on the decision process. However, the findings indicate that 
respondents do not value decisions in which only the provider determines the location, 
probably because providers are perceived as less trustworthy than governmental institutions. 
Other researchers have suggested that fairness plays an important role for residents (Earle & 
Siegrist, 2008; Renn et al., 1995), which is reflected in the fact that participants appreciate 
decisions where residents are involved. 
The attribute “building” was equally important as the decision process. Factories are 
clearly favored as appropriate buildings for base stations. Presumably, participants have 
drawn the conclusion that workers in a factory would only be exposed during the day, while 
residents of a dwelling would also be exposed at nighttime. Also, participants may believe 
that factory workers are at risk anyway, and that the radiation exposure would only 
marginally contribute to the total risk of a factory worker.  
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Appearance was the least important attribute, only half as important as the location of 
the facility. According to WHO recommendations (WHO, 2000), aesthetic aspects should be 
taken into account in siting base stations. In fact, our results show that visible base stations 
are rejected by most participants. Furthermore, for a small portion of participants (cluster 1),  
aesthetic modifications that aim at camouflaging base stations are clearly rejected, probably 
because participants fear that camouflaged base stations are deliberately intended to delude 
residents. Nonetheless, all respondents showed a positive utility for covered base stations. 
Consequently, if aesthetic modifications of mobile phone base stations are intended (WHO, 
2000), covering base stations (with sheeting etc.) would reach the broadest consensus among 
the population.    
The cluster analysis identified four segments with different preferences, indicating that 
the sample was not homogeneous in their siting preferences. Cluster 2 differed from the other 
clusters in regard to their preferences and also with respect to several descriptor variables. To 
minimize radiation for the mobile phone user, it is reasonable to place base stations at a 
central village location, and cluster 2 was the only cluster that favored this site. Compared to 
other respondents, they were characterized not only by little risk and higher benefit 
perception, higher trust, and fewer health beliefs, but also by more knowledge. This is in line 
with Cousin and Siegrist (2010), who demonstrated that knowledge gaps were related to 
respondents’ preferences regarding base station siting. For example, using a forced- choice 
task, they could show that respondents with little knowledge about interaction patterns 
between mobile phones and base stations preferred locations, which would cause more 
exposure for the phoning population. 
Following this line of argument, our research provides a guide for risk communication 
regarding EMF. At first, it highlights the importance of knowledge transfer. Our findings 
confirm that people generally have little knowledge about the functionality of mobile phone 
base stations and the interaction pattern of mobile phones and base stations, which 
emphasizes that provision of information should focus on imparting these facts. Secondly, 
because we found that people who select advantageous sites also have less negative health 
beliefs, the results highlight that it is advisable for public health authorities to communicate as 
clearly as possible about the functionality and health effects of mobile communication in 
order to reduce ambiguities. Third, our findings also show that trust is crucial for risk 
communication, since it was found to be a significant descriptor for the clusters. In order to 
foster trust, communication programs designed by public institutions may, for example, 
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facilitate a two-way communication process in which citizens have the possibility of 
expressing their needs (as suggested by Renn & Levine, 1991).  
The present study was aimed at exploring the siting preferences of a randomly selected 
sample from the general population. Results are therefore limited to participants, who were 
presumably moderately involved in the topic. For this reason, results of the conjoint analysis 
might be different for residents who are directly affected by a real base station conflict in their 
neighborhood, because highly involved participants may weight the attributes and attribute 
levels differently. Moreover, only the most important attributes of a base station could be 
addressed in the present study. From a theoretical point of view, it would have been possible 
to further subdivide some of the attribute levels. The appearance of a freely visible base 
stations, for example, could be broken down into height, style, color etc. Increasing the 
number of attribute levels, however, would also lead to a higher number of stimulus cards, 
and sorting too many cards might overstrain participants. 
A conjoint analysis as employed in the present study is thought to be instrumental for 
further investigation of public preferences for mobile base station sites. Since the findings of 
our study underscore, among others, the importance of knowledge for choosing adequate 
locations, it might be interesting to incorporate conjoint analysis in an experimental setting. 
An experiment may shed more light into the question of how much and what kind of 
knowledge is needed in order to enable citizens to come to appropriate base station site 
decisions. Such an experiment could be combined with a thought listing technique (Brock, 
1967; Greenwald, 1968), in which participants are asked to list everything about which he or 
she was thinking during the ranking of the conjoint cards. This technique may give insights 
about the reasons why one option is preferred over the other, which remains speculative in 
traditional conjoint analysis.   
Finally, we believe that the implementation of more realistic measures such as 
conjoint analysis in risk perception must not be restrained exclusively to an EMF topic. 
Conjoint analysis was found to be a useful tool when applied to mobile phone base stations 
preferences, but it may also be applied to preferences regarding, for example, power plant 
sites, waste incineration plants and other environmental risks. Beyond this, the segmentation 
of participants into homogeneous subgroups permits the tailoring of information material to 
the specific characteristics of those groups. Thus, especially in combination with other 
techniques such as cluster analysis or experimental methods, we conclude that conjoint 
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analysis allows for an improved understanding of environmental risk perception and 
communication. 
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Abstract  
 
When it comes to the new siting of a mobile communication base station in one’s 
neighborhood, some people react with rejection because they fear health consequences from 
the emitted high-frequency radiation. Most people would prefer to site base stations outside 
residential areas, but from a public health perspective, this may result in even more radiation 
for the phoning population. Therefore, authorities are interested in improving the current base 
station siting processes. The question arises whether specific knowledge enhancement would 
influence base station siting preferences or whether affective or emotional components (due to 
the scientific uncertainties involved) would overrule the influence of such attempts. To 
answer this question, an experimental study with a convenience sample of Swiss citizens (N = 
228) was conducted. Participants were confronted with one of three texts: a neutral text 
(control group), an information booklet about mobile communication and an emotionally 
charged newspaper article that reported a conflict about the siting of a new base station. After 
reading the text, participants filled out a questionnaire about their perception of mobile 
communication and their base station siting preferences. Reading the information booklet 
increased participants’ knowledge and led to perceptual changes of base stations and mobile 
phones. Importantly, participants reading the booklet were able to transfer their knowledge to 
a base station siting task and found locations that would emit less radiation for the phoning 
population. Implications and limitations of these results are discussed. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Mobile communication is part of daily life and provides many benefits. In many western 
countries, vast majorities of the population own a mobile phone (International 
Telecommunication Union [ITU], 2009). To make wireless telecommunication possible, an 
infrastructure consisting of base stations (= mobile communication antennas or transmission 
masts) is needed. This infrastructure is perceived with suspicion especially in residential areas. 
Some people fear that the emitted high-frequency electromagnetic fields (EMF) may harm their 
health or wellbeing (Burgess, 2002, 2004; European Commission [EC], 2007). Therefore, they 
would prefer to locate base stations outside of residential areas, the farther away the better 
(Dohle, Keller, & Siegrist, 2010a). 
Mobile communication and its consequences have initiated various research activities. 
In addition to the extensive research concerning the potential health effects, societal aspects 
such as the handling of scientific uncertainties and adequate precautionary measures (e.g., 
Barnett, Timotijevic, Vassallo, & Shepherd, 2008; Dolan & Rowley, 2009), risk 
communication of scientific uncertainty (e.g., Barnett, Timotijevic, Shepherd, & Senior, 2007; 
Timotijevic & Barnett, 2006), participatory approaches for base station siting (e.g., 
Wiedemann & Schütz, 2008) and the relevance of trust in regulation (e.g., Poortinga & 
Pidgeon, 2003; Siegrist, Earle, & Gutscher, 2003) have been investigated. To the best of our 
knowledge, past studies have not examined whether specific knowledge about mobile 
communication influences people’s preferences in base station sitings. People may be 
concerned about having a base station in their backyard, because they rely on flawed mental 
models. 
When the base station is far away or the connection is bad, the mobile phone is forced to 
radiate more in order to reach the nearest base station (Independent Expert Group on Mobile 
Phones [IEGMP], 2000; Neubauer et al., 2005). Therefore, an infrastructure with many low-
powered antennas in areas where people are actually using their mobile phones may minimize 
the exposure of mobile phone users (GSM networks). The interrelations between mobile phones 
and base stations are somewhat counterintuitive. A certain amount of specific knowledge is 
needed for understanding them. 
The present paper explores whether specific knowledge provision about the technical 
functionality of mobile communication influences people’s perception of mobile 
communication and their base station siting preferences. 
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1.1. People’s Perception and Knowledge of Mobile Communication 
Scientific evidence provides little support for adverse health effects of high-frequency 
radiation emitted by mobile communication at levels below the current international standards 
(International Commission on Non-Ionizing Radiation Protection [ICNIRP], 1998; Valberg, 
van Deventer, & Repacholi, 2007; World Health Organization [WHO], 2002). However, long-
term studies are lacking. Therefore, there are scientific uncertainties concerning the potential 
health effects of long-run exposure.  
Several studies have surveyed laypeople’s perception of EMF emitted by mobile  
communication. These studies found, compared to other environmental or health risks, 
moderate concerns (e.g. EC, 2007) but also the perception that base stations are more dreadful 
or risky than mobile phones (Bronfman & Cifuentes, 2003; Hutter, Moshammer, Wallner, & 
Kundi, 2004; Siegrist, Earle, Gutscher, & Keller, 2005; Siegrist, Keller, & Cousin, 2006; EC, 
2007; Ruddat, Sautter, Renn, & Pfenning, & Ulmer, 2010). Other studies explored affect 
associated with mobile communication (e.g., Dohle, Keller, & Siegrist, 2010b, 2010c). A 
reaction time-based study conducted by Dohle and colleagues (2010b)  
showed that some people, such as EMF experts, immediately attach positive concepts to 
mobile phone base stations, while other people, such as base station opponents, react 
negatively towards base stations. In addition, specific emotions such as fear and anger have a 
different influence on judgments in regard to mobile communication: Risk perception of mobile 
phone base stations is more strongly influenced by fear of base stations than by anger; on the 
other hand, benefit perceptions and the acceptance of mobile phone base stations are primarily 
determined by anger reactions regarding base stations (Dohle et al., 2010c). Taken together, 
these results suggest that people rely on the affect heuristic (Alhakami & Slovic, 1994; 
Finucane, Alhakami, Slovic, & Johnson, 2000; Slovic, Finucane, Peters, & MacGregor, 2002, 
2004) when they judge mobile communication risks. Dohle et al.’s (2010b) results also suggest 
that strong negative affective reactions to mobile phone base stations may trigger avoidance 
motivation (‘the farther away, the better’ or ‘the fewer antennas, the better’). 
Studies that surveyed participants’ knowledge of mobile communication observed low 
knowledge levels (Ruddat, Sautter, Renn, & Pfenning, 2005; Siegrist et al., 2005; Bianco, 
Nobile, Gnisci, & Pavia, 2008), low familiarity with EMF key words (Büllingen & 
Hillebrand, 2005) and incorrect conceptions of EMF exposure magnitudes (Yaguchi, 
Nobutomo, Shingu, & Miyakoshi, 2000). Studies that used Morgan et al.’s ‘Mental Models 
Approach’ (Morgan, Fischhoff,  Bostrom, & Atman, 2002) found that laypeople have limited 
knowledge of interaction patterns between mobile phones and base stations and, therefore, 
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misjudge the resulting exposure magnitudes of both devices. Laypeople perceive the base 
station as the higher exposure source and underestimate the exposure contribution of their 
own mobile phone by far (Cousin & Siegrist, 2010c, 2010b). Based on these insights, a new 
booklet that informs people about the basic functionality of mobile communication and the 
resulting exposure for users was developed and pretested (Cousin & Siegrist, 2010a). Reading 
the booklet increased people’s knowledge considerably and led to a more adequate risk 
perception of mobile communication devices. This booklet has also been used in the present 
experiment (an English version of the booklet can be downloaded at: 
http://www.cb.ethz.ch/studienergebnisse). 
1.2. Rationale of the Present Study 
 
In order to enable the public to make informed decisions, relevant knowledge has to be 
provided. The present study explores the effects of specific knowledge in the field of mobile 
communication on base station siting decisions. We hypothesize that specific knowledge 
enhancement decreases the negative perception of base stations and increases the critical 
perception of mobile phones (H1). In addition, we assume that participants who are provided 
with specific knowledge are able to transfer their knowledge to a base station siting scenario 
and choose sites that account for less radiation for the phoning population (H2). As a third, 
explorative hypothesis, we tested how emotionally charged information on base stations might 
affect perception and base station siting preferences. We expected that participants  
who are confronted with emotionally charged information would choose more remote base 
stations sites that expose users to more radiation compared with participants not reading an 
emotional text (H3). Research indicates that the negative affective tone of news media material 
or a magazine article can have an impact on people’s attitudes, intentions and risk perceptions 
(Lerner, Gonzalez, Small, & Fischhoff, 2003; Yi, 1990). Furthermore, people in an affective 
focus rely more strongly on associative processes (Scarabis, Florack, & Gosejohann, 2006), 
which build the basis for immediate affective reactions to a given object. Thus, reading a highly 
emotional article might trigger negative affect and avoidance of antennas, especially of those 
antennas that are nearby. 
2. Procedure and Materials  
 
Participants were told that the purpose of the study was to survey people’s opinion 
about mobile communication. They were not aware that in fact they were taking part in an 
experiment with different conditions. The experiment (between-subject design) comprised 
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reading one of three texts that were given in a printed version to participants. Questions 
concerning these texts, as well as all other dependent variables, were collected on a portable 
computer (Lenovo 1.8 GHz dual core ThinkPad) using Inquisit software 
(http://www.millisecond.com). Data collection was done by face-to-face interviews. 
Participants received a full debriefing after the interview. 
2.1. Experimental Design and Questionnaires 
 
Participants were installed in front of the laptop. After some general information was 
presented on the screen, the computer randomly assigned participants to one of three 
experimental conditions while controlling for gender. Depending on the experimental 
condition, the experimenter handed out the corresponding text, and participants were instructed 
to read it carefully. They had unlimited time to read the text. In Condition 1 (the  
control group), participants read a neutral text about a historical Swiss abbey. In Condition 2, an 
information booklet about mobile communication was presented. Participants in Condition 3 
read an authentic, emotionally charged newspaper article about a base station siting conflict in a 
Swiss neighborhood, which had appeared in the news several years before the study was 
conducted. 
Participants who read the informative, neutral text about the Swiss abbey served as the 
control group; they received no information on mobile communication. Their text had no 
emotional tone and was matched for length with the text given to the participants in the third 
condition (word count: 718 words). Thus, we ensured that all groups would be occupied with 
reading before answering the subsequent questions. In the information booklet presented in 
Condition 2, the GSM technology and its consequences for radiation exposure were presented. 
This included information about electromagnetic fields in general, mobile communication 
networks and their properties in regard to emitted radiation, the current state of research and the 
remaining scientific uncertainties concerning potential health effects. Special focus was on the 
interaction patterns of base stations and mobile phones and the resulting EMF emission. For 
example, the booklet explained that base stations should be located near a phoning person, and 
not outside urban areas. Otherwise, the mobile phone is required to radiate with higher power to 
reach the nearest base station. In addition, personal precautionary recommendations were 
derived and presented in boxes throughout the text. These recommendations, e.g. ‘As far as 
possible, telephone only when a good connection (signal) quality is available’, were 
summarized again at the end of the booklet. This text was somewhat longer than the texts of 
Conditions 1 and 3 (word count 1,210) and included figures and a table. The emotionally 
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charged newspaper article given to participants in Condition 3 described the father of a family 
who is concerned about the base station planned in his neighborhood. He fears adverse health 
effects due to the radiation of the antenna as well as a depreciation of his property. He also 
thinks about launching an initiative against the antenna. Several emotional words such as 
‘shocked’, ‘threatening’ or ‘discomfort’ appeared throughout the text. 
After the participants read the text, the experimenter removed the texts, and the 
participants answered the questions. The subsequent questionnaire, which was presented on the 
laptop, included a manipulation check that measured the impact of the three different texts (two 
items: informational content and emotional tone), different scales measuring health concerns, 
benefit and risk perception and affect in regard to mobile communication (each with three 
items) and a 13-item knowledge test about the technical functionality of mobile 
communication. The main dependent variable was a base station siting task consisting of 15 
forced choices in which participants were asked to select one of two proposed base station 
siting locations. In addition, participants had to rate each of the proposed base station locations 
separately with three items. The questionnaire finished with general socio-demographics 
questions. There were also other measurements that are not relevant for the present paper (e.g. 
trust in mobile communication stakeholders). After completing the electronic questionnaire, 
participants received a full debriefing. Participants in Conditions 1 and 3 were also confronted 
with the information booklet in order to provide them the same information about mobile 
communication as the participants of Condition 2. 
2.2. Participants 
 
The data collection was conducted between May 2009 and July 2009 in the German-
speaking part of Switzerland. Eleven interviewers were trained to conduct the interviews. The 
interviewers recruited the participants by themselves (e.g. at sport clubs, public libraries). They 
were instructed to interview people between 15 and 75 years of age who own a mobile phone. 
In addition, the interviewers had to balance gender and education level. 
Two hundred and twenty-eight interviews were conducted. Fifty-four percent (n = 122) 
of the respondents were female, and 46% (n = 106) were male. Reported age ranged between 
15 and 74 years. The mean age was 36.10 years (SD = 14.11). Fifty-nine percent of the 
respondents were between 15 and 34 years of age, 26% were between 35 and 54 years of age 
and 15% were 55 years or older. Participants were asked to indicate their highest completed 
education level: 23 (10%) participants were not well educated (primary or secondary school), 
66% (150 participants) had achieved a vocational training or a grammar school degree and 24% 
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or 55 participants were highly educated (university or university of applied science). 
3. Results 
3.1. Manipulation Checks and Learning Effect of the Booklet 
 
The experimental manipulation was effective. The manipulation check showed that the 
texts were perceived significantly differently (Table 6.1.): The text of Condition 2 was 
perceived as significantly more informative than the other two texts and less emotional than 
Condition 3. 
Participants were asked to complete a set of 13 knowledge questions (e.g. A base station 
gives off the same level of radiation throughout the whole day. When I make a call on my 
mobile phone, the level of radiation I am exposed to is much higher from my handset than from 
the nearest base station). The same 13 knowledge questions were used in Cousin and Siegrist 
(2010a). The response options provided were ‘true’, ‘wrong’ and ‘don’t know’. A summative 
index counting the number of correct answers was computed. An ANOVA  
disclosed that the number of correct answers differed significantly between the experimental 
conditions (F(2,225) = 113.01, p < .001). Post hoc tests (Tukey’s HSD, Honestly Significant 
Difference) showed that Condition 2 (M = 10.42, SD = 1.64) differed significantly from 
Condition 1 (M = 5.30, SD = 2.79) and Condition 3 (M = 6.82, SD = 3.54). Therefore, the 
lecture of the booklet significantly enhanced participants’ knowledge. 
 
Table 6.1. Manipulation Check 
Note. Superscript letters (
a b
) indicate the significant differences identified by the post hoc 
tests. Differing letters mark significant differences between the means. 
 
 
 Condition 1: 
Neutral 
 Text 
n = 77 
 Condition 2: 
Information 
Booklet 
n = 74 
 Condition 3: 
Newspaper 
Article 
n = 77 
  
ANOVA 
df (2,225) 
 M SD  M SD  M SD  F p 
The text I read 
was informative. 
4.56
a
 1.22  5.07
b
 0.97  3.87
c
 1.24  20.60 .000 
The text had an 
emotional touch. 
2.14
a
 1.12  2.35
a
 1.25  3.74
b
 1.32  37.92 .000 
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3.2. Perception of Mobile Communication Devices 
 
Each perception construct was measured by three items (see Table 6.2.). A summative 
index was built for each construct. All constructs had high Cronbach’s alphas. As shown in 
Table 6.3., there are several significant differences between the experimental conditions. Health 
concerns about base stations and mobile phones were significantly lower in Condition 2 
compared to Condition 1. Risk and benefit perception as well as affect in regard to mobile 
phones did not differ among the three conditions. Affect associated with base stations was 
significantly more positive for the readers of the booklet than for the other two conditions. To  
sum up, reading the booklet decreased health concerns and increased the positive perception of 
base stations. 
 
 
Table 6.2. Perception of Base Stations and Mobile Phones: Items Used 
Constructs and corresponding items (rating scales) 
Health concerns mobile phone (1 = no concerns at all; 6 = very high concerns;   = .867) 
 1.) I am concerned that radiation emitted by my mobile phone affects my health in the long run. 
2.) I am concerned that the radiation emitted by my mobile phone affects my immediate wellbeing. 
3.) I am concerned that in the long run the radiation emitted by mobile phones affects people’s 
health negatively. 
Health concerns base station (1 = no concerns at all; 6 = very high concerns;   = .906) 
 1.) I am concerned that radiation emitted by base stations affects my health in the long run. 
2.) I am concerned that the radiation emitted by my base stations affects my immediate wellbeing. 
3.) I am concerned that in the long run the radiation emitted by base stations affects people’s health 
negatively. 
Benefit perception (1 = no benefit al all; 6 = very high benefit;   = .885) 
 1.) Overall, I associate mobile communication with…  
2.) I associate base stations with… 
3.) I associate mobile phones with… 
Risk perception (1 = no risk at all; 6 = very high risk;   = .893) 
 1.) Overall, I associate mobile communication with…  
2.) I associate base stations with… 
3.) I associate mobile phones with… 
Affect base station (1 = negative; 6 = positive;   = .928) 
 1.) How do you valuate base stations overall? 
2.) When I think about base stations my thoughts are predominantly... 
3.) When I think about base stations my feelings are predominantly... 
Affect mobile phone (1 = negative; 6 = positive;   = .935) 
 1.) How do you valuate mobile phones overall? 
2.) When I think about mobile phones my thoughts are predominantly... 
3.) When I think about mobile phones my feelings are predominantly... 
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Table 6.3. Means and SD of All Perception Measurements for Each Experimental Group 
 Condition 1: 
Neutral 
Text 
n = 77 
Condition 2: 
Information 
Booklet 
n = 74 
Condition 3: 
Newspaper 
Article 
n = 77 
ANOVA 
df (2,225) 
 M (SD) M (SD) M (SD) F Sig. 
Health concerns base 
station 
3.59 (1.15)
a
 2.95 (1.06)
b
 3.34 (1.27)
ab
 5.769 .004 
Health concerns mobile 
phone 
3.65 (1.13)
a
 3.08 (1.07)
b
 3.30 (1.26)
ab
 4.765 .009 
Risk perception 
 
3.58 (0.93) 3.32 (0.99) 3.53 (1.07) 1.453 .23 
Benefit perception 
 
4.87 (0.87) 4.83 (0.92) 4.69 (1.01) 0.788 .47 
Affect base station 
 
3.00 (0.97)
a
 3.45 (1.13)
b
 2.93 (0.97)
a 
 5.531 .005 
Affect mobile phone 
 
4.32 (0.87) 4.39 (1.02) 4.32 (1.09) 0.145 .865 
Note. The reported means represent the summative index of three items each. Superscript 
letters (
a b
) indicate the significant differences identified by the post hoc tests. Differing letters 
mark significant differences between the means. 1 = low value of the construct or negative; 6 
= high value of the construct or positive (see Table 6.2. for details). 
 
3.3. Base Station Siting Preferences 
 
In the base station siting task, participants were asked to indicate their preferences 
concerning base station siting in a forced-choice task. Six different scenarios, presented as map 
segments, were used. Respondents were asked to compare all possible pairs of scenarios and, 
for each pair, to indicate their preferred option. In Figure 6.1., the six scenarios and their verbal 
descriptions are combined into one figure. The following instructions were provided to 
participants: 
 
In each of the following questions, you will see two different diagrams, each showing the layout 
of the same village. There are various ways in which the entire village can be provided with full 
signal coverage by the mobile phone network. In each case, please decide which variant you 
would choose from the point of view of the village as a whole. The position of the base station is 
represented by a red triangle. Below each diagram, there is also a written description of the 
situation. All of the base stations belong to the same service provider. 
 
In every combination, one scenario provides objectively less radiation for the phoning 
population than the other scenario. Generally, mobile phone use accounts for more individual 
exposure than base stations do. To minimize emitted radiation by mobile phones, as well as 
overall exposure, siting base stations as close as possible to the phoning population is advised. 
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Therefore, distant base stations (edge of the village, edge of the woods, edge of the street) are 
less favorable than nearby ones. The scenario with two half-power base stations or three third-
power antennas would result in the lowest radiation level for the phoning population. 
Based on these objective preferable options, a summative index counting the number of 
chosen better options was calculated (Min = 0; Max = 15). Mean values differ significantly 
between the three experimental groups (F(2,225) = 55.11, p < .001). The readers of the booklet 
(Condition 2: M = 11.89, SD = 3.86) scored significantly higher than the other two groups 
(Condition 1: M = 5.71, SD = 4.77; Condition 3: M = 5.00, SD = 4.70). The technical 
information provided by the booklet resulted in better choices with lower exposure. 
 
 
Figure 6.1. Base station siting task. 
 
In addition to the siting task, participants were asked to assess the acceptability of every 
scenario separately (see Table 6.4.). Therefore, participants indicated their disagreement (1 = I 
do not agree at all) or agreement (6 = I agree strongly) to three statements each on a six-point 
scale (1. This base station location is… / These base station locations are good for the entire 
village community and me. 2. This base station location provides… / These base  
station locations provide a low exposure rate for the entire village community and me. 3. This 
base station location constitutes… / These base station locations constitute a health risk for the 
entire village community and me). Cronbach’s alphas ranged between  = .600 and  = .761. 
    
 
        
A. A single base station is centrally located in 
the middle of the village. 
B. A single base station is located at the edge of 
the village. 
C. A single base station is located at the edge of 
the woods, away from the village. 
D. A single base station is located beside the 
street, far away from the village. 
E. Two small half-power base stations are 
installed at different locations in the village. 
F. Three small third-power base stations are 
installed at different locations in the village. 
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Again, summative indexes of the three items were built. Table 6.4. reports the overall 
assessments of every scenario. All three experimental groups perceived the scenario with one 
base station at the edge of the village similarly. In all the other scenarios, the perception of the 
group who read the information booklet differed significantly from the other two groups. The 
means reveal that the latter used two heuristics, ‘the farther away, the better’ and ‘the fewer 
antennas, the better’, whereas participants who read the booklet used the opposite heuristics 
(‘the nearer, the better’, ‘the more antennas, the better’). Thus, they were able to transfer the 
information given in the booklet to the base station siting task and correctly inferred that a 
higher number of antennas and a central location in the village would be better options for the 
village community. 
 
 
Table 6.4. Evaluation of the Six Base Station Locations 
 Condition 1: 
Neutral 
Text 
n = 77 
Condition 2: 
Information 
Booklet 
n = 74 
Condition 3: 
Newspaper 
Article 
n = 77 
ANOVA 
df (2,225) 
 M (SD) M (SD) M (SD) F Sig. 
One base station,  
center 
 
2.57 (1.08)
a
 3.61 (1.04)
b
 2.61 (1.16)
a
 21.62 .000 
One base station,  
edge of village 
 
3.18 (0.73) 3.16 (0.85) 2.98 (1.01) 1.19 .305 
One base station,  
edge of the woods 
 
4.01 (0.99)
a
 3.04 (1.05)
b
 3.82 (1.10)
a
 18.29 .000 
One base station,  
edge of the street 
 
4.27 (1.19)
a
 2.93 (1.11)
b
 4.13 (1.24)
a
 29.50 .000 
Two half-power base 
stations 
 
2.99 (0.94)
a
 3.94 (0.80)
b
 2.89 (1.12)
a
 27.28 .000 
Three third-power base 
stations 
 
3.05 (1.10)
a
 4.10 (1.10)
b
 2.97 (1.35)
a
 20.55 .000 
Note. The reported means represent the summative index of three items each. Superscript 
letters (
a b
) indicate the significant differences identified by the post hoc tests. Differing letters 
mark significant differences between the means (1 = I do not agree at all; 6 = I agree 
strongly). 
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4. Discussion 
 
Base station siting frequently results in conflicts with parts of the concerned population 
(Burgess, 2002, 2004). Intuitively, people would place base stations far away from the users 
(Cousin & Siegrist, 2010b; Dohle et al, 2010a). Unfortunately, this choice would lead to 
higher exposure because the most important radiation source is the user’s own mobile phone 
(IEGMP, 2000; Neubauer et al., 2005). The farther away base stations are placed from the user 
(or the worse the connection is), the more the mobile phone is forced to radiate in order to reach 
the nearest base station. Previous research has shown that people lack relevant knowledge about 
the functionality of mobile communication in order to assess the amount of radiation they are 
exposed to (Cousin & Siegrist, 2010b, 2010c). 
In the present paper, we explored whether specific knowledge about the technological 
functionality of mobile communication and the resulting exposure may affect people’s 
perception of mobile communication as well as their base station siting preferences. We 
hypothesized that specific knowledge enhancement would decrease the negative perception of 
base stations and increase the negative perception of mobile phones (H1). In addition, we 
assumed that specific knowledge leads to better base station siting choices (H2). As a third, 
explorative hypothesis, we tested whether emotionally charged information would lead to 
worse base station siting choices (H3).  
These hypotheses were tested in an experimental setting in which we confronted 
participants with three texts: A neutral text, an information booklet about mobile 
communication or an authentic emotionally charged newspaper article about a base station 
siting conflict in a Swiss neighborhood. 
We found partial support for the first hypothesis. Reading the information booklet led to 
a decrease in negative perception of base stations. Participants confronted with the information 
booklet rated base stations as less negative and indicated fewer health concerns in regard to 
base stations. Contrary to Hypothesis 1, the health concerns in regard to mobile phones 
decreased as well. However, there was no difference in the affective rating between the three 
experimental conditions. In sum, the information provision seemed to correct participants’ 
perception, especially of base station emission and to complete participants’ knowledge about 
exposure dynamics. 
As Hypothesis 2 stated, the specific knowledge enhancement led to changed base 
station siting preferences. Participants who read the information booklet were able to transfer 
the technical knowledge they had gained to a task that consisted of siting a base station in a 
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hypothetical village. Apparently, the technical information given in the booklet enabled them to 
choose the scenarios that emit less radiation to mobile phone users. The Condition 2 
participants applied decision heuristics different from those of the other participants. The 
heuristics of participants who read the booklet can be broadly described as ‘the nearer the 
antenna, the better’ and ‘the more antennas, the better’. These choices would provide less 
radiation to mobile phone users. Adequate knowledge helps people to understand current base 
station siting practice and its advantages. 
The third, explorative hypothesis was not supported by the data. Emotionally charged 
information in the form of a newspaper article did not enforce participants’ tendency to ban 
antennas outside the village and to decrease the number of antennas, although the manipulation 
check indicated that the manipulation was successful. Furthermore, participants who were 
confronted with the newspaper article also indicated similar risk perceptions and affect of base 
stations and mobile phones as participants reading the neutral text. Thus, this research stands in 
contrast to Lerner et al.’s (2003) study, which indicated that fear triggered by a picture and a 
text from the news media increased risk estimates. Results also differ from a study in the field 
of advertisement, which has shown that the negative affective tone of a magazine article leads 
to more negative attitudes towards the ad (Yi, 1990). However, participants in the present study 
may have noticed the emotional tone of the article but nonetheless did not identify with the 
concerned resident. Furthermore, mobile communication risk may have been of only minor 
importance for the participants. Affect determines risk perceptions more strongly when issue 
importance is high (Earle & Siegrist, 2008). In daily life, people are often confronted with this 
type of information about mobile communication (Litmanen & Tuikkanen, 2008; Elvers, 
Jandrig, Grummich, & Tannert, 2009). The result can be seen as a sign that a single negative or 
emotionally charged reporting of base station siting conflicts has limited impact on readers’ 
perception of mobile communication and the associated base station siting preferences. The 
impact of technical facts seems to have the bigger effect of immediate assessment than an 
emotionally charged article. Research by Ruddat et al. (2010) points in the same direction. They 
found that their participants were able to identify biases in information, regardless of their own 
view and whether they rejected obviously exaggerated or downplayed information. 
Some limitations of the study results need to be mentioned. In order to diversify the 
background and previous knowledge, we chose to interview people from the general public 
rather than students. However, the present study still used a convenience sample and might, as 
all experimental studies, have limited generalizability. More crucial are the following 
limitations: First, in reality laypeople are mostly not involved in the site selection of base  
 Information Provision and Base Station Siting Preferences     129 
stations (Mobile Operators Association [MOA], 2006). Therefore, the results are somewhat 
speculative, but they give clear indication that people lack specific information and that 
information provision would alter people’s preferences. Secondly, the participants chose a base 
station location in a hypothetical village. When it comes to a new base station siting  
project in the participants’ own village, other factors (e.g. other environmental burdens, 
placement of the local school or kindergarten, trust in the involved authorities) probably affect 
people’s decisions. However, information about the technical functionality of mobile 
communication and the resulting exposure would at least not increase risk perception and health 
concerns. It is also important to keep in mind that technical information like that given  
in this experiment is only a part of the relevant information in order to form opinions about 
mobile communication risks. Information from various media, knowledge about regulation and 
decision-making are important, too. More generally, the perception of a technology is largely 
caused by the societal framework in which the technology is embedded (e.g., Pidgeon et al., 
2003).  
The present study showed that people lack specific information about the functionality 
of mobile communication and the resulting exposure magnitudes. Provision of this knowledge 
would help people to better understand authorities’ base station siting policies and, if wished, 
decrease radiation emission from the own mobile phone. Even when it takes some effort to 
provide information about technical functionality and the resulting exposure, these topics need 
to be included in effective risk communication approaches in order to help people make 
informed decisions. 
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1. Discussion 
 
The present work examined the perception of non-ionizing radiation. Non-ionizing 
radiation risks, in particular mobile communication, can be perceived quite differently by 
different groups of people. In everyday life, these differences become apparent in the 
metaphors chosen by the conflicting parties. Opponents of mobile communication often argue 
that, in the past, some hazards have been ignored by experts, and finally emerged to be quite 
harmful to health, such as smoking or asbestos. Advocates of the mobile communication 
technology, on the other hand, quote different examples. They believe that the prosperity of 
society is largely based on technical advances such as electricity, automobiles, and, finally, 
mobile phones, and testing these technologies before they come on the market would 
counteract technological progress. 
Why is the same technology perceived so differently? The reasons for these differences 
are manifold; thus, various methods were used in the present work to explore this question. In 
the two studies presented in Chapter II, a SC-IAT was employed (Karpinski & Steinman, 
2006), which is a method for measuring implicit attitudes based on reaction times. A free 
association technique designed to collect and categorize associations to mobile phone base 
stations was applied in the following chapter. In order to analyze the causal relationships 
between cognitive appraisals, specific emotions, and risk judgments, structural equation 
modeling was used in Chapter IV. Furthermore, a conjoint analysis—a method that 
determined how people value different attributes of mobile phone base stations—was 
presented in Chapter V. An experiment finally investigated how knowledge influences siting 
decisions (Chapter VI). 
 To facilitate a critical discussion of these studies, an overview of the central results will 
be presented first in this concluding chapter. Subsequently, consequences for risk 
communication will be discussed. At the end of this chapter, several limitations as well as 
implications for future research will be addressed.   
 
2. Central Findings 
 
Five main findings stand out in this research. First, the studies showed that affect 
determines the perception of non-ionizing radiation and other risks. Second, this research 
demonstrated that affect toward mobile communication differs among experts, opponents, and 
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laypeople. Third, the studies found that risk perception differs due to important demographic 
variables. Fourth, the research corroborated that knowledge influences base station siting 
decisions. And last, evidence was provided that citizens prefer distant and covered base 
station sites. In the following sections, these results will be discussed in detail. 
 
2.1. Affect Determines the Perception of Non-Ionizing Radiation and Other Risks 
 
The psychometric paradigm (Fischhoff, Slovic, Lichtenstein, Read, & Combs, 1978; 
Slovic, 1987) aims at identifying the underlying factors in risk perception. These studies have 
revealed that a so-called dread risk factor, which is supposedly strongly linked to affect 
(Slovic, Finucane, Peters, & MacGregor, 2002; Visschers & Siegrist, 2008), is a major 
determinant of public perception and acceptance of risk for a wide range of hazards. It is 
important to keep in mind, however, that no systematic research has yet tested the hypothesis 
that this factor is closely linked to affect. Sjöberg (2007), for instance, has questioned this 
assumption by pointing to the fact that the dread risk factor is not made up of affective or 
emotional items but rather consists primarily of several cognitive items (such as the severity 
of consequences). Using an implicit method based on reaction times (the SC-IAT; cf. 
Karpinski & Steinman, 2006), the present work supports the idea that the dread risk 
dimension of the psychometric paradigm is strongly related to immediate affective reactions 
toward risks (Chapter II, Study 2). Because the dread risk factor usually explains a large 
amount of the variation of public risk perception, the findings suggest that risk perception is 
largely determined by affect.  
Affect can also be measured by utilizing imagery techniques such as the free association 
tasks (Finucane, Slovic, & Mertz, 2000; Siegrist, Cousin, Kastenholz, & Wiek, 2007; Slovic, 
Flynn, & Layman, 1991). In Chapter III, results of free associations to mobile phone base 
stations were presented. This technique was used to complement the results of the SC-IAT 
because free associations give more specific insights about the words or images that people 
have in mind when they evaluate risks. It could be demonstrated that thinking about mobile 
phone base stations entails various negative affective images such as “negative 
consequences,” “esthetic aspects,” or “radiation.” Furthermore, the images differed among 
people with low, medium, and high risk perception: participants with high risk perception 
mainly mentioned associations such as “senselessness” or “hazard,” while participants with 
low risk perception often expressed associations such as “science” or “camouflage.” A related 
study (Chapter IV) also showed that not only global affect but also specific emotions such as 
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anger and fear influence perceived risks, benefits, and the acceptance of a hazard. Notably, 
the research found that risk perception was more strongly influenced by fear than by anger. 
Benefit perceptions and the acceptance of base stations, on the other hand, were determined 
by anger. 
Taken together, the results of these studies suggest that mere affect serves as a fast, frugal, 
and first evaluation of mobile communication and other risks. This first evaluation tells us 
whether the stimulus is good or bad for us, or in other words, if it is personally relevant. 
According to the affect heuristic, this evaluation stems from an affect pool: “All of the images 
in people’s minds are tagged or marked to varying degrees with affect. An individual’s ‘affect 
pool’ contains all of the positive and negative markers associated (consciously or 
unconsciously) with the images. The intensity of the markers varies with the images” (Slovic, 
Peters, Finucane, & MacGregor, 2005, p. S36). In the field of neuroscience, such signals are 
considered conscious or non-conscious somatic markers to denote that they are embodied, i.e., 
that they include visceral and nonvisceral sensation (Damasio, 1994). However, daily 
experience tells us that affective reactions can be quite manifold and complex. Indeed, the 
findings of the present work suggest that the global evaluation of a hazard is also 
accompanied by more specific emotions. The results of the study presented in Chapter IV, for 
instance, suggest that fear and anger are crucial emotions in the field of mobile 
communication. These emotions were triggered by appraisals of fairness and control. Hence, 
it is important to consider not only global affect but also specific appraisals and emotions to 
gain more insights about people’s risk perception (Zeelenberg, Nelissen, Breugelmans, & 
Pieters, 2008).  
In addition, it was shown that affective reactions to mobile communication were also 
strongly related to trust. These results are in line with a study conducted by Siegrist et al. 
(2007), which demonstrated that social trust influences affect. In contrast to the study by 
Siegrist and colleagues, affect was measured using an implicit task in this work (Chapter II), 
which is tenably a more appropriate proxy for affect in risk perception. The findings suggest 
that the relationship between affect and trust is remarkably strong: Of all the implicit-explicit 
correlations examined in Chapter II, the correlation of the Base Station SC-IAT with trust was 
the highest. Both trust and affect have also been discussed as important determinants of the 
inverse relationship of risk and benefits (Siegrist & Cvetkovich, 2000; Slovic et al., 2002). 
Little is known, however, about the direction of the relationship. It is possible that affect 
influences social trust, but likewise, general affective reactions may also shape social trust 
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(for a discussion on this issue, see Visschers & Siegrist, 2008). Hence, more research is 
necessary to explore the cause-and-effect chain of affect and trust in risk perception.  
 
2.2. Affect Toward Mobile Communication Differs Among Experts, Opponents, and 
Laypeople  
 
Chapter II also demonstrated that experts, base station opponents, and laypeople differ in 
their immediate affective associations to mobile phones and mobile phone base stations, 
which were measured using the SC-IAT. Base stations evoked positive implicit associations 
in a group of experts on mobile communication, neutral associations in a laypeople group, but 
negative associations in a group of base station opponents. In the subsequent chapter, in 
which the free association technique was employed, considerable differences in the affective 
images mentioned by experts and base station opponents were found as well (Chapter III, 
Study 1). While base station opponents think more often of “negative consequences” than 
laypeople or experts, the latter more often mention “technical concepts” of mobile phone base 
stations.  
It is known from the existing literature that experts and laypeople often differ in the 
perception of risks (Fischhoff, Slovic, & Lichtenstein, 1982; Kraus, Malmfors, & Slovic, 
1992; Savadori et al., 2004; Sjöberg, 1998; Thomson, Onkal, Avcioglu, & Goodwin, 2004). 
Various reasons for expert-laypeople differences, such as role conception or knowledge 
deficits, have been suggested (Sjöberg, 2002). In an extension, the results of the two studies 
mentioned above suggest that differences in risk perception between laypeople and experts 
are due to different affective reactions to technologies. Because the groups were matched 
according to age, gender, and education, this result cannot be ascribed to demographic 
variables.   
These studies, however, cannot determine where these differences derive from. It is 
possible that differences in affect can be explained by an underlying second factor. That is, it 
is possible that affect is only the consequence of another important variable. Long experience 
(i.e., familiarity) may have habituated experts to mobile communication risks, and thus, 
experts evaluate these risks less negatively. Similarly, experts might sense that they have 
more control over these risks. Control, as shown in Chapter IV, is a crucial factor in the 
perception of mobile communication risks, and opponents may show more negative affect 
because they perceive less control over base stations than expert. Furthermore, the free 
association task revealed that experts often think of the technical concepts of base stations, 
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while opponents more often think of the negative consequences of base stations. Thus, experts 
may much more interested or even enthusiastic about technologies than others, which makes 
experts think more optimistically about the risks (and which also may have led experts to 
choose their respective profession). While the present work was able to demonstrate that there 
are differences in affect among experts, opponents, and laypeople, future studies might want 
to address the question where these differences stem from. 
 
2.3. Risk Perception Differs Due to Important Demographic Variables 
 
In the above-mentioned studies that contrasted experts, base station opponents, and 
laypeople, demographic variables were controlled by a matching procedure. In other studies 
presented in this work, demographic variables were not specifically controlled, but 
nonetheless surveyed in order to determine their influence on risk perception. The results of 
the second study regarding free associations to base stations (Chapter III) and findings of the 
conjoint analysis (Chapter V) indicated that age and gender are important demographic 
variables that influence the perception of mobile communication. The free association task 
showed that younger respondents attribute fewer risks to mobile phone base stations than 
older respondents. Presumably, younger participants are also more familiar with mobile 
communication, and according to Sandman’s public outrage theory, familiarity is an 
important factor that diminishes people’s worries about risk (Sandman, 1987, 1993).  
Gender effects were primarily revealed in the conjoint analysis. Participants within the 
cluster that preferred a base station location in the middle of the village (i.e., a more 
advantageous site in regard to precautionary health protection) were predominantly male. 
These participants also perceived fewer risks and more benefits from mobile communication, 
too. Interestingly, the cluster was also characterized by more knowledge concerning the 
interaction patterns of mobile phones and base stations. Therefore, it stands to reason that 
males generally possess more knowledge in regard to mobile communication, although the 
relationship between gender and knowledge was not directly tested in this work. However, 
Cousin and Siegrist (2010a) provided evidence that older participants, as well as females, 
have less knowledge in the domain of mobile communication. Thus, for risk communication 
purposes, these results imply that knowledge should be provided particularly to women and 
older people.  
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2.4. Knowledge Influences Base Station Siting Decisions 
 
Effects of knowledge about mobile communication have been previously investigated by 
Cousin and Siegrist (2009, 2010a). The authors have shown that information on mobile 
communication influences health concerns, and can lead to behavioral changes (Cousin & 
Siegrist, 2009). In a related study, the authors also demonstrated that participants with a 
higher level of knowledge (as measured by a scale that covered different technical domains) 
often chose base station locations that minimized radiation for the phoning population 
(Cousin & Siegrist, 2010a). However, these data are based on correlational data. In contrast to 
the study conducted by Cousin and Siegrist (2010a), knowledge was experimentally 
manipulated in the present work in order to support a causal relation between knowledge and 
siting decisions (Chapter VI). Some participants were provided with information on mobile 
communication, while other participants either received emotionally laden information or no 
information. Compared with the other conditions, knowledge provision was shown to have an 
influence on a realistic base station decision: participants who were provided with knowledge 
preferred locations in the center of the village, which would be the best location from a public 
health perspective (Cousin & Siegrist, 2010a; WHO, 2000). Compared to the control group, 
participants who were provided with knowledge also indicated more positive explicit affect 
and fewer concerns in regard to mobile phone base stations.  
These results stand in contrast to other studies that only found weak and inconsistent 
effects of knowledge enhancement on risk perception (Kennedy, Probart, & Dorman, 1991; 
MacGregor, Slovic, & Morgan, 1994; Morgan et al., 1985; Sjöberg & Drottz-Sjöberg, 1991). 
It is possible that knowledge plays an important role for some hazards, but not for others. For 
example, it is possible that hazards that load very highly on the dread risk dimension of the 
psychometric paradigm might be less responsive to knowledge provision than other risks. As 
shown in Chapter II, the dread risk dimension is closely related to affect, which is located in 
the experiential system. Knowledge, in contrast, is part of the analytic system (Slovic, 
Finucane, Peters, & MacGregor, 2004). Mobile communication is perceived as moderately 
dreadful (Bronfman & Cifuentes, 2003; Siegrist, Keller, & Kiers, 2005), and it has been 
proved that people have knowledge gaps in regard to this technology (Cousin & Siegrist, 
2009, 2010a, 2010b). The latter finding, which was derived by applying the mental models 
approach, indicated that technical knowledge is important for the perception of mobile 
communication risks. Due to these results, knowledge gaps could be specifically addressed in 
the booklet used in Chapter VI. The lack of a relationship between knowledge and decision 
making in other studies might also be ascribed to methodological factors. Other studies often 
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captured knowledge using single questions or self-assessments, which are less accurate than 
objective scales consisting of multiple items. The studies conducted by Cousin and Siegrist 
(2009, 2010a) and the studies presented in Chapters V and VI highlight that the assessment of 
objective knowledge is crucial to examining knowledge influences on the perception of 
mobile communication. 
 
2.5. Citizens Prefer Distant and Covered Base Station Sites  
 
The conjoint analysis (Chapter V) was based on a large-scale sample and gave insights 
into public preferences in regard to mobile phone base stations. In most countries—and also 
in Switzerland—citizens are not allowed to participate in the decision-making process 
regarding a base station. If people could decide about the base station’s site in Switzerland, 
the conjoint analysis indicated that the majority of citizens would prefer a covered base 
station that is mounted on a factory. From the public’s point of view, it would also be 
important that residents can participate in the decision process, and that the base station is 
located far away from the center of the village. 
In combination with the results of Chapter III (where participants freely associated about 
mobile phone base stations), the results of the conjoint analysis also emphasized that esthetic 
aspects play an important role in the acceptance of mobile phones. The conjoint analysis has 
shown that participants reject freely visible base stations. Likewise, the free association 
method revealed that esthetic aspects are important for many people: Across two studies (one 
exploring differences among experts, opponents, and laypeople and another collecting 
associations from a large sample from the general public), esthetic aspects were mentioned 
frequently. Based on these results, public authorities or mobile phone providers may want to 
consider altering the appearance of base stations. It should be noted, however, that changing 
the appearance of a base station should be considered with caution. Although citizens would 
appreciate covering the base station (e.g., with a sheeting), some people clearly disapprove of 
a camouflaged base station (e.g., as a tree or a crucifix).  
 
3. Consequences for Risk Communication 
 
In addition to suggestions concerning the appearance of a base station, the results of the 
present work involve various other implications for risk communication. To facilitate 
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informed decision making, means of optimizing risk communication will be discussed more 
deeply in the following. 
Chapter IV has indicated that a lack of control is crucial for the development of fear and 
anger in the context of mobile communication. These emotional responses are in turn 
important for risk and benefit perceptions and the acceptance of base stations. Thus, one way 
to reduce negative affective reactions toward mobile phone base stations would be to 
implement control, which is strongly related to fairness (Smith & Ellsworth, 1985). 
Facilitating a reciprocal communication process, in which citizens have the possibility of 
expressing their needs (Renn & Levine, 1991), and involving citizens in the base station siting 
process are options for reaching this aim. In most countries, however, citizens have only a 
small voice in siting decisions. It is noteworthy, however, that countries or provinces that give 
citizens the opportunity to co-determine base station sites have gained a positive experience 
with this approach (Kastenholz & Benighaus, 2003).  
At the same time, it is important that citizens are adequately informed when making 
choices about the location of base stations (Stewart, 2000). As indicated by Chapters V and 
VI, people arrive at different conclusions when they are adequately informed about the 
interaction of mobile phones and their base stations. Therefore, an information booklet on 
mobile communication provided in order to enable informed decision making should include 
an explanation about how radiation decreases with distance from the base station (Stewart, 
2000). Likewise, such a booklet should contain precautionary recommendations referring to 
the users’ mobile phones. These recommendations would enable users to avoid unneeded 
exposure, which could also lead to a heightened sense of control. A communication example 
that takes these issues into account was given in Chapter VI, which used a booklet developed 
by Cousin and Siegrist (2009). Interestingly, this booklet was able to change explicitly stated 
affect, which might be due to a heightened sense of control.  
Another way to implement control could be the provision of exposimeters to citizens who 
want to be informed about their personal daily exposure. Exposimeters display personal 
radiofrequency electromagnetic field exposure. Europeans most frequently mention mobile 
phones and mobile phone base stations as a source of EMF (European Commission, 2007). 
Only a few people know, however, that home appliances, computers, induction heaters, and 
cordless home telephones are sources of EMFs, too. Exposimeters are a way to visualize these 
EMFs. Thus, citizens would have the opportunity to compare the radiation of mobile 
communication to other sources of EMF. If individuals wish to minimize their daily exposure, 
the exposimeters’ results would indirectly provide instructions on how to act. For instance, if 
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exposure from the cordless home telephone is relatively high (which is often the case), the 
person might think about replacing it with a phone connected by wire. Another possibility for 
implementing perceived control could be the integration of a scale on mobile phones that 
displays exposure in relation to international exposure limits. This implementation, of course, 
would be possible only with the collaboration of the industry.  
From the perspective of dual process models, it seems to be important that risk 
communication material addresses not only the analytic system but also the experiential 
system (cf. Slovic et al., 2004). The present work strongly suggests that affect, which is part 
of the experiential system, is an important factor in the perception of mobile communication. 
The exposimeters as well as a visual scale displayed on mobile phones have the advantage 
that they may address the experiential system more strongly than the analytic system. More 
generally, images, metaphors, and narratives are assumed to have a stronger impact on the 
experiential system than logic or reasoning (Slovic et al., 2004). Therefore, it is also 
reasonable to assume that audiovisual material (less than text material) is effective for risk 
communication purposes. In fact, there is evidence that a video’s audiovisual material 
primarily affects people’s immediate gut feeling about a risk or, in other words, the 
experiential system (Visschers, Meertens, Passchier, & de Vries, 2008). In contrast, a video’s 
text designed to inform about a risk particularly affects cognitive processes.  
The present work also highlighted the importance of trust for risk communication. The 
conjoint analysis has indicated that people who preferred central base station locations were 
also characterized by higher trust in mobile communication authorities. Similarly, Chapter II 
(in which the IAT was employed) emphasized the close relationship between affective 
reactions and trust. It is also known from other studies that trust is an important factor in risk 
perception (Siegrist & Cvetkovich, 2000), especially when people lack the knowledge about a 
hazard—which is typically the case for mobile communication (Cousin & Siegrist, 2010a). 
Thus, for risk communication purposes, it is important to ensure contexts in which trust can 
grow and establish. The TCC Model suggests that social trust is directly influenced by value 
similarity (Earle, Siegrist, & Gutscher, 2007). Furthermore, it is known from the literature that 
trust is difficult to acquire but easy to lose (Slovic, 1993, 1999). Thus, if public authorities or 
companies convey that they do not care about the public and open dialogues, or demonstrate 
that they have different values than the public, trust might be destroyed beyond repair. Risk 
managers are well advised to communicate the values that are compatible between themselves 
and the public, in particular in crisis situations (Siegrist, Gutscher, & Keller, 2007). In the 
field of mobile communication, it has also been suggested that information about the location 
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and operating characteristics of all base stations in a country might foster trust, and should be 
revealed to the public (Stewart, 2000).  
 
4. Limitations and Future Studies  
 
The present work concentrated on the perception of mobile communication risks and 
found that affect largely determines the perception of this technology. Thus, the present 
findings set the stage for examining how risk communication might change affect, or in 
particular, implicit evaluative associations. Chapter VI provided evidence that knowledge 
provision is able to change explicitly stated affect to base stations. However, it would be even 
more interesting and compelling when such impacts could also be detected by the SC-IAT. 
Future work could explore, for instance, what kind of information is useful for changing 
implicit associations to mobile communication or whether a one-time or repeated information 
provision is necessary to change implicit associations.  
Future studies in risk perception might also want to address how specific emotions to 
different hazards can be influenced. For mobile communication, the structural equation model 
presented in Chapter IV demonstrated that control and fairness influence anger and fear. In 
this study, people were asked about their perceived control and fairness regarding mobile 
phone base stations, which differed among participants. However, this study cannot determine 
whether perceived and induced control (i.e., experimentally manipulated) influence fear and 
anger in the same way. A systematic experiment could close this gap. If induced control leads 
to the same effect as perceived control, control would be a crucial and modifiable parameter 
that has the ability to change emotional reactions to risks.  
Other studies might want to concentrate on influencing global affect per se. Little is 
known about the origination and development of affect (Spence & Townsend, 2008). As 
emphasized in the introductory section, affect refers to the valence of a stimulus. It has been 
proposed that evaluative conditioning is a way to change the valence of a neutral stimulus by 
pairing it with another, liked or disliked, stimulus (De Houwer, 2007; De Houwer, Thomas, & 
Baeyens, 2001). The effect of evaluative conditioning is often used in ads, when a neutral 
object (e.g., a car) is repeatedly presented together with images of smiling people. However, a 
word of caution seems appropriate here. First, the theoretical understanding of evaluative 
conditioning is quite limited (De Houwer, 2007). There are many conflicting results about the 
conditions under which this phenomenon occurs. Second, from an ethical point of view, it is 
questionable whether affective reactions to hazards should be changed at all. In contrast to 
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knowledge, there is no clear and straightforward criterion what kind of affective reactions to 
hazards are correct or false. Instead of trying to alter affective reactions per se, it seems more 
appropriate to examine (and potentially change) the eliciting conditions that trigger affective 
reactions toward risks, such as the lack of control in the case of mobile communication.  
In this sense, it would also be interesting to see if the public’s global affect or free 
associations to mobile phone base stations change over time, and which influences lead to 
such a change. For example, it could be investigated if media coverage on mobile 
communication contributes to a change in affect and perception of mobile communication. 
According to the social amplification of risk framework (Kasperson et al., 1988; Renn, Burns, 
Kasperson, Kasperson, & Slovic, 1992), news media act as important amplification stations 
for public perceptions and responses to risks. Thus, it could be interesting to analyze how 
media reports present information about mobile communication. Similarly, one could 
investigate how the public interprets press articles, TV, and radio program broadcasts on this 
topic. For example, laypeople might overestimate the frequency of studies that demonstrate 
adverse health effects because such studies are discussed more often in the media than studies 
that show no effects—regardless of the study quality (Burgess, 2004; Elvers, Jandrig, 
Grummich, & Tannert, 2009). Furthermore, seeking balance in stories is an important 
principle of professional journalism. However, giving all sides their respective points of view 
might lead to the misimpression that adverse health effects of mobile communication are 
highly probable.  
Moreover, future studies might want to extend the scope of the present work. The focus of 
the studies was mobile communication. Nonetheless, it would be interesting to explore how 
the public perceives other sources of non-ionizing radiation. Previous studies have applied the 
psychometric paradigm to address this research question (Bronfman & Cifuentes, 2003; 
Siegrist et al., 2005). Multidimensional scaling (Kruskal & Wish, 1978) might be another 
option for investigating how different sources of non-ionizing radiation are evaluated and how 
they relate to each other. Multidimensional scaling enables a researcher to reveal the basic 
perceptual dimensions of data based on proximities. Therefore, using this method, it is 
possible to explore which sources of non-ionizing radiation are perceived as similar. 
Multidimensional scaling could be an interesting method for newly developed technologies, 
such as private or public wireless local area networks (WLAN). For example, whether WLAN 
is perceived as similar to computers or similar to mobile phones could be explored. Likewise, 
the location of public WLAN in the multidimensional scaling configuration might be different 
for participants who already use this technology. 
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Finally, it is worth mentioning that the field of social psychology has recently been 
criticized for neglecting actual behavior in its studies (Baumeister, Vohs, & Funder, 2007). In 
the present studies, care was taken to design choice tasks as realistically as possible (e.g., the 
base station siting task), but no actual behavior was investigated. Thus, it cannot be excluded 
that citizens would decide differently about the site of a base station if they had to irrevocably 
choose the site of a base station in their neighborhood. Certainly, citizens’ actual siting 
behavior can hardly be observed, because laypeople (at least in Switzerland) do not 
participate in siting decisions. Nonetheless, future studies might want observe if affective 
reactions toward mobile communication influence, for instance, other actual behavior such as 
phoning duration and frequency.  
 
5. Conclusion: Affective Rationality or Affective Delusion? 
 
There is a popular belief that wise decisions come only from cool heads, and that good 
judgments should not be based on emotions (Damasio, 1994). In fact, there are instances 
when emotions can be misguiding and deluding. The downside of affect is revealed, for 
instance, when pleasant music in a supermarket encourages customers to buy more products, 
or when attractive pictures seduce people to smoke cigarettes. In particular, research has 
shown that emotions are actually harmful to decision making when they are incidental, i.e., 
unrelated to the decision task at hand (Damasio, 1994; Zeelenberg et al., 2008).  
However, when emotions are integral to the decision being made, they serve as important 
cues in order to come to fast and advantageous decisions. Many studies have demonstrated 
that knowledge and reasoning alone do not suffice for sound and rational decision making 
(Damasio, 1994). Human beings require emotional signals, or somatic markers, because such 
a signal “forces attention on the negative outcome to which a given action may lead, and 
functions as a alarm signal which says: Beware of danger ahead” (Damasio, 1994, p. 173). 
Perceiving and integrating these affective feelings mean that we become rational actors in 
numerous important situations (Slovic et al., 2002), and, ultimately, ensure survival 
(Damasio, 1994). Humans feel, therefore they are. 
The present work has highlighted and supported the idea that affective reactions are also 
crucial for the perception of risks. These reactions occur rapidly and, apparently, mostly 
automatically. And, instead of deluding rational risk judgments, they can serve decision 
making in their own right. Thus, affective and emotional reactions to risks should not be 
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disregarded or ignored. Instead, the investigation of affect is necessary to thoroughly 
understand people’s perception of risk. 
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Summary 
 
Non-ionizing radiation is ubiquitous in the human environment. Some sources of this 
radiation are natural, while others, like mobile communication, are human-made. In the case 
of mobile communication, little is known about whether long-term exposure to the radiation 
of mobile phones and mobile phone base stations leads to adverse health disorders. 
Accordingly, many citizens are concerned about the rapid growth of this technology. The 
present work investigates which factors determine perceived risks and benefits of mobile 
communication, and also the acceptance of this technology. Specifically, the work examines 
the role of affect in risk perception, since previous research has indicted that affect can serve 
as an important shortcut within decision making.  
Various methods were used to investigate the influence of affect on the perception of 
mobile communication. Chapter I develops the central research questions of this work and 
gives an overview of the methodology. Chapter II presents results of a Single Category 
Implicit Association Test, which indicated that affective evaluations of different risks are 
carried out very rapidly. In addition, it was found that base stations evoked positive implicit 
associations in a group of experts on mobile communication, neutral associations in a lay 
group, but negative associations in a group of base station opponents. In Chapter III, affect 
was measured using a free association technique which indicated what kind of images come 
to people’s minds when they think of mobile phone base stations. Respondents from a large-
scale Swiss sample mentioned predominantly negative images. It is noteworthy that 
respondents who attached high risks to base stations had different images than respondents 
who ascribed only low risk to base stations. In the subsequent chapter (Chapter IV) specific 
emotions were examined. It was found that anger strongly determined the benefit perception 
and the acceptance of mobile phone base stations; fear, in contrast, strongly influenced risk 
perception of base stations. Chapter V concentrates on public preferences for different base 
station sites. By applying a conjoint analysis, it was revealed that in comparison to other 
attributes, the location of the base station is of capital importance for citizens. Preferences for 
base station sites were also related to health beliefs, trust, and demographic variables. Finally, 
an experimental study (Chapter VI) demonstrates that participants who were provided with 
technical knowledge expressed more favorable base station siting preferences, i.e. those that 
would cause less exposure for the phoning population. The last section (Chapter VII) of this 
work synthesizes the results of all studies, and also addresses some limitations. In addition,  
central implications for research and practice will be derived.  
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